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Thesis Summary
Thesis Summary
This Thesis examines the use of social values in human behaviour and social 
judgment and investigates the processes that underlie how values are used. Across 10 
experiments, I examine aspects of social values that have been largely unaddressed by 
prior research. Chapter 1 highlights the importance of social values, reviews the 
previous research on the topic, and outlines three main issues that are the focus of the 
subsequent experimental chapters. Chapter 2 investigates whether people base their 
decisions on values or on value-irrelevant consequences; the results reveal that 
situational factors influence whether or not social values are used to guide decision­
making (Experiments 1 - 3). Chapter 3 focuses on this use of values as guiding 
principles and specifically on how abstract trans-situational values bridge the gap to 
impact behaviour in specific contexts. The results show that this occurs through the 
instantiation of the value in the specific situation and not via the abstract value itself 
(Experiments 4 - 7). Chapter 4 examines the use of values in persuasion and 
specifically the impact o f the relatedness of the values paired in co-value arguments; 
the findings show that the motivational structure of values places plausibility 
constraints on which values can be paired in this way (Experiments 8 - 10). Finally, 
Chapter 5 reviews the contribution of the research presented in the Thesis to the field 
of human behaviour and decision-making and outlines potential directions for future 
research. Overall, the research emphasises the importance of social values and 
presents a new conceptualization of how values are used and applied in everyday life.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Chapter Overview
The primary purpose of this Thesis is to provide a deeper insight into when 
social values are used to guide judgment and behaviour and the processes that 
underlie their use. Before addressing this issue in later chapters, this Chapter 
introduces the concept of social values and briefly reviews relevant research. I aim to 
show that values are important constructs and to illustrate how a better understanding 
of social values would usefully contribute to the study of human behaviour and 
decision-making. To achieve my aims, I will discuss the interdisciplinary interest in 
social values and explain their nature. I will then review the evidence that emphasises 
the importance of social values in everyday life and across diverse situations, and 
subsequently highlight some critical elements that are not addressed in the extant 
literature. Finally, I will outline how these elements will be addressed by the research 
presented in the subsequent chapters.
This Thesis incorporates three streams of research, which I will outline below. 
Each stream provides further knowledge regarding how social values are used and the 
processes that underlie their use. The research streams are not sequential progressions 
from one to another; instead, they deal with separate, but interrelated, aspects of the 
use of social values. As a result, much o f the detailed review, discussion, and 
reasoning about the background literature and experimental methodologies will be 
broached in the relevant chapter introductions, rather than in this Chapter. 
Consequently, the current review is more general in nature and my aim is to provide
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adequate background information before turning to the specific questions addressed 
in each of the three subsequent chapters.
1.2 Social Values and their Importance
“Values are not just words, values are what we live by. They’re about the 
causes that we champion and the people we fight for.”
(Senator John Kerry, b. 1943)
Interest in social values is prevalent in a hugely diverse range of disciplines 
from anthropology to medicine and from law to sociology. Each of these disciplines 
differs in its definition of social values and, over the years, there has been extensive 
variability in the use of the term ‘values’ (see Ahmed & Yannou, 2003).
Nevertheless, most social values, including freedom, equality, success, national 
security, and helpfulness, are well known and have been widely used for centuries. 
Mirroring the breadth of interest in these constructs, discussion of social values has 
become more prevalent in everyday life as is evident from the quotation above.
Values figure in debates on diverse topics, including abortion, the death penalty, 
education, energy consumption, euthanasia, food production, immigration, health 
care, social welfare, transport, and war. Values are so central to these issues that 
many commentators have claimed that it was the influence of moral social values that 
won the 2004 Presidential Election in the United States (see Ashbee, 2005; Lovett & 
Jordan, 2005). Similarly, in the 2005 UK General Election, Tony Blair regularly 
appealed to the electorate about values. For example, in his acceptance speech 
following the return of the Labour Government to Office for its third term, Prime
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Minister Blair (2005) claimed that . values of fairness and decency and 
opportunity for all ... those values are the values I believe in, the values our 
Government will believe in.” Consistent with this, Gordon and Miller (2004) 
emphasised the important role that values have come to play in political dialogue and 
propaganda. Moreover, people tend to communicate about their values and their use 
o f values on a regular basis; they are often referred to in everyday discussions and in 
the media. For example, Ball-Rokeach, Power, Guthrie, and Waring (1990) 
documented the media’s attempts to align certain values with different attitudes for or 
against abortion.
Within the domain of sociology, Aberle (1950) suggested that social theory 
strongly emphasized the “crucial importance of a shared system of ultimate values as 
an element in any society” (p. 495). Consistent with later psychological thinking on 
values (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992), Aberle claimed that a large part of the 
population shared similar values and that these mutual value priorities promote social 
interaction at an individual and even governmental level, as well as enabling 
commercial and other business dealings. Aberle concluded that a core of common 
values is essential for any viable social system.
At an individual level, Glazer and Beehr (2002) found that values impacted on 
career choices over and above the individual’s country of residence. There is also 
evidence that social values play an important role within the group context; Roccas 
(2003) found that values moderated people’s identification within groups, a crucial 
element in group functioning. Research within business and corporate management 
suggests that the values o f individuals and  groups can significantly impact strategy 
choices and implementation (Beck, 1981; Tichy & Charan, 1995) as well as the 
general decision-making and future direction of an organisation (Antal, Dierkes, &
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Hahner, 1994; Beach & Mitchell, 1990). Within the legal domain, Basser and Jones 
(2002) addressed the extent to which it is the duty of the legislature to foster and 
encourage social values through progressive legislation (see also Feather, 1994, for 
discussion of the role of values injustice).
In moral philosophy, the importance of such principles and moral duties has 
been recognised for centuries. For example, Kant (1785/1948) proposed that 
principles (e.g., social values) play a central role in people’s moral decision-making. 
More recently, theorists such as Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) have emphasised the 
importance of principles and their influence in moral judgments. In fact, decision­
making with principles (post-conventional reasoning) is seen as the highest level of 
moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976).
With respect to the philosophy of science, many theorists have examined the 
non-scientific influences o f values on science and empirical research. For example, in 
his review of the current state of scientific research, Lacey (2005) concluded that 
social values do impact the research agenda of science. Although Lacey viewed this 
as an undesirable state of affairs, Caton (2004) took the opposite perspective in his 
discussion of the influence of social values within the field of medicine. In fact,
Caton argued that social values should play a stronger role in medical science in the 
future, as they have in times past.
Within psychology, Allport’s (1955) 50 year old criticism that psychologists 
did not considering these central elements of the human psyche is equally relevant 
today since far less attention is paid to this important topic than should be. For 
example, a large number of articles are published each year on the topic of 
stereotypes and prejudice, whereas a mere handful of articles directly examine the 
social values that are presumed to support or oppose prejudice.
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Moreover, there has been considerable debate in social psychology over the 
term used to label this construct (see Rohan, 2000, for a discussion of this debate), 
although recent consensus seems to have converged on ‘social values’ (Maio, Olson, 
Bernard, & Luke, 2003). In his seminal work on social values, Rokeach (1973) 
proposed that values are prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs wherein some means or 
end is evaluated as desirable or undesirable. He suggested that values are made up of 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural components. As such, individuals know the end 
state or means that is desirable, they feel emotion about it, and it leads to action when 
activated. Consistent with this view, Feather (1990) proposed that values are 
relatively stable criteria or frameworks against which current experience can be 
tested. These views are well summarised by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987; Schwartz,
1996). In their work on the structure of the value system, they suggest that “values are 
(a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviour, (c) that transcend 
specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and (e) 
are ordered by relative importance” (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p. 551). They see 
values as “cognitive representations of three types of universal human requirements: 
biologically based needs of the organism, social interactional requirements for 
interpersonal coordination, and social institutional demands for group welfare and 
survival” (p. 551).
Most value theorists agree that people possess similar values, although the 
importance that people allot to their values differs because of a person’s experiences, 
biological endowments, and the impact of culture (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 
1996; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). These differences in importance are presumed to 
predict the role of values in human behaviour and decision-making. Highly important 
values influence the behaviour of individuals and groups because they provide criteria
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with which people choose their goal and their means of achieving that goal (Pant & 
Lachman, 1998). They are considered to envelop standards that both guide and justify 
behaviour as well as incorporate the hopes and future goals of individuals and society 
(Braithwaite & Scott, 1991; Kluckhohn, 1951). Therefore, social values guide 
conduct in a variety of ways: they guide an individual’s behaviour in a manner 
congruent to the value, but also provide the individual with a standard against which 
to compare their own and others’ behaviour.
However, values also allow an individual to justify or rationalize their 
behaviour to others, ensuring their actions are perceived as socially acceptable. Thus, 
in contrast to their role as principles that guide behaviour, social values can also serve 
as justifications for actions that enable individuals to appear in a positive light and 
allow them to account for their actions (Eiser, 1987; Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988; see 
also Rokeach, 1973).
Values’ potential for use as guides or as post-hoc justifications comes from 
their abstract nature. This property allows people to use social values in a wide 
variety of contexts and in relation to diverse topics. It is this level of abstraction and 
breadth that has resulted in social values being described as “desirable transsituational 
goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” 
(Schwartz, 1992, p. 2). As such, values are able to fulfil their role as important, 
prescriptive principles that guide decision-making and are not limited to a certain 
context or specific situation. At the same time, this breadth enables values to be 
reconstrued to justify decisions that are motivated by other factors (e.g., the 
consequences of alternative A and the advantages of alternative B).
Furthermore, whether values act as justifications or as guides to behaviour (an 
important distinction examined in Chapter 2), values fulfil an important role in
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maintaining and enhancing “the master-sentiment of self-regard” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 
15). Steele (1988; Steele & Liu, 1983) proposed that this occurs, at least in part, 
through a process of self-affirmation. Affirming a value (using it as a guiding 
principle or as a justification) increases an individual’s feelings of self-integrity and 
this enables the individual to preserve a positive self-concept even when he or she 
engages in a behaviour that might threaten that self-concept. Consistent with this, 
Kristiansen (1990) proposed that individuals may use values to justify their 
prejudicial attitudes towards an outgroup, whilst maintaining a positive self-regard by 
exaggerating perceptions of intergroup value differences.
Despite these important roles, values have not received as much empirical 
attention as they deserve. Nevertheless, over the past half century there has been 
some interest in social values, with a number of influential social psychologists 
recognising the crucial role they play. For example, Allport (1961, p.543) described 
values as “the dominating force in life” and Rokeach (1973) suggested that values 
should be given a central role across all the social sciences because they could unify 
the diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human behaviour. In the 
conclusion to his book, Rokeach (1973) stated that social values seem “relevant to all 
o f the behavioural sciences and to philosophy and religion as well” (p. 326). He 
proposed that all science of human behaviour was relevant to values because the use 
of values in decision-making was one of the distinguishing marks between humans 
and other species.
Since the work of Allport and Rokeach, other psychologists have also argued 
for the importance of social values. In particular, Schwartz and colleagues conducted 
extensive cross-cultural research on social value structure. Although people differ in 
the importance they place on values, this research has found consistent results when
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comparing the structure of values in over 60 nations around the world (Schwartz, 
1996; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris, & 
Owens, 2001). In this research, respondents rated the importance of 56 abstract ideals 
(e.g., honesty, success, national security, daring) as guiding principles in their lives.
In most of the nations examined, there was a consistent pattern of correlations 
between value ratings. This consistency of interrelationships suggests that values are 
universally understood in similar terms, at least to some extent.
It is therefore unsurprising that there is evidence for a central role of values in 
people’s cognitive networks (Gold & Robbins, 1979; Gold & Russ, 1977; Thomsen, 
Lavine & Kounios, 1996). Some of this evidence exists in research that has examined 
interconnections between values and attitudes in memory. For example, Thomsen et 
al. (1996) found that participants were faster at responding to pairs of attitudes and 
values that were high or low in relatedness. This result suggests that value and 
attitude concepts are associated within people’s semantic networks. Moreover, these 
researchers found that participants were faster at making decisions on relatedness for 
more important values, suggesting a more central role for the important values. This 
finding is consistent with Thomsen et al.’s other observation that values had more 
cognitive associates (or links) than attitudes and are thus more central within 
cognitive networks.
Some researchers have argued that the central role of values is also revealed 
by the relations between values and diverse behaviours (e.g., Feather, 1995; Homer & 
Kahle, 1988; Maio, Roese, Seligman, & Katz, 1996; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; 
Schwartz & Bardi, 2000, 2001), ranging from automobile purchase (Henry, 1976) to 
Church attendance (Rokeach, 1960), and from political choices (Baum, 1968) to 
cigarette smoking (Grube, Weir, Getzlaf, & Rokeach, 1984). Social values, and
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specifically value-congruence, also impact well-being, including greater job 
satisfaction, greater family satisfaction, and greater emotional well-being (Burke, 
2001; Joiner, 2001; Megliano, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). In 
fact, Compton (2001) claimed that any definition of personal well-being is intricately 
tied to values. Furthermore, social values have even been found to influence choice of 
alcoholic beverage; Hawkins, Best, and Coney (1995) found that consumers preferred 
the taste of one beer (in all ways identical to the other alternative) because of the 
values with which it had been associated in a marketing campaign. Such evidence 
suggests values serve as criteria or reference points for the selection or evaluation of 
diverse behaviours. The ability to predict diverse behaviours makes it likely that 
values are in fact stored in central positions that enable people to easily link them to 
the behaviours. This may be the case even if  values are mere post-hoc justifications, 
rather than anchors for determining behaviour.
In summary, evidence from diverse sources and disciplines indicates that 
social values are unique and important constructs that need to be further examined in 
order to better understand human behaviour and social judgment. Rokeach (1973) 
argued that “values are determinants of virtually all kinds of behaviour that could be 
called social behaviour” (p. 24) and proposed that values underlie many, if not all, 
social attitudes. Consequently, a better understanding of social values could provide 
an important insight into, seemingly, all social behaviour. Nevertheless, this crucial 
importance of social values seems to have been missed by much of social 
psychology, and thus many relevant questions remain unanswered. In particular, we 
know little about the psychological processes underlying the use of social values on 
an everyday basis. As will become evident, the role of values as abstract guiding 
principles leaves open several substantive issues to explore.
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1.3 The Structure of Social Values
There are two broad perspectives that have been used to examine social 
values. First, there is a long history of research that has measured value orientation 
using hypothetical games or vignette-like measures (see McClintock, 1972; Messick 
& McClintock, 1968). In this approach, an individual’s social value orientation is 
assumed to be a stable dispositional variable: a preference for certain outcome 
allocations to oneself and another individual that has even been described as a 
personality trait (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). There are three 
kinds of orientations; pro-social, individualistic, and competitive orientations. These 
dispositional variables are often studied within research into co-operative behaviour 
using interdependence dilemmas such as the prisoner’s dilemma game (e.g., 
Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003). A pro-social 
orientation involves maximising joint outcomes and maximizing equality in 
outcomes. In contrast, the other two orientations have been labelled pro-self 
orientations (e.g., Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991): the individualistic orientation 
involves maximizing own outcomes irrespective of the opponent’s outcomes, and the 
competitive orientation involves maximizing own outcomes relative to the opponent’s 
outcomes. Overall, individuals with a pro-social orientation tend to be more co­
operative than individuals with a pro-self orientation (e.g., Van Vugt, Meertens, & 
Van Lange, 1995).
These orientations do not solely impact behaviour however; they also 
influence how individuals perceive the behaviour of other people. An individual with 
a pro-social orientation tends to make moral judgments, whereas an individual with a 
pro-self orientation tends to make judgments in terms of strength and competence
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(Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). However, both of these uses of social value 
orientations are based on the stability of this dispositional variable. The emphasis is 
on general behavioural tendencies and not on subjective evaluations of importance of 
various ideals or on the explicit contemplation of these ideals (or values) in everyday 
decisions.
The other broad perspective focuses on explicit, subjective evaluations of 
value importance. Most research using this emphasis has stemmed, at least in part, 
from Rokeach’s (1973) seminal work. Rokeach proposed a distinction between values 
that encompass modes o f conduct (instrumental values) and values that are end-states 
of existence (terminal values). Rokeach suggested that instrumental values related to 
morality and competence, whilst terminal values related to personal or social goals. 
Although these two systems were proposed to be separate, they were also thought to 
be functionally interconnected, with instrumental values being used to attain terminal 
values. Rokeach’s (1973) construal of an interconnected belief system involved 
countless beliefs that were organized into thousands of attitudes, 70 - 80 instrumental 
values, and around 18 terminal values, with the terminal values being more central 
than the instrumental values, which are more central than the attitudes.
However, Rokeach did not propose a theory about the underlying structure of 
the value system itself. Moreover, in extensive research on the structure of social 
values, Schwartz (1992) found no evidence for the distinction between terminal and 
instrumental values. Instead, using the structure initially proposed by Schwartz and 
Bilsky (1987), Schwartz (1992) further elaborated on a circumplex pattern of 
relations between self-ratings of the importance of values. These ratings incorporated 
10 distinct motivational value types: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism.
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Values organized into these value types represent, in the form of conscious goals, the 
three universal requirements of human existence: biological needs, needs for social 
interaction, and survival and welfare goals (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).
The relationships between the values and the motivational types can be 
summarized in terms of a two-dimensional structure composed of two orthogonal, 
bipolar, dimensions. One dimension, self-transcendence versus self-enhancement, 
contrasts values that transcend self-interest (e.g., forgiving, helpfulness) with values 
that involve social superiority and esteem (e.g., social power, influence). The second 
dimension, openness to change versus conservation, contrasts values that follow 
intellectual and emotional interests in uncertain directions (e.g., daring, a varied life) 
with values that emphasize conservation of order and harmony (e.g., respect for 
tradition, obedience). These value types can be arranged in a circumplex design (see 
Figure 1.1) with similar value types adjacent in the circular structure and less 
compatible value types further apart. Given the a priori theory about the motivational 
underpinning of the value types, Schwartz (1992) proposed that specific values that 
are further apart around the circle have lower compatibility and greater conflict. 
Values in opposing positions (e.g., a varied life and respect for tradition) are 
postulated to be in the greatest conflict because fulfilment of both values at the same 
time would give rise to conflicting psychological, practical, or social consequences.
In contrast, adjacent values in the circumplex structure (e.g., helpfulness and 
forgiveness) are postulated to be compatible.
Research in over 60 countries has found support for this value structure when 
assessing the patterns of correlations between ratings of the importance of specific 
values as guiding principles (Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz et al., 2001). As a result, this 
value structure has been used in much of the subsequent research on values conducted
Frost 2006 12
Chapter 1 Introduction
UNIVERSALISM
CONFORMITYOpenness 
to Change
TRADITION
SELF-DIRECTION
ST IM ULA TI ON SECURITY
HEDONISM
P O W E RACHIEVEMENT
Conser­
vation
Self-Enhancement
Figure 1.1. The Schwartz (1992) circumplex value structure.
over the last 25 years (see Maio et al., 2003; Rohan, 2000, for reviews). Recently, 
there has been particular interest in examining the motivational underpinnings of the 
value system structure. For example, Pakizeh, Gebauer, and Maio (in press) 
investigated the latent structure o f social values in memory and found that, consistent 
with Schwartz’s (1992) model, the speed o f value ratings and value preference 
judgments in pairs o f values could be predicted from the motivational compatibilities 
and conflicts in the circumplex structure. Moreover, these compatibilities and 
conflicts predicted speed of value-importance judgments over and above the effect of 
the perceived semantic relations between the values. This result is consistent with 
Schwartz and Bilsky’s (1987) theorising that the circumplex structure is not an 
artefact o f the semantic similarity among the words.
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1.4 Values are Unique and Yet Truistic
The use of values to guide or justify attitudes is relevant to an important point 
that must be made early in any review of social values; values and attitudes are not 
equivalent (Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003a; Feather, 1995; Maio & Olson, 1994; 
Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 1996). Attitudes are an organisation of beliefs and 
affect relating to a specific object or situation and a simple disposition to evaluate it 
with some degree of favour or disfavour (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). For example, I 
have a very positive attitude to chocolate, which makes me want to eat a lot of it. My 
attitude influences my thoughts, feelings, and behaviour in relation to that specific 
object (chocolate), but it would probably not influence my thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour with respect to other food types, let alone behaviours unrelated to food, 
such as revision for examinations. In contrast, values are far broader and wider 
reaching (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996). For example, I may consider the value of 
self-discipline to be important. This value would influence my thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour, not only in relation to chocolate and how I should not eat too much of it, 
but also in relation to a whole host of other food and non-food objects and situations 
including how much time I spend revising for examinations. Therefore, values should 
play an important practical role in decision-making and behaviour across diverse 
objects and situations (Feather, 1995; Mumford, Connelly, Helton, Van Doom, & 
Osboum, 2002; Rokeach, 1973; Verplanken & Holland, 2002).
For similar reasons, it is clear that social values are distinct from social norms, 
needs, traits, and interests (see Rokeach, 1973, for further discussion of these 
distinctions). Values differ from specific goals (Roberts & Robins, 2000) because 
values are trans-situational and thus are able to guide behaviour across contexts.
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Values also differ from needs and motives. In his model of needs, Murray (1938) 
proposed 20 needs (e.g., need for affiliation, need for power, need for achievement) 
that he suggested were based in human physiology. Murray proposed that needs form 
the core o f an individual’s personality and are formed in the process of adapting to 
environmental forces. Values, on the other hand, are cognitive representations of 
three universal requirements of human existence, including biological, social, and 
group survival goals (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987), and are inherently 
desirable.
Furthermore, values have been described as an important part of an 
individual’s self-concept and, thus, they play a role in contributing to an individual’s 
self-identity. For example, one may consider oneself a defender of social justice, and 
may even campaign against legislation that one perceives as threatening this value. 
Consistent with this, many theories of racism emphasize the role that values, and 
more specifically value violation, plays in determining levels of racism and racial 
attitudes. For instance, the theory of symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 
1988) suggests that racism is at least partly based on perceptions by the ingroup (e.g., 
Whites) that the outgroup (e.g., Blacks) violate their cherished values. Similarly, 
Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky (1990) suggest that outgroup antagonism is caused by 
perceived discrepancies in value hierarchies between the ingroup and the outgroup.
Despite this evidence for the importance and uniqueness of social values, it 
does not necessarily follow that people have strong, easy-to-articulate reasons or 
argumentative support for their values. In fact, the values-as-truisms hypothesis 
(Maio & Olson, 1998, see Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003b, for evidence of values-as- 
truisms for both personal and societal values) suggests exactly the opposite. In their 
investigation of values, Maio and Olson (1998) found that social values meet the two
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empirical criteria for truisms: people highly agree with values and yet lack cognitive 
support for them. For example, in one experiment, Maio and Olson found that 
considering reasons for values caused participants’ ratings of value importance to 
change, unless participants were provided with cognitive support for their values 
prior to considering their reasons.
This evidence does not suggest that values are somehow unimportant, but 
rather that their importance does not come from their cognitive support or the reasons 
that participants give for their values. Instead, Maio and Olson suggest that the 
importance o f values comes from the strong feelings that individuals have about them 
(affective information) and individuals’ memories of value-affirming actions that they 
performed in the past (behavioural information). They propose that, because there is 
little debate over the importance, centrality or general desirability of values, they are 
widely shared and rarely questioned. Consequently, people do not bother to build 
cognitive support for their values at least partly because they are fundamental 
principles. This general consensus on the importance of social values is something 
that Rokeach (1973) alluded to when he discussed the ways in which individuals 
learn about values; children are not told to be a little bit honest, or to strive for a little 
bit of freedom, rather values are taught in an all or none fashion.
1.5 Values as Principles or Not?
If values are important trans-situational guiding principles (Schwartz, 1996), 
then they should be consistent with decision-making and behaviour. However, people 
do not always act in accordance with their values. For example, in a now famous 
experiment (Darley & Batson, 1973), theological seminary students who had been
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asked to give a short talk in a nearby building were far more likely to stop and help an 
ill individual on their way to the talk if they were on time (63%) than if they were 
already late (10%). This situational effect occurred irrespective of whether the talk 
they were asked to give was on the parable of the Good Samaritan (helpfulness 
salient) or on a subject unrelated to helpfulness.
Furthermore, other evidence suggests that values can function as post-hoc 
justifications for decisions made on the basis of other factors, rather than as guides to 
behaviour. For example, Kristiansen and Zanna (1988) found that people with 
different attitudes on the same topic considered different values as relevant to the 
topic, over and above any difference in the importance that participants attributed to 
the values themselves. For instance, opponents of abortion listed true friendship as 
more relevant to the issue, whereas proponents regarded the values of freedom, a 
comfortable life, and happiness to be more relevant. These researchers interpreted this 
evidence as support for the value justification hypothesis (see Kristiansen & Zanna,
1994, for a review), which states that social values play a stronger role in 
justifications of established attitudes and behaviours than they do as guides to 
behaviour.
Similarly, Seligman and Katz (1996) proposed that individuals construct their 
value systems within specific contexts, rather than possessing a general system of 
values. This view emphasises the dynamism, rather than the stability, of value 
systems and values themselves. Values are not seen as general principles applied to 
situations or issues as they arise; instead, people are thought to modify or create their 
value systems within the situations. As such, people consider other factors when they 
decide how to behave in a situation, such as evaluations of imagined outcomes of 
their actions and perceived norms. These factors bias subsequent judgments and
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behaviours, and people then use values to provide a post-hoc justification. As a result, 
people’s ratings of the importance of different values (e.g., sanctity of life) vary in the 
context of different issues (e.g., abortion, capital punishment), rather than remaining 
consistent with their endorsements of the values as general guiding principles 
(Seligman & Katz, 1996).
Despite these arguments and the evidence that people do not always act in 
accordance with their values, no empirical research has directly examined when or 
how social values are used as the basis for decision-making, whilst simultaneously 
examining the impact of value-irrelevant consequences. Only if these influences are 
jointly examined can a reliable picture be achieved of when social values are used as 
guiding principles and when they are not. Moreover, if they are used as guiding 
principles, the extant literature says nothing about how these abstract values bridge 
the gap to guide behaviour in specific contexts. The values-as-principles research 
conceptualizes values as abstract and trans-situational. In contrast, the values-as- 
justifications research conceptualizes values as transient and context specific. An 
integration of these two conceptualizations is necessary to enable better 
understanding of how values are used.
1.6 The Current Research
Given this review of social values, it is not difficult to understand why some 
researchers (e.g., Feather, 1990; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 1996) 
consider values to be among the most fundamental social psychological constructs 
and why values are considered important in such a wide variety of disciplines. The 
use of social values in reasoning, moral philosophy, politics, and law (e.g., the
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights), has been recorded for centuries (see the 
works of Aristotle and Plato). However, the empirical study of these constructs has 
been neglected until relatively recently and, despite some interest, the study of social 
values is still on the fringe of social psychological research (see Rohan, 2000). What 
research there is within psychology has tended to focus around a few key issues such 
as the structure of the value system (e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1996), the truistic nature of 
values (e.g., Maio & Olson, 1998), and value orientations (e.g., McClintock, 1972).
As a result, there still remain crucial elements within the study of social values that 
are unaddressed. Moreover, empirical evidence of when and how social values are 
used is equivocal. In my view, there are two basic issues that need to be addressed. 
First, when are decisions based on values as guiding principles in decision-making 
rather than based on value-irrelevant consequences with values used as post-hoc 
justifications? Second, if values are used as guiding principles, how are these 
principles applied within specific contexts?
The first issue to be addressed is when values are used as guiding principles or 
as post-hoc justifications. Given the general desirability of values, it seems logical 
that normative pressure on individuals to appear in a positive light and portray a 
positive image to others would cause people to justify their behaviour or decisions by 
appealing to these desirable, widely shared constructs. Such appeals could give the 
impression that values are used in decision-making when decisions are actually based 
on other factors, including the consequences of the available alternatives (entirely 
unrelated to the salient values). Nonetheless, there is also reason to expect that values 
should impact and guide behaviour. All decisions require some criteria as 
benchmarks, and consistency in decision-making requires abstract criteria as 
benchmarks that cover various instances. Thus, the issue is when do people base their
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decisions more on values than on value-irrelevant consequences? To my knowledge, 
no experimental research has directly examined this issue. This gap in the literature is 
addressed in Chapter 2, “Decisions: Values or Consequences?”
The second issue is also raised by the debate between the values as principles 
and the values as justifications (within specific contexts) perspectives. In their review 
chapter, Seligman and Katz (1996) conclude that there is a need to find the middle 
ground between seeing the value system as stable and applicable to all contexts and 
seeing it as ever-changing in the face of transient forces. I propose that this middle 
ground can be achieved by examining the processes that underlie the application of 
values as abstract guiding principles within specific contexts and situations. In 
everyday life, people must bridge the gap between social values in their abstract form 
and specific contexts or issues. In fact, even Schwartz (1996), who proposed the 
‘rigid guiding principle’ view of values, emphasises the necessity of studying values 
within specific contexts to “increase our understanding of how values enter into 
concrete decision-making” (p. 47). Similarly, Rokeach (1973), in his discussion of the 
influence of values on politics, highlighted the importance of the instantiations of the 
value:
“Obviously, then freedom  cannot mean the same thing to socialists and to 
capitalists even though both may insist that they value it very highly. It is one 
thing to value freedom  highly and ignore or be silent about equality, and it is 
quite another thing to insist that freedom  is not truly possible unless it goes 
hand in hand with equality. To American Conservatives, freedom  probably 
means lack of restraint on individual initiative and the freedom  to achieve 
superior status, wealth, and power; to Socialists, freedom  probably means
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sufficient restraint on individual initiative to ensure greater equality for all.”
(Rokeach, 1973, pp. 183-184) 
However, the potential of value instantiation to bridge the gap between abstract
values and specific contexts has not been empirically examined in past research; this 
will be the focus of Chapter 3, “Application: Abstract to Specific.”
The above quotation also illustrates the final issue to be considered in this 
Thesis. Rokeach notes how freedom and equality could each be used in 
argumentation for the other value. Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter 4,
“Persuasion: Similar is Best”, values are often paired in co-value arguments in a 
variety of disciplines, but there is little understanding of this use of values despite its 
prevalence. Schwartz’s (1992) circumplex model makes salient the possibility that 
some values can be combined in arguments because they are motivationally 
compatible, whereas others cannot be combined because they give rise to conflict. I 
aim to investigate whether this pattern acts as an implicit, hereto undocumented, 
constraint on co-value argumentation in order to shed further light on this common 
use of values.
1.7 Chapter Summary
The current Thesis aims to provide some of the first empirical examinations of 
aspects of social values that are largely unaddressed in the extant literature: 
specifically, the use of social values and the processes that underlie that use. As such, 
the three streams of research undertaken shed light on the impact of these important 
psychological constructs on human behaviour and decision-making. The three 
streams consider the use of values in different contexts, including hypothetical
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scenarios (Chapter 2: “Decisions: Values or Consequences?”), specific contexts of 
value-relevant reasoning and behaviour (Chapter 3: “Application: Abstract to 
Specific”), and instances of co-value argumentation (Chapter 4: “Persuasion: Similar 
is Best”). Given the diverse cross-disciplinary interest in social values and the general 
scarcity of empirical research addressing crucial questions about how social values 
are used, this research will illuminate these important issues.
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Chapter 2 
Decisions: Values or Consequences?
2.1 Chapter Overview
The aim of this Chapter is to shed light on when social values are used as 
guiding principles in decision-making. In order to address this issue, I sought 
evidence that individuals make decisions on the basis of social values and on the 
basis of value-irrelevant consequences (e.g., costs to self vs. others). This aim was 
achieved through three experiments: Experiment 1 found that a manipulation of value 
promotion (vs. threat) in decision-making scenarios predicted participants’ decisions 
and justifications of their decisions. Using a task that placed less stress on 
participants’ reasoning about the scenario, Experiment 2 found evidence for an effect 
of manipulated consequences. Using a similar scenario, Experiment 3 found that 
reasoning by principles attenuated this effect when participants were asked to explain 
their decisions. These experiments provide the first examination of the simultaneous 
impact of values and consequences on human decision-making and reveals important 
information about when values are used.
2.2 Principles or Consequences?
“Choices are justified both by consequentialist arguments showing the 
acceptability of a ruling one way or the other having regard to their 
consequences and by arguments of coherence and consistency showing how a
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ruling acceptable on other grounds can fit with the existing relevant body of 
law.”
(MacCormick, 1979, p. 113) 
The above extract from MacCormick’s (1979) well known analysis of legal
decisions suggests that the principles laid down by law and the anticipated 
consequences of decisions both influence judicial findings. In contrast, Hart’s (1961) 
well known account of legal theory suggests that laws simply become post-hoc 
explanations for a decision made to minimize aversive consequences. Such assertions 
have led to controversy over the relative use of the principles and predicted 
consequences in legal decision-making (e.g., Dworkin, 1977, 1986; Hart, 1961; 
MacCormick, 1979) -  a debate that echoes a centuries-old controversy in moral 
philosophy. On the one hand, “consequentialists” like Bentham (1789/1982, see also 
Ross, 1930) have suggested that decisions are taken to maximize the utility of 
imagined consequences. On the other hand, “principlists” like Kant (1785/1948) have 
proposed an emphasis on moral duties and principles in decision-making. This issue 
has been debated at length in diverse areas of social science, including legal theory, 
ethics, political science, and moral philosophy.
This philosophical debate mirrors the first issue highlighted in Chapter 1; 
when are decisions made on the basis of values or on the basis of value-irrelevant 
consequences? Given the extensive evidence (reviewed in Chapter 1) indicating that 
values predict judgments and behaviour, it is important to empirically examine the 
extent to which this prediction occurs because values are actively used in decision­
making or because people make their decisions on other bases and appeal to values as 
justifications. Investigating this issue will also shed light on which factors influence 
the way in which values are used.
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Initially, however, clarification of some nomenclature is necessary. As 
outlined in Chapter 1, by ‘values’, I imply trans-situational goals that serve as 
fundamental guiding principles in people’s lives and represent universal requirements 
of human existence, including biological, social, and group survival goals (Schwartz, 
1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Examples include equality, success, helpfulness, 
and security. Values are not simply all things that have a positive utility, however 
minor or transient that utility might be, but are fundamental and general prescriptive 
ideals. Naturally, all decisions and choices must have some ‘value’ or utility (e.g., 
varied aspects of hedonic experience). However, this is not to be confused with 
fundamental ‘values’ that are prescriptive ideals that are salient as explicit 
considerations prior to decisions. These ideals are what people claim should be used 
in the decision, over and above any other reinforcement or value in the situation.
By ‘consequences’, I imply states that result from making one choice or the 
other; these encompass a wide range of factors, large or small, which may be liked or 
disliked, and which may themselves be compatible or incompatible with value-based 
decisions. One such consequences dimension is whether one is making a decision for 
oneself or for another. For example, people might believe that the decision to donate 
to a charity should depend on whether it will actually help people who need it (i.e., 
the value of helpfulness) and on how much money can be afforded (i.e., the value of 
wealth), and that these considerations should be used by all donors and applied to 
every charity equally. In deciding whether or not to donate, it would be hypocritical if 
these principles were applied more to some people than to others; the same principles 
would apply to a decision about whether to donate money to a charity oneself or to 
advise another to donate the money. However, the imagined consequences for the self 
may be more negative than the imagined consequences for the other. Philosophers
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have asserted that this personal dimension “makes a vast difference” to the utilitarian 
calculus (Ross, 1930, p. 22; but see also Sidgwick, 1907). More importantly for my 
purposes is the distinction between consequences for the self versus another; this 
offers a straightforward empirical basis for beginning to address the role of imagined 
consequences and disentangling the impact of values. Thus, the present studies 
examine when people are influenced by values, consequences, or both.
2.2.1 Effects o f  Values and Consequences
My proposal is that both processes occur, such that values and consequences 
influence decisions. This perspective has been advanced in legal theory and the study 
of ethics (Ross, 1930; Wolf, 1982; see also MacCormick, 1979), but has not been 
subjected to empirical test. Prior research has not examined (a) the causal effects of 
value-laden principles and o f consequences, (b) their simultaneous impact, and (c) the 
effects in contexts where the principles themselves conflict. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that both values and consequences do impact decision-making.
Past research on social judgment has found considerable evidence that moral 
judgments may be predicted by basic values and moral principles (e.g., Kohlberg & 
Hersh, 1977; Maio, Olson, Allen & Bernard, 2001; Maio & Olson, 1998; Rokeach, 
1973; Schwartz, 1996). However, the specific role of social values is, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, somewhat equivocal. Most of the research reviewed in the previous 
chapter supports the notion that values guide the fulfilment of important motives; 
there is evidence that values structure and guide attitudes (Homer & Kahle, 1988; 
Maio & Olson, 1994; see also Olson & Zanna, 1993), while serving as standards by 
which people can judge their own actions and the actions of others (see Rohan, 2000). 
Consequently, individuals attempt to behave consistently with their values (Rokeach,
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1973; Schwartz, 1996) and values are important predictors of choices in situations of 
decision conflict (Feather, 1995; Mumford et al., 2002; Verplanken & Holland,
2002). This evidence fits Kant’s (1785/1948) view that duties and principles play an 
important role in decision-making.
Resembling the debate in legal theory, other research suggests that people 
modify their value systems within situations, rather than using fixed values as guiding 
principles (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988; Seligman & Katz, 1996). That is, people 
consider other factors when they decide how to behave in a situation, such as 
evaluations of imagined outcomes or consequences of the alternatives and perceived 
norms governing behaviour. These factors bias subsequent judgments and behaviours, 
and people then use different values to provide a post-hoc justification of their 
judgments and behaviours. This results in differences in endorsements of values in 
different contexts (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988; Seligman & Katz, 1996) because 
values are used to justify decisions made on the basis of value-irrelevant 
consequences.
The role of anticipated consequences in decision-making generally has been 
established by a century of psychological research, beginning with the demonstration 
of operant conditioning (e.g., Skinner, 1938; Thorndike, 1898), and remains one of 
psychology’s most basic theoretical constructs. This echoes the long-standing 
philosophical assertions that consequences are important (Bentham, 1789/1982), 
although the conceptualization of consequences is still under debate. For example, 
though some have deemed the self-other distinction as relevant to the utilitarian 
calculus (e.g., Ross, 1930), this is arguably not the dominant philosophical view. 
According to main-stream utilitarianism, people’s aim should be to maximise the 
utility of imagined consequences for the individual and people as a whole. In other
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words, everybody’s well-being matters. This means that conflicting interests 
somehow need to be aligned. There are numerous suggestions as to how this might be 
achieved, such as imagining that all decisions were made by a single person (Hare, 
1981), or assessing overall comparative losses and gains. These proposals, though 
different in technical detail, will typically not licence the influences of self-other 
discrepancy examined as consequences in this research.
My conception of consequences as factors that are irrelevant to principled, 
universal standards (values), is consistent with the majority of the psychological 
literature on consequentialism (e.g., Baron, 1992; Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, & 
Allgaier, 2003; Kray & Gonzalez, 1999; Kray, 2000). More specifically, for the 
purposes of the current research, the consequences must be irrelevant to the values in 
conflict and have no immediate links to other values in order to determine whether 
decisions are made on the basis of values or values are simply applied in a post-hoc 
fashion to justify the decisions based on consequences whilst maintaining a positive 
self-concept (see discussion in Chapter 1). It is especially important to address this 
issue because there is evidence that these value-irrelevant consequences, such as self 
versus other consequences, do impact decision-making even though participants do 
not think they should. For example, Kray and colleagues (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999; 
Kray, 2000) found that participants would tend to make different decisions regarding 
job choices dependent on whether deciding for themselves or advising a friend. 
Similarly, Beisswanger et al. (2003) studied a variety of decision topics and found 
that participants were more risk averse when making decisions for themselves than 
when advising a friend. Beisswanger and colleagues suggested that this was partly 
because, when making personal choice decisions, participants focused more on the 
negative (rather than the positive) consequences of the potential outcomes. Finally,
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Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) have provided evidence to 
suggest that moral decisions that are ‘up close and personal’ involve different brain 
regions than decisions that are not. Thus, there is substantial evidence that the self- 
other distinction is an important place to begin looking for effects of value-irrelevant 
consequences that may override effects of values on decisions.
The abstract nature of values is a major reason for the emergence of the 
reasoning by principles and reasoning by consequences debate in psychology and 
other social sciences. On the one hand, values are abstract principles or rules that 
develop with experience (Rokeach, 1973). To enable their use in varying situations, 
any rule must be represented more abstractly than the instances to which it applies. 
Values as abstract guiding principles fulfil this criterion. On the other hand, the 
abstractness o f values enables them to be used as tools to rationalize decisions that 
are governed primarily by evaluations of the consequences of the decisions. Thus, the 
abstractness of values enables them to be used both as guiding principles and as post- 
hoc justifications.
This dual process should be particularly evident in situations that contain 
conflict between values. People are continually faced with a multitude of unavoidable 
trade-off decisions between values. For example, people often decide between using 
their resources now and saving them for a rainy day, and between work, family and 
leisure time (Tetlock, Peterson, & Lemer, 1996). In these situations, pursuing one 
particular value (e.g., achievement) may conflict with the pursuit of another value 
(e.g., enjoying life). According to Schwartz (1996), such conflicts cause values to 
enter into conscious awareness and to be used as guiding principles. In such conflicts, 
the role of personal consequences might be attenuated because, as many value
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theorists predict (e.g., Feather, 1990; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996), attention is 
drawn to the conflicting values.
The current research seeks to shed light on when decisions are made on the 
basis of values and when they are made on the basis of consequences. As a result, it 
will reveal more about the use of social values in human behaviour and decision­
making.
2.2.2 The Importance o f  Social Context
A weakness of the prior research on values and on consequences is that it has 
been highly asocial in conceptualization. This is particularly true of some of the 
values research that has looked at the importance ratings of abstract general principles 
and their correlations with behaviour (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996; cf. Kristiansen 
& Zanna, 1994). Most real decisions have a social context, wherein people have to 
explain their choices. I expect that such a pressure to explain their decision should 
augment the normative pressure to appear principled and rational, forcing people to 
engage in reasoning by principles. This pattern would provide an illustration of the 
‘aboutness’ principle proposed by Higgins (1998a), which is people’s tendency to 
infer that their own and other people’s actions and decisions are ‘about something’. 
People assign meanings to the decisions made and often identify a single source that 
they view as responsible for that decision or action. In the absence of normative 
pressure, people may perceive a decision as being ‘about’ the consequences that 
would result from their choice. However, the addition of normative pressure to justify 
their choice may lead people to perceive the decision as being ‘about’ the values 
involved in the situation. This pattern would be consistent with Maslow’s (1970) 
hierarchy of needs, which suggests that immediate utilitarian consequences would be
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the more obvious focus of people’s decisions because they are lower in the needs 
hierarchy. In this way, participants would naturally make the decision that would 
achieve the most positive self-consequences or at least avoid negative self­
consequences. The introduction of justification would prime people’s higher order 
social and self needs, which would necessitate an explicable decision based on the 
values involved. Consistent with this view, values are stronger predictors of 
behaviours when they are salient (Karremans & Van Lange, 2004; Maio et al., 2001; 
Verplanken & Holland, 2000). This is at least partly because their salience enables 
them to be used as priors in a decision and guide the decision-making process 
(Oaksford & Hahn, 2004).
To illustrate, consider a situation wherein the values of wealth and helpfulness 
are in conflict. These are two fundamental values (Schwartz, 1992) and are not 
decisions that simply involve some degree of positive value (see Rohan, 2000). 
Helpfulness may be promoted by a charity that works to save the lives of starving 
children, but promoted to a lesser extent by a charity that works to save historical 
artefacts. The value of wealth is threatened by the charity requesting a donation of 
£50, but threatened to a lesser extent by requesting £10. Both of these principles are 
involved at higher and lower levels of value promotion or threat. For example, 
helpfulness is threatened by not donating, but wealth is promoted. In contrast, 
helpfulness is promoted by donating, but wealth is threatened. Importantly, the same 
fundamental, universal, principles should be used to decide for oneself or for another 
person. For both the self and another, donating £50 is a greater threat to the value of 
wealth than donating £10, and saving starving children is more beneficial to the 
principle of helpfulness than saving artefacts. Nevertheless, the affective 
consequences of this deliberation should appear more vivid and impactful for the self
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than for another. For a decision about the self, it is easy to imagine loss of funds for a 
personal goal (e.g., attending the ballet). Yet, such consequences are less vivid as 
imagined endpoints for others. Thus, the self-other dimension affects the salience of 
diverse, specific consequences of the decision, consequences that people would often 
not codify as general principles across situations.
2.2.3 Overview o f  Experiments
In the following three experiments, I search for evidence of reasoning by 
principles and reasoning by consequences using manipulations of values and 
consequences within value conflicts. Experiment 1 examined the effects of values and 
consequences in value conflict dilemmas that focused on participants’ decisions and 
required explanation of participants’ choices. Experiment 2 made the decision 
secondary to participants’ main task and required no decision justification. Finally, 
Experiment 3 again made the decision secondary, but included a request for decision 
justification. These designs thus enabled me to examine the effects of values and 
consequences at varying levels of focus on the decision, and to test the hypothesis 
that the expectation to justify a decision decreases the impact of consequences whilst 
increasing the impact of values.
2.3 Experiment 1
Participants in the first experiment were given hypothetical choices between 
performing a behaviour that affirmed one value and performing a behaviour that 
affirmed another value. The choices threatened or promoted each value to a high or 
low degree. For example, in one scenario, the value of honesty was promoted to a
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high degree by suing a legal firm that had been dishonest (a senior partner stole 
money), but promoted to a lower degree by suing a legal firm that had lost the money 
because it had been a victim of fraud. The value of social justice was threatened to a 
high degree by choosing to sue when the jobs and livelihoods of 30 members of staff 
were at risk, but to a lesser degree when no jobs were at risk. The consequences factor 
in all of the scenarios was whether participants were making decisions for themselves 
or advising a friend on what they should do. In other words, participants either 
decided whether to sue the firm or decided whether to advise a friend to sue the firm. 
Participants were asked to make a binary choice decision, to rate the likelihood of 
making this decision, and to list their reasons for making the choice they did. 
Participants could support the value of honesty by choosing to sue the company or 
support the value of social justice by choosing not to sue the company.
If people were guided solely by their values, the manipulations of value threat 
should affect participants’ choices, while the manipulation of self versus other should 
have no effect. If people were guided solely by consequences (see, e.g., Batson, 
Thompson, & Chen, 2002, for discussion on moral hypocrisy), then the manipulations 
of value threat should have no effect, while the manipulation of self versus other 
should affect participants’ choices. If people are guided by values and consequences, 
both manipulations should affect their decisions. Finally, threats to values and 
consequences may interact. For example, threats to values may have significant 
effects when personal consequences are high, but not when personal consequences 
are low. Alternatively, when there is high value conflict, participants may rely on the 
consequences as an additional motive to choose one side of the conflict or the other. 
The present design enabled me to examine all four possibilities.
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2.3.1 Method 
Participants
Participants were 80 students (56 women, 24 men) at Cardiff University who 
participated for course credit or £3. Three additional participants were eliminated 
from analyses because they failed to follow instructions.
Procedure
Participants were asked to read and make decisions about four hypothetical 
value dilemmas (see Table 2.1 for details). All of the scenarios presented a choice that 
pitted one value against another value, while having consequences for the self (high 
personal consequences) or for another person (low personal consequences). All 
scenarios were used in a between-subjects 2 (value A: High vs. Low promotion) x 2 
(value B: High vs. Low promotion) x 2 (consequences: self/High vs. other/Low) 
design. Participants were randomly assigned to receive all four scenarios in one of the 
eight manipulation combinations (e.g., HHH or LHL). The scenarios were presented 
twice (for different dependent measures; see below). The order of presentation of the 
scenarios was randomised across participants, but this order was maintained for both 
presentations of the scenarios to each participant. This was to ensure that there would 
be no order or presentation effects.
In the first presentation of the scenarios, participants made a binary choice 
decision relating to each scenario. Because the scenarios each involved two 
conflicting values, participants’ choices promoted one value or the other. Extensive 
pilot testing ensured that the scenarios were easy to follow and were perceived as 
being relevant to the values that were identified. The value choices also varied across 
scenarios (see Table 2.1), meaning that the design was not intended to assess trends in
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Table 2.1
Conflict Scenarios in Experiment 1
Scenario Value Conflict
Helpfulness:
W ealth:
C onsequences:
Exciting Life:
True Friendship:
C onsequences:
Honesty:
Social Justice:
C onsequences:
Helpfulness vs. Wealth 
High prom otion = donate m oney to  orphanages in a third world 
country to ensure they are supplied w ith sufficient food and w ater 
Low prom otion = donate m oney to a charity that saves cultural and 
historic pieces o f  art in a third world country 
High threat = donate £50 
Low threat = donate £10 
High threat = donate m oney yourse lf
Low threat = advise a friend w hether she should donate the m oney 
Exciting life vs. True Friendship 
High threat = cancel your m onth-long expedition to the H im alayas 
the day before you leave
Low threat = cancel your tour o f  local tourist attractions the day 
before you leave
High prom otion = cancel your trip because your best friend, who has 
no surviving close fam ily, has asked you to  check on her w hile she is 
in hospital having an operation
Low prom otion = cancel your trip  because som eone you know from 
your course has asked you to check on her w hile she is in hospital 
having an operation
High threat: m ake the decision yourse lf 
Low threat: advise your flatm ate on this decision 
Honesty vs. Social Justice 
High prom otion = sue a d ishonest legal firm who stole your money 
Low prom otion = sue a legal firm  who were not dishonest, but had 
been a victim  o f  fraud
High threat = the law suit w ould threaten the jobs and livelihoods o f  
30 sta ff
Low threat = the law suit would not result in any loss o f  jo b s 
High threat: m ake the decision yourself 
Low threat: advise your friend on this decision
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Table 2.1 continued:
Scenario Value Conflict
4 Helpfulness vs. Self-discipline
H elpfulness: High prom otion = spend m ost o f  the day helping a friend w ith her 
dissertation the day before your exam
Low prom otion = spend h a lf an hour helping a friend with her 
dissertation the day before your exam
Self-discipline: High threat = the friend needs help because she went out and got 
drunk the night before
Low threat = the friend needs help because she has been unwell
C onsequences: High threat: m ake the decision yourself 
Low threat: advise your flatm ate on this decision
Note. For all scenarios, participants were presented with the choice between following one course of 
action or not, e.g., for Scenario 1, “Donate” or “Not Donate.”
the type of value choices (e.g., helpfulness vs. wealth). Instead, I coded participants’ 
decisions based on the arbitrary presentation of the options. Below the scenario, the 
choice of options was presented to participants on either side of the page: choice of 
the left option was coded as 0 and choice of the right option was coded as 1. 
Participants were also asked to rate the likelihood of making this decision on a six- 
point scale anchored from 1 (definitely) to 6 (definitely not). Participants were then 
asked: “Why did you make this choice? Please give your reasons for this decision 
below.”
Finally, the dilemmas were re-presented to participants, each followed by 
three further questions. These items asked participants to rate the extent to which they 
considered each of the two manipulated values to be important in their decision and 
to rate the extent to which they considered whether they or someone else would 
receive the consequences of the decision. Participants responded to each item using a 
six-point scale anchored by 1 (totally irrelevant) to 6 (extremely important). These
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more specific questions were placed after the initial presentation of all of the 
scenarios to avoid drawing attention to the specific values and consequences before 
participants made their decisions. In this way, it is unlikely that participants were 
aware of what was expected; individual participants received a short story and were 
not explicitly made aware that two values were being put in conflict. In addition, 
participants were not asked to choose between the values, only to choose whether or 
not to take a particular course of action.
2.3.2 Results 
Binary Choices
As shown in Table 2.1, different social values were used in the four scenarios 
and, consequently, the analyses were conducted on each scenario separately. To 
analyse the binary choices, I examined each scenario using hierarchical logistic 
regressions. The first step in each analysis included the value promotion 
manipulations and the consequences factor as predictors (coded 0 or 1). The 
interaction terms were added in the second step.
Analyses of the main effects revealed a significant impact of at least one of 
the value manipulations in each scenario. As shown in Table 2.2, the odds ratios 
revealed that participants were more likely to choose in favour of a value in the 
conditions where the value was maximally promoted (or threatened) than in the 
condition where the value was less promoted (or threatened). For example, the odds 
in favour of donating the money were 5 times higher when the value of helpfulness 
was highly promoted (helping save starving children) than when the value was 
promoted to a lesser degree (helping save historical artefacts). There were no 
significant effects of the consequences manipulation. However, in response to
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Table 2.2
Effects o f  the Values and Consequences Manipulations on Participants ’ Binary 
Decisions in Experiment 1
Scenario Manipulation Odds /-statistic /7-value
Value manipulation
1 helpfulness 5.03 3.01 <.01
1 wealth 4.04 2.62 <.01
2 exciting life 5.83 3.36 <.01
3 honesty 3.27 2.47 <.05
4 helpfulness 5.29 3.04 <.05
4 self-discipline 5.29 3.04 <.05
Consequences manipulation
1 self vs. other 2.49 1.74 .08
Notes. df=  76, N  = 80
For ease o f understanding, all odds ratios are coded positively. For all manipulations, the 
higher the threat or promotion, the higher the odds of participants making a choice in line 
with that value.
Scenario 1, there was a marginal effect of the consequences manipulation, such that 
the odds in favour of participants not donating the money were 2.5 times higher for 
participants in the condition involving the self (high consequences) than for 
participants making decisions for others (low consequences). All of the interaction 
terms were non-significant.
Decision Probability Ratings
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were used to analyse participants’ 
ratings of the likelihood of making their decision. The first step included the value 
promotion manipulations and the consequences factor as predictors. The interaction 
terms were added in the second step.
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Table 2.3
Effects o f  the Values and Consequences Manipulations on Participants ’ Decision 
Probability Ratings in Experiment 1
Scenario Manipulation b /-statistic /7-value
Value manipulation
1 helpfulness - 1.15 -4.11 <.001
1 wealth 0.65 2.32 <.05
2 exciting life 1.18 4.07 <.001
2 true friendship -0.58 - 1.99 .05
3 honesty -0.80 -2.65 <.05
4 helpfulness 1.33 4.14 <.001
4 self-discipline 1.03 3.20 <.01
Note. d f = 1 6 , N = S 0
Table 2.3 shows the b coefficients, t statistics, and p  values for the effects of 
the value and consequences manipulations on participants’ decisions. Similar to the 
results of the binary choice analyses, participants were significantly more certain that 
they would choose in favour of the maximally promoted values than the less strongly 
promoted values. There were no significant effects of the consequences manipulation. 
All of the interaction terms were non-significant.
Value Influence Ratings
I repeated the analyses of the binary choices with participants’ ratings of the 
influence of each value and consequences factor as continuous (centred) predictors. 
As shown in Table 2.4, virtually all of participants’ ratings of the influence of the 
values in their decisions significantly predicted their actual choices. This result 
supports my choice of value concept terms as labels for the manipulation variables 
(e.g., “honesty” for the act of suing when a solicitor stole money) and more 
importantly, indicates that participants were aware of the extent to which they
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Table 2.4
Effects o f  Participants ’ Ratings o f  the Influence o f  the Value and Consequences 
Manipulations on their Binary Decisions in Experiment 1
Scenario____________Influence of________Odds______ /-statistic_____ /7-value
Value manipulation
1 helpfulness 3.24 3.46 <.01
1 wealth 1.70 2.52 <.05
2 exciting life 2.26 3.70 <.001
2 true friendship 3.68 3.21 <.01
3 social justice 1.48 1.94 .05
4 helpfulness 3.53 3.15 <.01
4 self-discipline 2.90 3.14 <.01
Consequences manipulation
1 self vs. other 1.67 2.62 .01
Note. df= 76, N =  80
considered the values when making their decisions. There was also a significant 
effect of participants’ ratings of the influence of the self-other consequences 
manipulation for their decision in Scenario 1 (see Table 2.4). Thus, participants were 
aware of the role of the consequences in their decision for the sole scenario that 
elicited some (weak) evidence for an effect of consequences. As shown in Table 2.5, 
a virtually identical pattern was obtained when I used the value influence ratings as 
continuous predictors of the decision probability ratings.
Decision Reasons
Participants were asked to list their reasons for their choices. On average, 
participants gave 1.7 reasons for each decision. Blind to the condition of the 
participants, I coded each reason as directly pertaining to the manipulation of the 
values (e.g., the importance of friendship, the dishonesty of the company) or to
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Table 2.5
Effects o f  Participants ’ Ratings o f  the Influence o f  the Value and Consequences 
Manipulations on their Decision Probability Ratings in Experiment 1
Scenario Influence of b /-statistic /?-value
Value manipulation
1 helpfulness -0.44 -4.36 <.001
1 wealth 0.23 2.68 <.01
2 exciting life 0.41 5.19 <.001
2 friendship -0.40 -3.47 <.01
4 helpfulness -0.50 -4.27 <.001
4 self-discipline 0.44 3.14 <.01
Consequences manipulation
1 self vs. other -0.20 -2.47 <.05
2 self vs. other -0.27 -3.49 <.01
Note. df= 76, N = 80
specific consequences of the decision for the self or other (e.g., failing the exam). 
Participants were significantly more likely to mention values in the scenario than 
consequences, t (79) = 14.68,/? < .001. This result is consistent with the view that 
values are important and salient in situations of value conflict (Schwartz, 1996). In 
fact, all but three participants explicitly used the manipulated values to justify at least 
one of their decisions.
2.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that values are important guides to decision-making in a 
situation that requires careful consideration of decisions. Although this is consistent 
with the predictions of previous research, this is the first time that the causal effects 
of value threat and consequences have been investigated simultaneously in the
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context of value conflict. Furthermore, although there was less evidence for 
reasoning-by-consequences, there was some indication of it in one of the four 
scenarios. It is likely that the scenarios showed no significant evidence of an impact 
of consequences because of the normative pressure to make the ‘acceptable’ choice 
(and hence consider the values) in an experiment that obviously focused on decision­
making. However, this pressure is not sufficient to explain the impact of the value 
manipulations in the different conditions. This research provides the first empirical 
evidence that participants are aware of the influence that value threat and promotion 
have on their decision-making. Participants were not explicitly told about the two 
values involved in the scenarios and they were not asked to choose between the 
values, but rather were asked to choose whether or not to follow a particular course of 
action. Nonetheless, participants identified the values as being the bases for their 
decisions. Finally, values were used in justifications for their decisions by almost all 
participants.
2.4 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examined reasoning by principles and reasoning by 
consequences in a context that did not include pressure to form decisions carefully. In 
this experiment, a value conflict dilemma was presented within an impression 
formation task, wherein participants’ role was simply to form an impression of a 
fellow student (Beisswanger et al., 2003). This impression formation task served to 
direct participants’ focus away from the normative pressure of making the right or 
acceptable choice. In addition, participants in Experiment 2 were not asked to justify 
their choices, further reducing any normative pressure to consider values. Given my
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examination of the factors influencing the use of values versus the use of 
consequences, I focused on the scenario (Scenario 1) that had previously provided the 
only (weak) evidence for a role of consequences in Experiment 1, in addition to 
finding strong evidence for the use of values. Given the reduction in normative 
pressure, I predicted that participants would exhibit reasoning by consequences and 
less reasoning by principles.
2.4.1 Method 
Participants
Participants were 60 psychology undergraduates (51 women, 9 men) who 
participated for course credit.
Procedure
Participants were told that the study was examining how people formed 
impressions of others. They were presented with a brief description of an individual, 
Rob, including personal details (e.g., age, interests) and information about one of a 
number of charities for which he volunteered.1 The description of the charity was 
essentially a modified version of Scenario 1 in Experiment 1. Participants were told 
that the charity was in need of extra donations to continue its work and Rob asked 
participants to either donate £50 of their own money (self: high personal
1 The inform ation about R ob’s w ork for other charities w as added in order to make 
participants unlikely to view Rob as being som ehow  obliged to contribute. This safeguard 
proved effective in that a num ber o f  participants, in their justifications in Experim ent 3, noted 
that Rob had done sufficient w ork for the charity already. In addition, ratings for advising 
Rob to donate to  the charity h im self were far from  ceiling. Also, a pilot test revealed that 
participants did not think that Rob should feel obliged to donate to the charity irrespective o f  
w hether Rob was a volunteer (A /=  4.45) or was totally  uninvolved in the charity (M =  3.70), 
Z*' (1, 38) = .64, ns (scale neutral point = 5.5).
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consequences) or to advise him whether he should donate £50 of his money (other: 
low personal consequences). In this version, the threat to the value of wealth was held 
constant, such that a fixed sum of £50 was requested by the charity, as in the prior 
high value threat condition. This change increased the proportion of high value 
conflict cells (which were my focal interest) and reduced the experiment to a 2 
(helpfulness manipulation: High vs. Low promotion) x 2 (consequences 
manipulation: self/ High vs. other/ Low) between-subjects design. The promotion of 
helpfulness was manipulated in an identical fashion to Experiment 1 (i.e., the charity 
saved children or historical artefacts).
After reading the description, participants were asked to complete four filler 
questions asking them to rate their impression of Rob, such as “How do you feel 
towards Rob?” and “Would you like to be friends with Rob?” These items were 
included solely to aid my cover story and focus attention away from the decision and 
are not discussed further.
After completing the impression formation questions, participants were 
informed that “In order for us to make an accurate assessment of your attitude to Rob, 
we have to control for the extent to which you agree with the cause he supports.” 
They then completed binary choice and decision probability ratings identical to those 
in Experiment 1. Participants were not asked to list reasons for their decision (unlike 
in Experiment 1).
2.4.2 Results 
Scenario Manipulation
Binary Choice. A hierarchical logistic regression analysis was conducted on 
participants’ binary choice for the scenario. The predictors in the first step were the
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manipulations of helpfulness and self-other consequences. The interaction between 
these variables was added in the second step, but was non-significant (p > .70). The 
first step model was significant, x 2 (2, N  = 60) = 9.45,/? < .01, however. This model 
revealed a significant effect of the consequences manipulation, t (57) = 2.78,/? < .01, 
such that the odds in favour of donating money were 6 times higher for participants 
advising Rob to donate than for participants donating the money themselves. There 
was no significant effect of the helpfulness manipulation that had been much stronger 
in the same scenario in Experiment 1, t (57) = 1.01, ns. That is, there was no effect of 
values in Experiment 2.
Decision probability ratings. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was 
conducted on participants’ ratings of decision probability. The same steps were used 
as for the logistic regression analyses and, again, the interaction in the second step 
was non-significant (/? > .45). In the first step, there was a significant effect of the 
consequences manipulation, b = 1.02, t (57) = 3.17,/? < .01. Consistent with the 
results of the logistic regression analysis, participants believed that they would be 
more likely to advise Rob to donate £50 to the charity than donate the money 
themselves. The effect of the helpfulness manipulation was again non-significant (/? > 
.26).
2.4.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 found reasoning by consequences using a dilemma that had 
previously revealed strong evidence for reasoning by principles. The key differences 
between Experiment 2 and the previous experiment using this dilemma are that the 
dilemma was embedded within an impression formation task and participants were 
not asked to explain their decision. These changes placed less stress on participants’
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reasoning about the dilemma, enabling them to escape any normative pressure to use 
reasoning by principles. The result was more reliance on consequences in decision­
making. Therefore, it seems parsimonious to assume that the ‘aboutness principle’ 
plays an important role in participants’ perception of the decisions they face, and 
people make decisions on the basis of both values and consequences.
2.5 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 tested whether the addition of the expectation to justify 
decisions in the context of the distracting goal would be sufficient to re-elicit use of 
reasoning by principles. In this context, reasoning by principles may add to or qualify 
(i.e., moderate) the use of reasoning by consequences.
2.5.1 Method 
Participants
Participants were 72 psychology undergraduates (70 women, 2 men) who 
participated for course credit. Two additional participants were eliminated from 
analyses because they failed to complete all sections of the study.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either a replication of Experiment 2 or 
a slight modification of it. In this modification, participants were told that their 
primary task was to form an impression of an individual, Rob. The researcher told 
half of the participants that, after reading the description of the individual, they would 
be asked to make a decision and that they would have to justify that decision. 
Participants then read one of the manipulated versions of Scenario 1 from Experiment
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2. Next, participants completed the impression formation questions, the charity 
donation decision, and the decision probability rating. Participants who had 
previously been told that they would have to justify their decisions then completed 
the open-ended question about their reasons for choosing whether or not to donate the 
money, using the same format and order as in the prior experiments. These 
procedures constituted a between-subjects 2 (helpfulness manipulation: High vs. Low 
promotion) x 2 (consequences manipulation: self vs. other) x 2 (with vs. without 
justification) design.
2.5.2 Results 
Scenario Manipulations
The analyses were similar to those used in Experiment 2, except that the 
additional variable of justification was included in the first step of the regressions, 
and the additional interactions with justification were added in the second step.
Binary choice. The logistic regression analyses of participants’ binary choice 
indicated that the model in step one was significant, x 2 ~ (3, N  = 72) = 26.40, p  <
.001, and that the model including step two was also significant, x 2 = (7, N  = 72) =
31.58, p  < .001. Although there were no significant main effects of the helpfulness, t 
(64) = 0.52, ns, or the justification manipulations, t (64) = 0.62, ns, there was a 
significant main effect of the consequences manipulation, t (64) = 2.34, p  < .05, such 
that the odds in favour of donating money were 14 times higher for participants 
advising Rob than for participants donating the money themselves. This main effect 
was moderated by a marginal three-way value x consequences x justification 
interaction, t (64) = 1.78, = .07, in step two. I interpreted this interaction because 
the same interaction pattern was significant in my analysis of the decision probability
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ratings (below). To interpret the interaction, simple effects were compared within 
each level of justification. When participants were not required to justify their 
decision, the two-way value x consequences interaction was not significant, t (32) = 
.74, ns. However, there was an effect of the consequences manipulation t (33) = 3.59, 
p  < .05, such that the odds in favour of donating the money were 25 times higher for 
participants advising Rob than for participants donating the money themselves. This 
replicates the results of Experiment 2.
When participants were required to justify their decision however, there was a 
marginal two-way value x consequences interaction, / (32) = 1.81,/? < .07, such that 
there was an effect of the consequences manipulation only at low levels of 
helpfulness promotion, t (16) = 2.11, p  < .05, such that the odds in favour of donating 
the money were 64 times higher for participants advising Rob than for participants 
donating the money themselves. When participants were required to justify their 
decision at high levels of helpfulness promotion, there was no significant effect of the 
consequences manipulation, t (17) = 0.73,/? > .45. Thus, the value of helpfulness 
attenuated the effects of consequences on participants’ decisions only when 
participants were asked to justify their decision.
Decision probability ratings. Consistent with the binary choice findings and 
the results of Experiment 2, the multiple regression analyses on the decision 
probability ratings revealed a main effect of the self-other manipulation, b = 1.54, t 
(64) = 2.85,/? < .01, such that participants were more likely to advise Rob to donate 
the money (‘Low’ consequences condition) than they were to donate the money 
themselves (‘High’ consequences condition). There were no effects of the 
helpfulness, b -  -.09, t (64) = -.30, ns, or the justification manipulations, b 0.10, t (64) 
= 0.35, ns. Also consistent with the binary choice findings, the self-other main effect
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was qualified by a significant three-way interaction, b = - 2.78, t (64) = - 2.52, p  < .05 
(see Figure 2.1). When the justification and no-justification conditions were analysed 
separately, there was a significant main effect of the self-other manipulation in the no 
justification condition, b = 1.90, t (33) = 5.28,/? < .001, such that participants were 
more likely to advise Rob to donate the money than to donate the money themselves 
(see lower section of Figure 2.1). The two-way interaction for these participants was 
non-significant (p > .30). The same main effect of the self-other manipulation was 
present in the justification condition, b = 2 . \ \ , t  (32) = 3.54,/? < .005, but this main 
effect was moderated by a significant two-way helpfulness x self-other interaction, b 
= - 1.89, / (32) = - 2.24, p  < .05. This interaction was such that this tendency to 
choose more charity from others was moderated by the principle of helpfulness: when 
there was low promotion of helpfulness, participants were less likely to favour self­
donation than donations from Rob, but when there was high promotion of 
helpfulness, participants were equally likely to advise Rob to donate as to donate 
themselves (see upper section of Figure 2.1).
Decision Reasoning
Participants in the justification condition were asked to list their reasons for 
their decision. Participants listed an average of 2.5 reasons. As a manipulation check, 
the number o f 'se lf references (e.g., I, me, my) and the number of'Rob' references 
(e.g., Rob, he, his) in participants’ reasons were counted. A one-way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) revealed that participants made significantly more self­
references in the self condition {M= 2.3) than in the other condition (M = 0.44), F  (1, 
34) = 15.50,/? < .001. Similarly, a second one-way ANOVA showed that participants 
made significantly more references to Rob in the other condition (M =  2.9) than in the 
self condition (M = 1.2), F (  1, 34) = 6.30,/? < .05. An independent rater and I coded
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Figure 2.1. Likelihood of donating to the charity as a function of level of 
helpfulness promotion and the self-other manipulation for the two justification 
conditions in Experiment 3.
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participants’ reasons as relevant to the values manipulation (e.g., the cause (artefacts) 
is not a very needy one) or consequences (e.g., he might feel guilty if he did not 
donate) while blind to their condition. The overall inter-rater reliability was good 
(Cronbach’s a = .81). Consistent with Experiment 2, participants were significantly 
more likely to use values in justifications than to cite something that could be 
construed as consequences, / (34) = 7.39, p  < .001. In fact, only six participants did 
not mention at least one of the values in their justifications.
2.5.3 Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 by again finding 
reasoning by consequences in a context that made participants’ decisions a secondary 
task. However, the added expectation to justify the decision attenuated the impact of 
the consequences; participants used values in their decision-making when they 
expected to explain their decision. This effect should not be confused with findings 
that people behave differently when observed by or in the presence of others as 
opposed to when they are not (see Kent, 1994, for discussion); a simple self­
presentation effect whereby participants are trying to Took good’ cannot explain the 
results. Such a pressure was present in both conditions, with justification and without. 
It is important to note that values are viewed positively and people attempt to act in 
accordance with their values (Rokeach, 1973). Therefore a simple self-presentation
2 Both raters w ere quite liberal in the coding o f  consequences in order to give them the best 
chance to appear. For exam ple, feeling guilt as a result o f  non-donation was seen as an 
aversive consequence, even though guilt could be view ed as a reaction to value-incongruence 
(H iggins, 2004). Thus, this evidence suggests that values are used to a greater extent than 
consequences in people’s justifications o f  their decisions despite allowing some potential 
value indicators to ‘coun t’ as consequences.
Frost 2006 51
Chapter 2 Decisions: Values or Consequences?
influence would facilitate a use of principles in all conditions and not solely in the 
justification condition, which included the high helpfulness manipulation. Moreover, 
if self-presentation was a factor in participants’ decisions, one would not expect 
people to anticipate less prosocial behaviour for the self than for another; people 
normally attempt to enhance perceptions of their warmth and competence relative to 
others (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Thus, both values and consequences play a role in 
decision-making.
2.6 Discussion
My investigation of the use of social values progressed across three 
experiments. Using several choice dilemmas, I examined whether people base their 
decisions on the principles (values) involved in the situation or on value-irrelevant 
consequences. Experiment 1 revealed evidence that strongly supported the 
importance o f values in decision-making and also found evidence of their explicit use 
in participants’ justifications for their decisions. Experiment 2 placed participants’ 
decisions about a value dilemma in a context that made their choice secondary to the 
experimental task, while not requesting explanations for decisions. In this context, the 
results indicated strong use of consequential reasoning, even though the same choice 
dilemma had revealed use of values in Experiment 1. Experiment 3 again examined 
responses to this dilemma in a context that made the choice preference less central to 
the experimental task, while including a condition in which participants were told to 
expect to justify their decisions. In this condition, values attenuated the use of 
reasoning by consequences. These results indicate that reasoning by principles and
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reasoning by consequences can both occur; their use depends vitally on the presence 
of distracting goals and the expectation of the need to justify the decision.3
These results have important implications for the issues discussed in Chapter 
1. Most importantly, this is the first empirical examination of the use of social values 
using dilemmas that have manipulated both the values involved and the value- 
irrelevant consequences of the decisions. This examination of the causal effects and 
simultaneous impact of these variables is the first to investigate directly the issue of 
how values are used in more complex terms. The evidence suggests that values do 
impact behaviour and decision-making in an a priori fashion and has highlighted at 
least one important factor that influences when values are used in this way; the social 
pressure of having to explain the decision. Moreover, the current research has 
provided evidence that values are also used as justifications. For example, in 
Experiment 1, all but three participants used values to justify their behaviour. 
Therefore, this is evidence that values are used both as principles and as 
justifications.
These findings suggest that pressure to explain a decision plays an important 
role in use of the ‘aboutness’ principle (Higgins, 1998a) to engage in reasoning by 
principles or reasoning by consequences. When people are asked to justify their 
decision, they view the decision situation as being ‘about’ the values involved. They 
may perceive the values as being the focus of any decision to be made and, therefore, 
base their decision on the values. This is consistent with other findings in decision­
making research (e.g., Huber & Seiser, 2001), which suggest that individuals who
3 As in m uch psychological research, my sam ple included predominantly fem ale 
undergraduates. N onetheless, there w ere enough m ale participants to exam ine potential 
effects o f  sex o f  participants across experim ents. N o  effects relating to sex o f  participant were 
noted, suggesting that a predom inantly m ale sam ple would have yielded sim ilar results.
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anticipate justifying their decision increase their use of utilized information; engaging 
in a more elaborate choice process. In contrast, when people’s attention is focused on 
another task and they do not have to explain their decision, people perceive the 
situation as being ‘about’ the personal consequences of the decision (Experiment 2). 
This is consistent with Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs, which would suggest that 
consequences are more basic than the use of principles. As such, consequences would 
be more automatically used in decision-making than higher-order principles that 
require thought and conscious consideration. This automatic operation is also 
consistent with the fact that the effects of consequences are replete in psychology 
(e.g., Boatsman, Moeckel, & Pei, 1997; O’Neill, Glasgow & McCaul, 1983; Snyder 
& Patterson, 1986).
Nevertheless, it is important to consider potential criticisms of these 
conclusions. One potential alternative explanation of the results is that participants 
may perceive the involvement of additional values in the different conditions as 
dependent on the involvement of the self. However, this explanation is not consistent 
with the results of Experiment 1, which showed a strong effect of the value 
manipulations irrespective of the consequences manipulation. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that this possibility was eliminated by pilot work. One of the pilot 
studies presented a subsection of the scenarios used in Experiment 1 to 20 
participants and asked them to rate the extent to which the value manipulation would 
influence their decision in each scenario. Results indicated that the manipulated 
values were salient and important in each of the scenarios. In addition, participants 
did not list additional values in either of the experiments that requested justification 
for decisions (Experiment 1 and Experiment 3). These findings indicate that the
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impact of the consequences manipulation cannot be explained by the additional 
involvement of values that were not manipulated.
A further issue is whether similar effects of personal consequences and 
justification would be found in real, rather than hypothetical, decisions. Imagined 
scenarios cannot be as powerfully relevant to the self as actual situations, because 
individuals are not as involved in imagined situations as they are in real life.
However, the use of imagined scenarios enables the elimination of excessive 
situational variance (see Schwartz, 1996) and, in fact, imagined procedures have been 
found to yield very similar results to those obtained using online situations (Robinson 
& Clore, 2001; see also Laner, Benin, & Ventrone, 2001; Davis, Mitchell, Hall, 
Lothert, Snapp, & Meyer, 1999). In addition, the results suggest that the scenarios 
elicited a sufficient level of personal relevance to discover reasoning by consequences 
and reasoning by principles. Moreover, the effects of personal consequences were 
entirely consistent with past research that has looked at self-other differences in 
relationship decisions (Beisswanger et al., 2003), monetary decisions (Stone, Yates,
& Caruthers, 2002), and career choices in naturalistic settings (Kray & Gonzalez, 
1999). Thus, the imagined scenarios in this research were sufficient to evoke a role of 
consequences, despite the weaker power of consequences in imagined contexts.
I expect that these results have implications for several other strands of 
research. Moral judgments are different from value judgments, because moral 
judgments are prescriptive beliefs about what everyone should or should not do. For 
example, people believe that everyone should support their children and that 
everyone should not kill out of greed or envy. In contrast, although we like others to 
follow our values, we do not generally regard it as unacceptable when they do not.
For example, in my scenarios, participants wanted Rob to donate, but also showed
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tolerance and understanding of not donating, especially as the alternative option 
supported an alternative value. Despite this vital difference, there may be an 
important parallel in how moral and value judgments are formed. In particular, the 
results can be linked to Haidt’s (2001) notion of two separate systems involved in 
moral judgment. In his social intuitionist model, moral judgment is generally the 
result of a fast, holistic, and affective evaluation. A separate, deliberate and conscious 
reasoning system is typically restricted to providing post hoc justification for the 
conclusion already reached by the intuitive system.
Consistent with these ideas, there should be greater effects of consequences 
on value judgments in an ‘impression formation’ task, which, by nature, would seem 
to encourage holistic, impressionistic and intuitive processing. It is also in keeping 
with these ideas that the influence of consequences should be affected by the 
expectation of having to provide a justification, in that justification necessarily 
involves the reasoning system. Haidf s model similarly allows for a contribution of 
the reasoning system to the actual outcome of a moral judgment in situations, such as 
a formal moral interview (Haidt, 2001, p. 819). However, the results indicate that, in 
the context of value judgments, it is not even necessary for the cognitive guides (i.e., 
values) to be explicitly salient before guiding a judgment.
A second relevant strand of research has directly investigated peoples’ 
sensitivity to consequences. The present finding of an influence of consequences 
stands in contrast to several studies that have failed to find such effects for broadly 
moral judgments. For example, Sunstein, Schkade and Kahneman (2000) found that 
participants’ assignment of punitive damages in personal injury cases was not 
influenced by considerations of deterrence. This finding is in line with several other 
studies on punishment by Baron and colleagues (Baron & Ritov, 1993; Baron, Gowda
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& Kunreuther, 1993). In addition, Baron (1994) cites evidence from a wide variety of 
other contexts in which consequentialist considerations fail to influence judgments 
(cf. Nord, 1992). For example, Ritov and Baron (1990) found that participants are 
unwilling to propose the use of a vaccine with potentially lethal side-effects, despite 
the fact that it would save more lives than would be impacted by the side-effects. In 
this paradigm, the net consequences of the vaccine are undeniably positive, but 
people do not decide consistently with them. Hence, the studies that have failed to 
find sensitivity to consequences have typically emphasised the ‘irrationality’ of 
participants. With regards to this issue, it is worth noting that the self-other distinction 
that people are sensitive to in this research is not one that utilitarian philosophers 
typically think they ought to use. Yet, the self-other distinction, with the distinct 
consequences it captures, is used nonetheless.
Moving further afield, one particularly interesting application of the present 
research lies within the field of political science. For example, in political elections, 
leaders unable to refer to concrete gains or losses for the population often turn their 
rhetoric to focus on values (see e.g., Gordon & Miller, 2004; this use of values in 
rhetoric and particularly in political propaganda is addressed in Chapter 4). This 
seems to be particularly true at times of war and increased political pressure. For 
example, in the US and Britain’s entry into the war on Iraq, speeches emphasised the 
negative consequences of ignoring the “imminent threat” and the potentially 
catastrophic outcome of not taking action against the Iraqi leadership. However, 
leaders’ use of consequences in the rhetoric has been attenuated by an emphasis on 
principles (social values) as increasing pressure is applied to justify the decision to go 
to war. This rhetoric has included phrases related to attacks on freedom and 
independence, whilst appealing to social values such as honesty, truth, and justice to
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justify military action. These real world incidents anecdotally corroborate the findings 
of the present research, where values were explicitly cited in participants’ 
justifications for their decisions to a greater extent than consequences.4
2.7 Chapter Summary
The present research provides the first direct empirical examination of the 
extent to which people use values and consequences in their reasoning about value 
dilemmas. The results support the hypothesis that, consistent with the quotation 
presented at the outset, people base decisions on the principles involved and on the 
consequences of the decision. In discussion about the role of principles in legal 
theory, there has been a sharp distinction between a decision-making phase and 
subsequent justification of the decision reached (see Hart, 1961). This is mirrored 
within social psychology by the debate between the use of social values as principles 
or justifications. The results show how closely these two components interact, in that 
the mere expectation of having to explain the decision subsequently altered, in subtle 
ways, the decision itself. In these contexts, values have a real effect on decisions that 
goes beyond their use as something merely to justify a decision that has pleasing 
outcomes for the self. Thus, values are more than mere justifications for a decision 
made on the basis of value-irrelevant consequences. However, the use of values does 
importantly depend on whether people are focussed on the decision and whether they 
expect to explain their decision.
4 Even if  we were to assum e that the references to “ im m inent threat” are actually thinly veiled 
appeals to the value o f ‘N ational Security ,’ the fact rem ains that leaders’ use o f  this argum ent 
has decreased, and their focus on other values has increased in breadth (i.e., m ore values) and 
intensity.
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The research presented in this Chapter has made an important step to 
furthering knowledge about the ways in which values are used. However, there still 
remains the second issue raised in Chapter 1; how do people bridge the gap between 
abstract values and specific contexts. This issue will be addressed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 
Application: Abstract to Specific
3.1 Chapter Overview
The aim of this Chapter is to address how abstract social values are projected 
on to specific situations in order to influence behaviour. I propose that abstract values 
must be instantiated within the situation in order for them to be used to guide 
behaviour and decision-making. Consequently, the manipulation of value 
instantiation might influence subsequent behaviour. Therefore, across four 
experiments, I investigated the hypothesis that reflecting upon a typical, rather than 
an atypical, instantiation of a value within the same situational context has differential 
impacts on subsequent behaviour. The results showed that typicality has two effects. 
Typicality influences the types of reasons that participants list for a value and the 
perceived strength of the reasons (Experiments 4 and 5). Even more importantly, 
participants engaged in more egalitarian behaviour following a typical instantiation of 
the value of equality compared to an atypical instantiation or a control condition that 
simply made the value salient (Experiments 4 - 7). Together, these experiments 
provide the first direct evidence of value instantiation processes in decision-making 
and thus provide crucial evidence about how values are used in decision-making and 
behaviour.
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3.2 From Abstract to Specific
“When your values are clear to you, making decisions becomes easier.”
(Roy Disney, b. 1930)
This quotation suggests that values are an important guide in life: When 
people are clear about their values, they are able to make decisions with a degree of 
ease because of the guidance that their values provide. As reviewed in Chapter 1, this 
idea is consistent with the bulk of empirical research investigating values (e.g., 
Schwartz, 1992, 1996), which suggests that values are abstract trans-situational goals 
that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives and represent universal requirements 
of human existence, including biological, social, and group survival goals (Schwartz, 
1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Indeed, values are held to be prescriptive principles 
that guide decision-making and there is evidence that values guide attitudes and 
behaviour across diverse contexts (Homer & Kahle, 1988; Maio & Olson, 1994; 
Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996; see also Olson & Zanna, 1993), while serving as 
standards by which people can judge their own actions and the actions of others (see 
Rohan, 2000). In Chapter 2 ,1 provided evidence that values are indeed used as guides 
for behaviour across diverse dilemmas when people focus on the decision at hand. 
Values can provide this broad guidance across a wealth of widely differing situations 
because they are abstract principles or rules that develop with experience (Rokeach, 
1973).
Given these correlations between values and behaviour, the effect of priming 
values on subsequent behaviour (Verplanken & Holland, 2002), and the evidence of 
the use of values over and above considerations of personal consequences (see 
Chapter 2), the next step is to explain how values have this effect. This step raises the
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important question of the processes through which values are actually applied to a 
situation. Some research indicates that values function by altering the perceived 
valence (i.e., negativity versus positivity) of objects (Feather, 1995; Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002), but no research has yet revealed how abstract values have this effect. 
Bringing a value to bear in a specific situation means that the gap from the abstract 
representation of the value to the specific representation of the situation must be 
bridged. This task is far from trivial and the processes that underlie this bridging have 
not been addressed.
Applying the value of equality to a concrete situation, for example, requires 
first of all that some quantity is recognized as unequal. Yet, not all inequalities are 
value-relevant and most probably are not. Observing two speakers, we may notice 
that one is taller than the other, one’s hair is longer than the other’s, one’s shirt is a 
darker colour, and so on. However, these differences are likely to be relevant to the 
importance of equality only when there are inequalities of outcome. For example, if 
one of the two speakers is awarded significantly more applause than the other, this 
may trigger the value of equality. At this point, however, the task of bringing the 
value to bear has only begun. The crucial question for evaluation is whether the 
applause should have actually been equal. There could be numerous reasons why the 
differential treatment is not a violation of equality (e.g., different audiences were 
present). Furthermore, other values, such as the need to support the weak or 
disenfranchised, could also be relevant and oppose a decision based on equality in the 
given context. Indeed, explicit examples of these difficulties can be found in the 
complex judicial explanations of legal decisions involving fundamental values and 
rights, whether these be ‘equality’, ‘freedom’, or the ‘sanctity of life’ (e.g., Conte, 
Davidson, & Burchill, 2004). By contrast, much value-guided behaviour in day-to-
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day life involves entirely tacit mental processes. Nevertheless, the same bridging task 
has to be achieved in both cases, and there is no prior evidence about the nature of 
these mental processes.
Elucidating these processes is necessary for an understanding of when values 
are applied and when they are avoided. I propose that individuals must instantiate a 
value in order to be able to relate it to the context in which it appears and that the 
specific instantiation within that context will influence the subsequent application of 
that value. Without instantiation, an abstract value cannot make sense within a 
situation. For example, without imagining the limitations that anti-terrorism measures 
would impose on people’s freedom, it is difficult to incorporate the value of freedom 
into one’s evaluation of such policies. Consistent with this proposal, studies of 
cognitive reasoning have revealed that people avoid reasoning about abstractions 
(e.g., Griggs & Cox, 1982) and prefer to use specific examples or instances when 
making judgments (e.g., Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Sonino-Legrenzi, 1972).
Crucially, the abstract nature of values allows them to be instantiated in 
diverse ways and enables people to use or by-pass their values if they are seen to have 
an ill fit to the situation. For example, some people instantiate the value ‘sanctity of 
life’ in discussions of abortion, but these same people may not instantiate this value in 
the issue of capital punishment (and vice-versa). Similarly, an individual may 
perceive ‘equality’ as a requirement to treat diverse ethnic groups and men and 
women in the same manner, but fail to perceive ‘equality’ in the issue of 
discrimination against people who differ in other characteristics (e.g., height, weight, 
or handedness). The present research examines the impact of different types of value 
instantiation on participants’ subsequent behaviour, thereby providing a vital glimpse
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of how values as abstract representations come to influence behaviour in specific 
situations.
3.2.1 The Importance o f  Value Instantiation
Although past evidence has revealed that contemplation of conflicting values 
increases the complexity of reasoning about an issue (Tetlock, 1986), no past research 
has directly examined effects of value instantiation per se on reasoning and 
behaviour. The most pertinent evidence has examined the effects of elaborate versus 
non-elaborate value representations on behaviour. Specifically, Maio et al. (2001) 
found that elaborating the argumentative reasons for a value increased participants’ 
subsequent pro-value behaviour. In one of their experiments, participants were asked 
to list reasons for the value of equality. Next, in an ostensibly distinct study, 
participants were asked to allocate points to two teams: their own team and another 
team. Despite having received substantial incentives to act in a discriminatory 
manner, participants who had considered reasons for the value of equality 
subsequently behaved in a significantly more egalitarian fashion than participants 
who had just been given a prior opportunity to restate the importance of equality to 
them. Moreover, Maio et al. (2001) predicted and found that the elaboration of 
cognitive support did not affect behaviour by increasing the personal importance of 
the value or by increasing the accessibility of the value from memory. Instead, they 
proposed that the elaboration of reasons for a value helps it to become more 
concretely instantiated. Consistent with this hypothesis, participants who listed more 
concrete instantiations of a value (e.g., describing affirmative action in the workplace) 
among their reasons exhibited more pro-value behaviour than participants who did
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not list such instantiations. This finding provided initial evidence that the instantiation 
of values may play some role in how people use values.
However, the research did not directly manipulate the occurrence of concrete 
value instantiation, nor did it examine effects of the specific content of the 
instantiations. I expect that two equally concrete instantiations within a context might 
nevertheless have substantially different effects. One content factor that might 
moderate the effect of instantiations is whether these instantiations are typical or 
atypical for that value.
In the general literature on conceptual structure, typicality has been found to 
be an important variable (Rosch, 1973). Typical instantiations (e.g., robin) of a 
concept (e.g., bird) are categorised faster (e.g., Heinze, Muente, & Kutas, 1998; for a 
review, see Smith & Medin, 1981) and are more likely to be mentioned first when 
participants are asked to list all members of a category (Battig & Montague, 1969). 
Similarly, typical instantiations are verified more quickly and elicit lower brain 
activity than atypical instances and non-members of a category (Stuss, Sarazin,
Leech, & Picton, 1983). Furthermore, Rosch (1973) found that typical instances of a 
category were more likely to serve as cognitive reference points than atypical 
instantiations. That is, people are more likely to refer to a typical instance of a 
category (e.g., a blackbird) when describing an atypical instance (e.g., a raven) than 
vice versa. Hence, there are reasons to expect that values might serve as stronger 
anchors of judgment and behaviour after people have considered a typical 
instantiation of the value (e.g., equality for women in the workplace) than after 
considering an atypical instantiation (e.g., equality for left handed people in the 
workplace).
Frost 2006 6 5
Chapter 3 Application: Abstract to Specific
Evidence for such a role of typicality would be important because, until now, 
the dominant view has been that values are trans-situational guiding principles that 
influence subsequent behaviour on a higher level than the individual situation (Bardi 
& Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 1992). If this is the case, the typicality of prior 
instantiations should not matter, or, with a more liberal interpretation of this view, 
different instantiations would operate through their impact on the emergent properties 
of the abstract value, such as its importance and centrality. However, if the typicality 
of a value instantiation does affect subsequent behaviour and operates through the 
instantiations themselves (not via properties of the abstract principle), it would be 
clear that the instantiations per se are of particular importance to theorising about 
values and their effects. This result would be of theoretical importance because it 
makes clear that the whole process of how values are brought to bear requires detailed 
attention in a way that has not previously been scrutinized.
The hypothesis that abstract values must be instantiated in order for them to 
be applied to a particular situation echoes some prior suggestions that values exist 
primarily as concrete instantiations for the purpose of justifying decisions made on 
the basis of other factors (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988; Seligman & Katz, 1996; see 
discussion in Chapter 1). Unlike the prior suggestions, however, I propose that people 
also possess an abstract representation of the value, possibly formed from their total 
sets of instantiations, just as occurs in other types of concept learning. If indeed both 
levels of representation are important, this has implications for the rationality of 
people’s value-based behaviour and consequences for numerous applied contexts. 
These implications will be elaborated after the description of the evidence testing this 
hypothesis.
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3.2.2 Overview o f  Experiments
In the following four experiments, I investigated whether the typicality of a 
value instantiation influences behaviour promoting the value. In these experiments, 
participants considered a value instantiation and the effect of the instantiation on their 
behaviour was measured in an ostensibly separate, entirely unrelated, behavioural 
decision-making task. Experiment 4 tested whether the typicality of value 
instantiations affects qualitative aspects of participants’ reasons for a value and their 
pro-value behaviour. Building on the results of Experiment 4, Experiment 5 tested 
whether the typicality of the value instantiation or qualitative aspects of the reasons 
that the instantiations produce affect behaviour. Experiment 6 did not involve reasons 
for values, but simply examined the effects of elaborated typical and atypical 
instantiations on behaviour. Finally, Experiment 7 used different typical and atypical 
instantiations to test the generalisability of the effect and examined potential 
influences of associated affective support and normative pressures on subsequent 
behaviour.
To establish comparable experimental control, all of the studies focused on 
instantiations supporting the value of equality within the same context. This value 
was selected because of its importance to many social psychological theories (e.g., 
Katz & Hass, 1988; Tyler, 2000) on a variety of topics (e.g., justice, prejudice, 
relative deprivation), its importance to the most influential models of values 
(Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992), and its fundamental importance to the global 
discourse about universal human rights (Conte et al., 2004). Because I wanted to 
make the instantiations highly relevant, I used pilot testing to select a single situation 
that was highly relevant to the value of equality and then manipulated typicality 
within that situation. In the pilot study, 12 participants were asked to list situations in
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which they considered equality to be important. The most frequently mentioned 
situation (10 of 12 participants) involved the work place and hiring decisions. 
Therefore, discrimination in the workplace was used as the focus for both the typical 
and atypical instantiations.
In the first three experiments, the typical instantiation for this situation was 
discrimination between men and women, whereas the atypical instantiation focused 
on discrimination between right-handed and left-handed people. The ideal of equality 
as a principle applied clearly to both instances because both sex and handedness are 
arbitrary distinctions that should have no effect in the workplace situation identified. 
If the value of equality is considered as a rigid guiding principle (Schwartz, 1992), 
then the male candidate should be evaluated using the same criteria as the female 
candidate, similarly the left-handed candidate should be evaluated using the same 
criteria as the right-handed candidate. Although the left-handed/right-handed 
distinction is less familiar in this context, and in this sense atypical, handedness is at 
least as arbitrary a criterion for job selection as gender. Because the abstract value of 
equality is highly important to the participants and they see it as highly relevant to the 
situation, it is inconceivable that it would be unacceptable to discriminate between 
candidates on the basis of gender, but acceptable on the basis of handedness -  the 
abstract value of equality does not distinguish between these cases.5
Despite this, I expected participants’ behaviour to differ following a typical 
instantiation as opposed to an atypical instantiation or a control task in which the
5 It is im portant to note a parallel between the concept learning research and the current 
experim ents: all o f  the instances o f  the categories in the cognitive research fall within the 
broader concepts. For exam ple, although robin is a typical instance o f  a bird and penguin is 
not, there is no doubt that they are both birds. Sim ilarly, in the current research, the 
instantiations are instances o f  the value under exam ination and are therefore equally relevant. 
It is sim ply the typicality o f  the instances that varies.
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value is just made salient. Specifically, because typical instantiations in general form 
stronger cognitive reference points, I expected participants to engage in more 
egalitarian (pro-value) behaviour following the typical instantiation than following an 
atypical instantiation or mere reminder of the importance of the abstract value. It was 
also conceivable that the distinctiveness of the atypical instantiation could lead to 
more subsequent pro-value behaviour by causing participants to engage in more 
extensive cognitive elaboration (i.e., justification and explanation) relevant to the 
instantiation. Either way, such typicality effects could occur directly at the level of 
the specific instantiation. If this is the case, then the typicality effect should not be 
mediated by any effect on numerous strength-related value properties that were 
included in the experiments, including ratings of value strength, value centrality, 
value certainty, and value relevance; that is, the effect of the typicality of the 
instantiation should not impact participants’ behaviour by increasing or decreasing 
these properties. Alternatively, if the process underlying the use of values operates at 
the level of the superordinate, abstract value, then the typicality effect should be 
mediated by the strength-related properties of the abstract value representation (e.g., 
value importance, value centrality).
3.3 Experiment 4
Participants in this Experiment were asked to consider reasons for the value of 
equality in situations that used a typical or atypical instantiation of the value within 
the same context prior to measuring egalitarian behaviour. Between the manipulation 
and the behavioural measure, I assessed value importance, value strength, and 
participants’ confidence in the reasons that they listed. I expected that participants
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who considered reasons for the value with a typical instantiation would act in a 
manner more consistent with the value than if they had considered the value with an 
atypical instantiation or had considered no instantiation prior to completing the 
ratings that made the value salient (control).
3.3.1 Method 
Participants
Participants were 90 undergraduate psychology students (76 women and 14 
men) who participated for course credit or £4. Seven additional participants were 
eliminated from analyses because of failure to follow instructions.
Procedure
Participants took part in groups of between five and nine people, seated 
approximately five feet apart. All participants were informed that they would be 
taking part in a number of different studies that had been combined because the 
studies were short. The “first study” contained the manipulation; the “second study” 
contained seven questions assessing the importance and strength of the value of 
equality; and the “third study” contained a measure of intergroup discrimination. 
After completing the measures, funnel debriefing was implemented: participants were 
first asked generally about their impressions of the studies and then progressively 
more specific questions about the procedures. None of the participants indicated any 
suspicion of a connection between the studies.
Experimental Manipulation
Typical condition. Participants were informed that the “first study” looked 
at why social values are considered important in different situations. Participants 
were told that they would be presented with a randomly selected social value and
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then asked to list reasons why it was important to consider that value in a 
specified situation. Participants were then presented with the situation “You must 
choose between a male and a female candidate for the position of Executive Vice 
President of a company” and were asked to give as many reasons as possible why 
the value of equality was important in this situation. Participants were given 
seven minutes to list their reasons on a page o f lined paper and were asked to use 
the entire time.
Atypical condition. Participants in this condition followed a similar procedure 
to the typical condition, except that they were asked to list reasons for equality with 
an atypical instantiation of the value, rather than a typical instantiation. Specifically, 
the context involved choosing between a person who is right-handed and a person 
who is left-handed for the position of Executive Vice President of a company.
Control condition. Participants were informed that the “first study” was 
looking at reasoning about everyday choices. Participants were asked to imagine 
walking into their local coffee shop and ordering their favourite drink. They were 
then asked to give as many reasons as possible as to why they liked that particular 
beverage, using a page of lined paper. Participants were given seven minutes to list 
their reasons and were asked to use the entire time. (The value of equality was then 
made salient using the value measures described below.)
Confidence in Reasons
After listing their reasons (but still as part of the first study), participants in all 
conditions were asked to re-read the reasons that they had listed and to place 
markings (e.g., “/”) to denote where each reason began and ended. Participants then 
rated how confident they felt about each reason by placing a number from 1 (not at all
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confident) to 6 (extremely confident) beside it. Each participant’s ratings were then 
averaged across their reasons.
Value Measures
Participants were informed that the purpose of the “second study” was to 
assess the importance and strength of various social values to students. Participants in 
the typical and atypical conditions were informed that they would be presented with 
the same randomly selected social value for which they had previously listed reasons. 
Participants in the control condition were told that the social value was randomly 
selected. In reality, all participants were presented with questions about the value of 
equality. The first item was taken from the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey: “How 
important is equality as a guiding principle in your life?” and was answered using a 
nine-point scale from -1 (opposed to my values) to 7 (extremely important). The other 
items were “To what extent does the concept of equality describe you and your 
concerns?”, “How certain do you feel about the importance of equality?”, “How 
strong are your feelings about equality?”, “How relevant is equality to how you see 
yourself?”, “How confident are you about the importance that you attach to 
equality?”, “How intensely do you feel about equality?”. Participants responded to 
the first item using an 11 -point scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very well) and to the 
latter five items using a scale from 0 (not at all) to 8 (extremely). These latter six 
items were highly intercorrelated (a = .88) and, therefore, were combined into a 
single measure of value strength. These questions served the dual function of (a) 
assessing whether instantiation typicality affects properties of the values at a more 
abstract level and (b) priming the value of equality in all conditions prior to the 
measure of intergroup discrimination (see below; Maio et al., 2001).
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Measure o f  Intergroup Discrimination
The measure of intergroup discrimination I used was an adaptation of Tajfel’s 
(1970) minimal group paradigm. Participants were told that the purpose of the “third 
study” was to examine decision-making in multiple choice situations and that they 
would be playing a quiz game similar to “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?” The 
experimenter told participants that they would be randomly assigned to either a “red 
group” or a “blue group” and that they would be asked to allocate points to other 
members of both groups before starting the game. To randomly assign group 
membership, each participant was asked to draw a slip of paper from a cup. Half of 
the slips in the cup had “red” printed on them, and the other half had “blue” printed 
on them. Additionally, a number between 30 and 100 was printed on each slip. 
Participants were told that the number was a code for them to write in their decision 
booklets, which the experimenter subsequently distributed.
Next, the experimenter informed participants that their decisions would affect 
future participants who, in the following week, would be randomly assigned a group 
colour and code number. He explained that the future participants would also play the 
quiz and would start with a number of points decided by the current participants’ 
responses in their decision booklets. The experimenter then gave participants general 
instructions on how to make point allocations using the matrices in their booklets (see 
Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994, for a description of these instructions).
After explaining how to allocate the points, the experimenter mentioned a 
“caveat” to their task. Specifically, participants were told that they would start their 
own game with the average number of points that members of their group assigned to 
future members of their group. Thus, the more points that participants allocated to 
their own group, the more points they themselves received. This “caveat” is a
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Matrix 1:
Please place a checkmark in the box that contains the 
points that you give to subject 115 in the RED group and 
subject 12 8 in the BLUE group:
115 RED 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
128 BLUE 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4
Please write the points that each person receives 
according to the box that you have chosen:
Points for 115 of RED: ____
Points for 128 of BLUE:
Matrix 2:
Please place a checkmark in the box that contains the 
points that you give to subject 116 in the RED group and 
subject 113 in the BLUE group:
116 RED 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
113 BLUE 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16
Please write the points that each person receives 
according to the box that you have chosen:
Points for 116 of RED: _____
Points for 113 of BLUE:_____
Figure 3.1. Point allocation matrices used to measure pro-value behaviour
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modification of the Tajfel (1970) paradigm that Maio et al. (2001) used to give 
participants added incentive to favour their own group (see Turner, 1978) and to 
increase the conflict with participants’ value of equality. Participants then indicated 
their group colour and code number on the front of their booklets. The next six pages 
each contained one Tajfel matrix (see Figure 3.1 for two examples), all of which were 
adapted from Bourhis et al. (1994). Each matrix contained two rows and 13 columns. 
At the beginning of each row, there was a code number designating a future 
participant and a colour identifying the group to which the future participants 
belonged. The top row always identified a member of the red group and the bottom 
row always identified a member of the blue group (see Maio et al., 2001). For each 
matrix, participants were asked to put a cross in the column that corresponded with 
the number of points they wished to allocate to the two future participants. 
Participants were also asked to write their choice below the matrix. As the simplest 
way of determining participants’ engagement in pro-value behaviour, the number of 
points allocated to the outgroup was subtracted from the number of points allocated to 
the ingroup across the six matrices (see Bernard et al. 2003b, for further explanation 
of this procedure). Higher scores on this index indicate more ingroup favouritism and 
lower egalitarianism.
3.3.2 Results
There were no significant effects of sex of participant on the dependent 
variables, so all subsequent analyses were collapsed across this variable.
Number o f  Reasons
I counted the number of reasons listed by each participant and a one-way 
(typical vs. atypical vs. control) ANOVA revealed a significant difference between
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the number of reasons listed in the different conditions, F  (2, 87) = 26.03, p  < .001. 
Using the Tukey HSD post-hoc test, there were no significant differences between the 
typical (M  = 4.63) and atypical (M=  4.10) reasons conditions, t (87) = 0.87, ns, but 
participants in the control condition (M = 8.17) listed significantly more reasons than 
participants in the typical, t (87) = 5.76, p  < .001, and atypical, t (87) = 6.64,p  < .001, 
conditions. This result is consistent with Maio and Olson’s (1998) observation that 
participants have more difficulty listing reasons for values than reasons regarding 
attitudes toward mundane objects.
Confidence in Reasons
A one-way (typical vs. atypical vs. control) ANOVA revealed that 
participants’ confidence in their reasons did not differ across conditions, F  (2, 87) = 
0.81, ns.
Value Measures
One-way (typical vs. atypical vs. control) ANOVAs revealed no significant 
effects of the manipulation on participants’ post-manipulation ratings of the 
importance of equality, F  (2, 87) = 0.79, ns, or on the measure of value strength, F  (2, 
87) = 0.40, ns. Similar results were found with separate analyses of the six items that 
constituted the measure of value strength (all ps > .11). These six items included 
measures of value centrality, value certainty, and value relevance, none of which 
were affected by the typicality manipulation.
Inter group Discrimination
A one-way (typical vs. atypical vs. control) ANOVA found significant effects 
on the intergroup discrimination index, F  (2, 87) = 6.30, p  < .01. A planned 
comparison revealed that participants in the typical condition exhibited less ingroup 
favouritism (M=  34.27) than participants in both the control condition (M=  54.87)
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and the atypical condition (M=  53.57), t (87) = - 3.54,p  < .01 (see Figure 3.2). 
Tendencies to favour the ingroup did not differ between the atypical and control 
conditions, t (87) = - 0.20, ns.
Reason Types
In a qualitative analysis of the reasons, I noted that there was a trend for the 
reasons listed in the atypical (left vs. right-hander) condition to be consequentialist in 
nature, in that they draw attention to the consequences of violating the value. For 
example, the reasons included “There are laws against discrimination -  being unfair 
in the choice of candidate, whether right or left-handed, would violate these laws”, “It 
is important to set the right example to others, treating people equally makes them feel 
g o o d \ and “Employees are more productive if  they perceive their environment to be 
fair”.
Conversely, there was a trend for reasons listed in the typical (male vs. 
female) condition to be more non-consequentialist in nature. For example, the reasons 
included “Being male or female should not matter when applying for a job”, “Males 
and females are of equal intelligence”, and “Equality is important when choosing 
between males and females because it is a fundamental right”. This pattern of reason 
production fits with the pattern of familiarity with the instantiations. Following the 
typical instantiation, participants simply restate the principle of equality and blandly 
assert its importance because they are familiar with the instantiation and the reasons 
seem entirely self-evident to them. In contrast, following the atypical instantiation, 
with which participants are less familiar, they use consequential reasons to provide 
extra justification of why equality was important in this novel situation as suggested 
in Section 3.2.
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Figure 3.2. Experiment 4: Ingroup favourability (ingroup points -  outgroup 
points). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
3.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 4 revealed that typical value instantiation elicited more 
subsequent pro-value behaviour than the atypical value instantiation or a condition 
that allowed participants to restate the importance of the value to them. Specifically, 
this effect is driven by the typical condition (see Figure 3.2); participants in this 
condition were more egalitarian than participants in either the atypical or control 
conditions, which do not differ significantly from each other. Additional evidence 
indicated that this effect did not occur because typical instantiations increased 
participants’ confidence about their reasons, the perceived importance of the value, or
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the strength of the value. This suggests that the effect on subsequent behaviour is not 
brought about by changes at the abstract value level. Participants also showed no 
awareness of the link between the “first study” and the subsequent behavioural task, 
despite extensive debriefing.
Additionally, consistent with prior research addressing value elaboration 
(Maio et al., 2001), the extent of the elaboration per se (independent of content) was 
not the crucial factor in determining subsequent behaviour. However, the typicality of 
the instantiation was reflected not only in the degree of egalitarian behaviour 
participants subsequently display, it also seemed to be reflected in the kinds of 
reasons participants gave for why the value was relevant in that situation. The next 
study explores further this difference in reasons and its role in the typicality effect.
3.4 Experiments
Two types of reasons emerged in Experiment 4: non-consequential reasons, 
which were generated in evaluating the typical value instantiation, and consequential 
reasons, which were prompted by the atypical instantiation. Experiment 5 sought 
further evidence for this distinction and its link to typicality by directly supplying 
participants with either consequential or non-consequential reasons. Both kinds of 
instantiations were paired with both kinds of reasons in a 2 (consequential vs. non- 
consequential) x 2 (typical vs. atypical) design. Participants then completed the 
measure of egalitarian behaviour from Experiment 4, as well as measuring the 
perceived strength of the reasons provided. Using this design, I was thus able to 
detect whether or not the effect of typicality on the behaviour observed in Experiment 
4 is mediated by the type of reason. That is, does the typicality effect emerge only
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when the reasons given are the ones that occur naturally in the typical or atypical 
context? Although this does not involve the usual, statistical mediation, the design 
allows examination of mediation experimentally (see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, in 
press).
3.4.1 Method 
Participants
Participants were 90 (63 female, 21 male, and six who failed to indicate their 
gender) high school ‘A’ level students in different schools across South Wales. A 
further nine participants were eliminated from analyses because of their failure to 
complete all sections of the questionnaires or because of suspicion. All participants 
took part on a voluntary basis.
Procedure
Participants were seated approximately four feet apart (in groups of six to 20). 
They were informed that they would be taking part in two different studies. The “first 
study” contained the manipulation and the value measures, and the “second study” 
contained the measure of intergroup discrimination. After completing the measures, 
participants were debriefed and probed for suspicion.
Experimental Manipulations
Participants were told that the “first study” examined social values that people 
consider to be important and the reasons that people think are effective in expressing 
the importance of these values. They were told that they would be presented with a 
situation involving a randomly selected social value and asked to rate the extent to 
which each of six reasons was strong and cogent in expressing the importance of the 
social value in that situation. In reality, all participants received reasons and value
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importance questions relating to the value of equality. Half of the participants rated 
reasons derived from the typical (male vs. female job decision) instantiation in 
Experiment 4, and the other half rated reasons derived from the atypical (left vs. 
right-hander job decision) instantiation in Experiment 4.
Consequential-atypical condition. The consequentialist reasons in the atypical 
condition were six of the reasons given by participants in the atypical condition for 
Experiment 1: “Ensuring there is equality in the decision would demonstrate that the 
company wants a sample of many different perspectives, from both right and left 
handers”, “There are laws against discrimination -  being unfair in the choice of 
candidate, whether right or left handed, would violate these laws”, “The company 
may lose out by choosing on the basis of handedness as the best candidate for the job 
is not chosen”, “It is important to set the right example to others, treating people 
equally makes them feel good”, “Right and left-handers bring different qualities to 
the job. If all the employees were right-handed, this would neglect the qualities that 
left-handers could bring to the job”, and “Employees are more productive if they . 
perceive their environment to be fair.”
Consequential-typical condition. The typical condition in Experiment 5 
modified the six consequential reasons to reflect the typical instantiation. Two 
examples are “Ensuring there is equality in the decision would demonstrate that the 
company wants a sample of many different perspectives, from both males and 
females”, and “There are laws against discrimination -  being unfair in the choice of 
candidate, whether male or female, would violate these laws.”
Non-consequential-typical condition. The non-consequentialist reasons were 
adapted from those provided by participants in the typical (male vs. female job 
decision) condition in Experiment 4. The typical condition in Experiment 5 used six
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of these reasons without modification: “Being male or female should not matter when 
applying for a job”, “It is unfair to select one person over another based on 
characteristics such as gender”, “Males and females are of equal intelligence”, 
“Personal preference or ideas about males or females should not be allowed to affect 
the decision”, “Equality is important when choosing between males and females 
because it is a fundamental right”, and “Being male or female does not influence 
skill.”
Non-consequential-atypical condition. The atypical condition in Experiment 5 
modified the six non-consequential reasons to reflect the atypical instantiation. Two 
examples are “Being left or right handed should not matter when applying for a job”, 
and “It is unfair to select one person over another based on characteristics such as 
being left or right handed.”
Reason Strength Ratings
For exploratory purposes, participants rated the strength and cogency of each 
reason using six-point scales from 1 (not at all) to 6 (extremely). These two ratings 
were strongly correlated, r = .61 >P< .01, and were therefore combined into a single 
measure of reason strength.
Value Measures
Having rated the six reasons, participants were asked to rate the importance of 
equality to them as a guiding principle in their life using a nine-point scale from -1 
(opposed to my values) to 7 (extremely important). Participants then rated the extent 
to which the concept of equality described them as a person (a one-item value 
centrality measure) using an 11-point scale from 0 (does not describe me at all) to 10 
(describes me very well).
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Measure o f  Intergroup Discrimination
Participants were asked to allocate points to future members of their own and 
another team using the same procedure and decision-making matrices as used in 
Experiment 4. Pro-value behaviour was then calculated in the same manner as in 
Experiment 4, such that higher scores on this index indicate more ingroup favouritism 
and lower pro-value behaviour.
3.4.2 Results
There were no significant effects of sex of participant on the dependent 
measures, so all analyses were conducted across this variable.
Value Measures
Consistent with Experiment 4, 2 (reason type: consequential vs. non- 
consequential) x 2 (typicality: typical vs. atypical) ANOVAs revealed no significant 
effects of the manipulation on participants’ post-manipulation ratings of the 
importance of equality or on the measure of the value’s centrality to the self.
Reason Strength
Participants’ ratings of the strength of the reasons for equality were analysed 
using a 2 (reason type: consequential vs. non-consequential) x 2 (typicality: typical 
vs. atypical) ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of the type of 
reasons provided, F ( l ,  83) = 25.35,/? < .001, such that participants overall found the 
non-consequential reasons to be stronger and more cogent than the consequential 
reasons. This main effect however, was moderated by a significant typicality x reason 
type interaction, F (  1, 83) = 15.70,/? < .001 (see Figure 3.3). For the typical 
instantiation, there was no significant difference between participants’ ratings of the 
strength of the non-consequential reasons (M=  4.98, SD = 0.18) and the strength of
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the consequential reasons (M=  4.78, SD = 0.17), F (1, 83) = 0.63, ns. In contrast, for 
the atypical instantiation, participants rated the non-consequential reasons as 
significantly stronger (M=  5.65, SD = 0.20) than the consequential reasons (M =
3.99, SD = 0.19), F ( l ,  83) = 37.49,p  < .001. Participants rated non-consequential 
reasons as weaker in the typical instantiation (M = 4.98, SD =0.18) than in the 
atypical instantiation (M=  5.65, SD = 0.20), F ( l ,  83) = 6.23,p  < .05, whereas the 
consequential reasons were rated as stronger in the typical instantiation (M =  4.78, SD 
= 0.17) than in the atypical instantiation (M =  3.99, SD = 0.19), F ( l ,  83) = 9.1$,p <  
.01 .
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Figure 3.3. Experiment 5: Participants’ ratings of strength of reasons. 
Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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Intergroup Discrimination
A 2 (reason type: consequential vs. non-consequential) x 2 (typicality: typical 
vs. atypical) ANOVA conducted on intergroup discrimination scores revealed no 
significant effects. However, when a planned t-test was used to investigate the 
conditions that were consistent with Experiment 4 (typical instantiation-non- 
consequential reasons and atypical instantiation-consequential reasons), the analysis 
revealed that participants were significantly more egalitarian in the typical-non- 
consequential condition (A/= 25.26) than in the atypical-consequential condition (M  
= 42.29), t (42) = - 2.08, p  < .05 (see Figure 3.4). This result replicates the findings of 
Experiment 4 with reasons provided to participants, rather than self-generated 
reasons.
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Figure 3.4. Experiment 5: Ingroup favourability (ingroup points -  outgroup 
points). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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3.4.3 Discussion
Experiment 5 sought to examine further the distinction between consequential 
and non-consequential reasons and their relationship to typicality of instantiation. 
This experiment enabled me to determine whether this distinction was valid and to 
better understand how typicality impacts the reasons that participants produce. 
Experiment 5 also sought to determine the extent to which the effects of typicality on 
subsequent behaviour observed in Experiment 4 were driven by the situations 
themselves or the reasons that they evoked.
I begin with a consideration of the argument strength results (see Figure 3.3). 
The ratings confirm the importance of the consequential versus non-consequential 
distinction and its relevance to instantiation of typicality in that there is both a main 
effect of reason type and an interaction between reason type and instantiation 
typicality. Overall, non-consequential reasons were perceived to be stronger than 
consequential reasons, a difference that is driven by the atypical instantiations in that 
there is a significant preference for the non-consequential reasons in the atypical 
instantiation, but no preference between the two types of reason in the typical 
instantiation.
That non-consequential reasons were perceived to be stronger in this way is 
surprising given the fact that most of the non-consequential reasons were really not 
reasons at all, but simply affirmations of equality’s importance in that context. By 
contrast, the consequential reasons sought to provide some further rationale as to why 
equality was important. In other words, simply stating that the value is important is 
seen as more convincing than giving an independent reason why. From a persuasion 
perspective, this is an example of a context where giving more reasons gives rise to a 
weaker argument (see also Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), which would seem irrational in
Frost 2006 8 6
Chapter 3 Application: Abstract to Specific
many contexts. It resonates well, however, with the notion of values as truisms (Maio 
& Olson, 1998; Maio et al., 2001) whereby individuals seem not to possess much in 
the way of cognitive support for their values, but rather find them self-evident. 
Providing consequential reasons for why a value matters would detract from the 
“self-evidence”, thus weakening the case for the value.
That non-consequential reasons were perceived to be the stronger in the 
atypical instantiation is interesting for a second reason. In Experiment 4 ,1 found that 
participants generated non-consequential reasons only within a typical instantiation; 
for the atypical instantiation they generated consequential reasons instead. In other 
words, the reasons participants spontaneously generate in the atypical condition are 
the ones that are perceived to be less compelling. Participants exposed to an atypical, 
unfamiliar, context seem to have felt the need to elaborate why equality matters in 
this novel situation; drawing out consequences of affirming or rejecting the value in 
this particular context was part of this elaboration. This is consistent with research 
suggesting that individuals uncertain about the validity of an account engage in more 
elaboration and integration of the information than participants who are confident in 
the information (Schul, Bumstein, & Bardi, 1996). It seems, then, that this 
uncertainty, which gives rise to more elaboration, is also inferred in other people’s 
arguments, such that more seems less.
When considering the effects of instantiation typicality on subsequent 
behaviour (see Figure 3.4), the results suggest an interplay between the situation itself 
and the type of reason. No main effects emerged here, rather the present experiment 
replicates the results of Experiment 4 in the conditions that were ‘naturally’ produced 
by participants in that experiment: participants were significantly more egalitarian 
after non-consequential reasons presented in a typical instantiation than after
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consequential reasons presented in an atypical instantiation. This was the case even 
though participants in Experiment 5 read presented reasons rather than generated 
reasons themselves as in Experiment 4. As in Experiment 4, the behavioural effect 
was not paralleled by changes in value importance or centrality of the value to the 
self.
This pattern of evidence indicates that the effect of reasons generation in 
typical versus atypical contexts in Experiments 4 and 5 was partly mediated by the 
types of reasons generated by participants in typical versus atypical contexts, such 
that the atypical context caused people to generate (consequential) reasons that are 
perceived as less strong. However, recall that the typical condition drives the effect 
on behaviour (see Experiment 4); participants are more egalitarian in the typical 
condition than in the atypical or control conditions. Importantly, there were no effects 
(see Figure 3.4) of reasons in these typical conditions; processing a typical 
instantiation of equality, regardless of the specific reasons produced, made 
individuals egalitarian. In contrast, processing an atypical instantiation facilitates this 
egalitarian behaviour (see Figure 3.4) only with the presence of the ‘strong’ (see 
Figure 3.3) non-consequential reasons. This latter effect may operate by increasing 
the familiarity of the atypical instantiation through the reassertions of the principle of 
equality by the non-consequential reasons. In other words, the non-consequential 
reasons help to make the atypical instantiation seem more self-evident and familiar, 
enabling its use as an anchor for later behaviour. Nevertheless, in the condition that 
drives the focal effect, the typical condition, there is no difference in reason strength, 
so differences in reason type do not seem necessary for the effect. What remains 
unclear, however, is whether some kind of reason, and the deliberative context that
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reasons provide, has to be present or whether the effect would occur even without any 
reasons at all.
3.5 Experiment 6
In order to test whether or not reasons are necessary for the typicality effect to 
occur and thus to provide more information about the use of social values, 
Experiment 6 used a design that discouraged individuals from generating reasons. It 
also mapped the task more closely onto real-world situations; despite the importance 
of reasoning and the use of reasons to elicit value-consistent behaviour in previous 
research (e.g., Maio et al., 2001), most real-world instantiations do not involve 
explication of reasons for a value (Maio & Olson, 1998). In everyday life, individuals 
simply experience, hear about, or read an account of an incident without necessarily 
considering the reasons for or against the actions involved. Therefore, if there is a real 
role of instantiation, it should not require reasons to be generated or contemplated in 
order to facilitate value-consistent behaviour. Consequently, it is important to 
investigate whether the typicality of the instantiation alone elicits this effect: is it 
sufficient to imagine a typical instantiation, rather than also produce or read reasons 
for a value? The answer to this question would shed light on the process underlying 
the use of values, and no previous research has addressed the possibility of 
encouraging pro-value behaviour via elaborated instantiations alone.
Experiment 6 examined whether the typicality of the instantiation itself 
influenced participants’ subsequent behaviour. In order to avoid the self-generation of 
reasons within a brief situation, participants simply read an expanded version of the 
typical or atypical instantiation used in the previous experiments for a limited time
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(three minutes) and no reasons were requested. Participants then completed the 
measure of egalitarian behaviour as in the prior experiments.
3.5.1 Method 
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 60 (46 female, 11 male and three who failed to indicate their 
sex) high school ‘A’ level students in different schools across South Wales. A further 
seven participants were eliminated from analyses because of failure to follow 
instructions or because they exhibited suspicion. All participants took part on a 
voluntary basis and completed the same basic procedure as in Experiment 5, except 
for alterations to the experimental manipulation (below). This manipulation simply 
varied the content of a value instantiation (typical, atypical or control) that 
participants were asked to read. Participants then completed measures of value 
importance and strength from Experiment 1, which also served to make the value of 
equality salient before completing the measure of intergroup discrimination. All 
participants then completed the same intergroup discrimination task as in 
Experiments 4 and 5.
Experimental Manipulation
Typical instantiation. In this condition, participants were told that the “first 
study” was investigating people’s perceptions of the involvement of social values in 
different situations. They read an expanded version of the typical instantiation from 
Experiments 4 and 5 for three minutes. Specifically, participants were presented with 
a short story that described interviews for the position of Executive Vice-President. 
The story described interviews that took place at a local cafe in order to accommodate 
the large numbers of people on the interview panel. Candidates had to make a
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presentation to the panel members on their ideas for the future of the company. The 
description ended with two sentences suggesting that an inadvertent physical feature 
of the setting (a cobble stone floor) caused unintentional discrimination against the 
female candidates: “Unfortunately, the cobble stones meant that the female 
candidates had a very hard time of walking while giving their presentations, because 
of the heels on their shoes. The male candidates did not have this difficulty and made 
better impressions on the interview panel.”
Atypical instantiation. Participants in this condition followed a similar 
procedure as above, but they were presented with an expanded version of the atypical 
situation from Experiments 4 and 5. The text was identical to that used in the typical 
instantiation, except that this version ended with two sentences suggesting that an 
inadvertent physical feature of the setting (placing of the lectern) caused unintentional 
discrimination against left-handed candidates: “Unfortunately, the set up of the 
equipment meant that the left-handed candidates had a very hard time making their 
presentation; they had to walk from the lectern to the other side of the screen to use 
their left hand to point out important information. Right-handers could stay at the 
lectern and continue to glance at their notes, and these candidates made better 
impressions on the interview panel.”
Control condition. In this condition, participants were informed that the “first 
study” would present them with two questions about a randomly selected social 
value. All participants in this condition proceeded directly to the measures of value 
importance and strength.
3.5.2 Results
There were no significant effects of sex of participants on the principal
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dependent variable (intergroup discrimination), so all analyses were conducted across 
sex.
Value Measures
Consistent with Experiments 4 and 5, one-way (typical vs. atypical vs. 
control) ANOVAs again revealed no significant effects of the manipulation on 
participants’ post-manipulation ratings of the importance of equality, F (2, 57) = 0.30, 
ns, or on value strength, F  (2, 57) = 0.16, ns.
Intergroup Discrimination
Again, consistent with Experiments 4 and 5, a one-way (typical vs. atypical 
vs. control) ANOVA revealed significant effects on the index of intergroup
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Figure 3.5. Experiment 6: Ingroup favourability (ingroup points -  outgroup 
points). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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discrimination, F ( 2, 57) = 6.20,p  < .01 (see Figure 3.5). A planned comparison 
revealed that participants in the typical condition (M=  13.36) exhibited less ingroup 
favouritism than participants in both the atypical (M=  30.35) and the control 
conditions (M =  43.44), t (57) = - 3.24,/? < .05. Tendencies to favour the ingroup did 
not differ between the atypical and control conditions, t (57) = - 1.49, ns.
3.5.3 Discussion
Experiment 6 supported the hypothesis that the typicality of the instantiation 
alone is sufficient to influence participants’ subsequent behaviour even when no 
reasons are contemplated. This is the first evidence that an extended instantiation 
alone can impact subsequent, unrelated behaviour; participants were more egalitarian 
after reading an extended version of the typical (male vs. female job decision) 
instantiation than after reading an extended version of the atypical (left vs. right 
hander job decision) instantiation or after simply rating the importance and centrality 
of equality (control condition). Crucially, the typical and atypical instantiations were 
within the same situational context, and it was only the typicality of the group 
categories as instantiations of equality that was manipulated. As in Experiments 4 and 
5, this effect was again not mediated by an impact on the importance or centrality of 
the value; there were no changes in the strength-related properties of the abstract 
value itself. Rather, the extended typical instantiation alone (without elicitation of 
reasons) was sufficient to elicit more subsequent pro-value behaviour.
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3.6 Experiment 7
Experiment 7 tested the generalisability of the results using new typical and 
atypical instantiations, again within the same situational context. Both instantiations 
involved discrimination against groups that are important potential targets of 
prejudice. The typical instantiation involved discrimination against a Black applicant, 
and the atypical instantiation involved discrimination against an applicant with a 
disability. Despite the change in target groups, I expected that the typical instantiation 
would again evoke more subsequent egalitarian behaviour than the atypical 
instantiation.
In addition, the experiment tested three further explanations for the effect of 
the typical instantiations. First, I tested whether the typical instantiation provides 
sufficient support for participants to engage in pro-value behaviour by perhaps 
affecting the emotions felt for that specific situation. For example, people might feel 
more sympathy for the victim of inadvertent discrimination in the typical instantiation 
than in the atypical instantiation. Because empathy tends to elicit greater pro-social 
behaviour (e.g., Batson & Tecia, 1999), it is possible that the elicitation of greater 
empathy in the typical instantiation directly leads to the increase in pro-value 
behaviour. To explore this possibility, participants were presented with the situation 
and asked to rate the extent to which they felt sympathy for the individual involved.
Second, the Experiment tested whether the typical instantiation affects the 
manner in which people regulate their pursuit of the abstract value. Higgins (1998b) 
draws a distinction between people’s wants and desires and the oughts and norms that 
they perceive from other people and society generally. It is possible that, although 
participants’ perception of the importance or centrality of equality does not change in
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the different instantiations, their perception of the extent to which they want to or feel 
they should use equality does change. This effect would contradict the claim that the 
effects operate purely at the level of the instantiation itself (i.e., without mediation 
through the abstract value). To examine this possibility, participants completed 
measures of the extent to which they ‘would want to’ and ‘would feel they should’ 
use equality in their general decision-making.
Third, Experiment 7 tested whether the typicality of the instantiation 
differentially impacts the accessibility of the concept of equality from memory. I 
consider this an unlikely explanation for the results given that equality was 
deliberately made salient (and therefore accessible) to participants in all conditions 
before they engage in the behavioural measure. Nevertheless, to rule out this 
alternative explanation, a separate group of participants were given the materials from 
either the typical or atypical condition and then completed measures of the 
accessibility of the concept of equality, based on two well-established reaction-time 
methods. These measures were given to a separate group of participants to avoid 
interference with the main measures, while still enabling a test of whether any 
differences between the typical and atypical instantiations were plausibly attributable 
to differences in value accessibility.
3.6.1 Method 
Participants
In the main sample, participants were 60 (47 female, 11 male, and two who 
failed to indicate their gender) undergraduate students who participated for course 
credit or £3. Eight additional participants were excluded from analyses for failure to 
complete all sections of the study or for indicating suspicion.
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In the sample that was used to examine effects of the manipulation on value 
accessibility, participants were 40 (35 female and five male) undergraduate students 
who participated for course credit or £3. Two additional participants were excluded 
from analyses for failure to complete all sections of the study.
Procedure
In the main sample, participants were seated approximately five feet apart in 
groups of two to seven. Following a similar procedure to the previous experiments, 
all participants were informed that they would be taking part in two different studies: 
the first contained the manipulation and the value measures and the second contained 
the measure of intergroup discrimination used in the prior experiments.
In the additional sample, participants completed either the typical or atypical 
instantiation condition, but instead of the group discrimination measure (previously 
“Study 2”), participants then (a) completed a word categorisation task and (b) 
completed a timed rating of the importance of five different social values (the final 
value was equality; the preceding values were used as practise trials). All participants 
in both samples were debriefed and probed for suspicion using the funnel debriefing 
method.
Experimental Manipulation
Participants in the typical and atypical instantiation conditions read the story 
involving discrimination and proceeded directly to the general value and regulatory 
focus measures after they had read through the text.
Typical instantiation. Following the same procedures as in Experiment 6, 
participants were presented with a short story that described interviews for the 
position of Executive Vice-President. (This overarching story-line was maintained 
from the previous experiments because participants often noted the ecological
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validity of the situation during debriefing in the prior experiments.) The story 
described interviews that included a half-hour presentation and then a formal 
interview by a large panel of interviewers. The description ended with three sentences 
suggesting that nervousness on the part of several members of the interview panel, 
who were keen to avoid prejudice, caused unintentional discrimination against a 
Black candidate: “Unfortunately, several of the members of the panel had limited 
experience with people from ethnic minorities and were nervous about appearing 
uncomfortable or biased. The Black applicant picked up on their nervousness, which 
affected his confidence and made him answer questions more tentatively. As a result, 
the White applicants made better impressions on the interview panel.”
Atypical instantiation. Participants in this condition followed a similar 
procedure as above, but they were presented with a short story that involved atypical 
discrimination. The text was identical to that used in the typical instantiation 
condition, except that this version ended with three sentences suggesting that 
nervousness by several members of the interview panel, who were keen to avoid 
prejudice, caused unintentional discrimination against a candidate with an eye patch: 
“Unfortunately, several of the members of the panel had limited experience of people 
with disabilities and were nervous about appearing uncomfortable or biased. The 
applicant with an eye patch picked up on their nervousness, which affected his 
confidence and made him answer questions more tentatively. As a result, the other 
applicants made better impressions on the interview panel.”
Control condition. In this condition, participants were informed that the “first 
study” was about social values and that they would be presented with three questions 
about a randomly selected social value. Participants in this condition proceeded 
directly to the general value and regulatory focus measures.
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General Value and Regulatory Focus Measures
Participants were asked to rate the importance of equality to them as a guiding 
principle in their life, using a nine-point scale from -1 (opposed to my values) to 7 
(extremely important). In addition, participants were asked to rate the extent to which 
they felt they should use and would want to use equality in their decision-making in 
general, using two 11-point scales from 0 (not at all) to 10 (definitely).
Associated Affect
Participants in the typical and atypical conditions were asked to rate how 
sorry they felt for the candidate who was discriminated against and how sympathetic 
they felt towards the candidate, using 11 -point scales from 0 (not at all) to 10 
(extremely).
Value Accessibility
Participants in the additional sample completed two reaction time measures of 
the accessibility of the concept of equality rather than progressing to the intergroup 
discrimination task. For the word categorisation task (or computer-based lexical 
decision task; see Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & De Vries, 2001) participants’ reaction times 
were measured as they categorised letter strings into words and non-words. Half of 
the word stimuli were equality related words (e.g., equal, similarity, fairness) and the 
other half were neutral words (e.g., slate, painting, marketing). The mean length of 
the letter strings and words was controlled.
For the timed importance ratings of the values, participants were presented 
with five different social values and were asked to rate the importance of the values 
on a rating scale from 1 (not at all important) to 4 (extremely important). The first 
four values acted as practise trials for the final value presented: the value of equality.
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Analyses were only conducted on the reaction times of the measure of the importance 
of equality.
3.6.2 Results
The effects of sex of participants on any of the dependent variables were not 
significant, so all analyses were collapsed across sex.
General Value and Regulatory Focus Measures
Consistent with Experiments 4, 5, and 6, a one-way (typical vs. atypical vs. 
control) ANOVA revealed no significant effects of the manipulation on participants’ 
post-manipulation ratings of the importance of equality, F  (2, 57) = 0.20, ns. In 
addition, one-way ANOVAs revealed no significant effects of the manipulation on 
the extent that participants should use equality in general, F  (2, 57) = 1.53, ns, or on 
the extent that participants would want to use equality in general, F  (2, 57) = 1.23, ns. 
Associated Affect
One-way (typical vs. atypical) ANOVAs revealed no significant effects of the 
manipulation on participants’ ratings of how sorry, F ( l ,  38) = 2.83, ns, or 
sympathetic, F  (1, 38) = 0.37, ns, they felt for the individual in the story. A combined 
measure of sorrow and sympathy (a = .81) revealed similar null effects (p > .3).
Value Accessibility
Analyses of the (logged) reaction times revealed no significant differences 
between the typical and atypical instantiation conditions for the neutral, F  (1, 38) = 
0.26, ns, or equality-related, F (  1, 38) = 1.42, ns, words. In addition, analysis of the 
timed value importance measures revealed no significant differences between the 
typical and atypical instantiation conditions for the reaction times, F ( l ,  38) = 0.31, 
ns, or the importance ratings, F ( l ,  38) = 1.30, ns.
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Intergroup Discrimination
A one-way (typical vs. atypical vs. control) ANOVA found significant effects 
on the index of intergroup discrimination, F  (2, 57) = 6.54,/? < .01 (see Figure 3.6). 
As in the prior experiments, a planned comparison revealed that participants in the 
typical condition exhibited less ingroup favouritism (M=  27.0) than participants in 
both the atypical (M=  51.9) and the control conditions (M=  53.2), t (57) = - 3.61,/? < 
.01. Again, tendencies to favour the ingroup did not differ between the atypical and 
control conditions, t (57) = - 0.17, ns.
3.6.3 Discussion
Using new instantiations, Experiment 7 again found that the typicality of the 
instantiation alone has a significant influence on participants’ subsequent pro-value 
behaviour. Participants were more egalitarian after reading the typical instantiation 
(Black candidate) than after reading the atypical instantiation (candidate with an eye- 
patch) or after simply completing the general value measures. As in the previous 
three experiments, this effect was not mediated by an impact on attributes of the value 
at an abstract level. In addition, the effect of typicality was not mediated by any 
impact of the manipulation on affective associations with the individual in the 
instantiation, regulatory focus towards the value, or differences in the accessibility of 
equality. This pattern again provides evidence that the effects occur through the 
application of the instantiations themselves, rather than via changes associated with 
the abstract values per se.
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Figure 3.6. Experiment 7: Ingroup favourability (ingroup points -  outgroup 
points). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
3.7 Discussion
The current investigation provides evidence that the way a value is 
instantiated has two important effects: the typicality of the value instantiation affects 
reasons associated with the value (Experiments 4 and 5) and affects subsequent pro­
value behaviour (Experiments 4 - 7). Across four experiments, results consistently 
indicated that exposure to a typical instantiation enhances subsequent pro-value 
behaviour whereas exposure to an atypical instantiation does not. This effect was 
evident despite considerable incentives for participants to behave in a discriminatory 
manner and is present when participants list their own reasons for the value
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(Experiment 4) or are provided with reasons consistent with those they would have 
generated (Experiment 5). This effect is also evident when no reasons are present 
(Experiments 6 and 7). Moreover, this effect does not occur because the instantiation 
makes the value seem more important or central to the self or because it alters 
affective associations with the value, the regulatory focus applied to the value, or its 
ease of retrieval from memory (Experiment 7). Thus, using salient instantiations that 
were akin to real-life situations, the results provide the first direct evidence that 
instantiations of a value have direct effects on subsequent behaviour.
Summarised simply, people’s behaviour in a simple task that allocates points 
to two different “teams” was altered by whether they had just thought about a typical 
or atypical instantiation of equality within the same situational context, even though 
the value of equality was equally relevant to both of these instantiations. Moreover, 
neither of these instantiations had any direct relation to the subsequent decision­
making. When I probed participants about these effects, none thought that they 
should be or were influenced by the nature of the prior instantiation. To them, there 
was no overt reason why seeing discrimination against women or left handers or 
against Blacks or the disabled should cause different subsequent levels of 
discrimination. In addition, participants did not perceive a link between the explicit 
priming of the value instantiation in the “first study” and the behavioural measure in 
the subsequent study. Using funnel debriefing throughout the four experiments, 
participants who indicated any level of suspicion were excluded from the analyses. 
This is not crucial, however. If participants were aware of a link between the studies, 
this would still not have accounted for the typicality effect because nothing about the 
reported values themselves changed, despite the observed changes in behaviour. The 
experiments included a variety of properties of the value at an abstract level,
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including measures of value importance, value strength, value centrality, value 
relevance, value certainty, value associated affect, means of value regulation, and 
value accessibility. Participants had ample opportunity to express increased 
commitment to the value, but there was no evidence that any of these variables 
mediated the robust effect of typicality. The typicality of the instantiations did not 
change any properties of the abstract value.
Therefore, in response to the second issue raised in Chapter 1 (the application 
of abstract values to specific contexts), the current research provides evidence that 
people bridge the gap between abstract values and behaviour within specific 
situations through instantiations of the value within the specific context. Moreover, 
Experiments 4 to 7 suggest that it is at the level of instantiations that participants’ 
subsequent behaviour is influenced and not at the level of the abstract guiding 
principle as suggested by much of the extant literature. In my view, the typical 
instantiations are effective because they bridge the gap between the abstract principle 
and the specific context in a familiar way and thus enable values to guide behaviour.
This evidence of the importance of value instantiations therefore raises the 
issue, as proposed in the values as justifications literature (e.g., Kristiansen & Zanna, 
1988; Seligman & Katz, 1996), of whether values primarily exist as concrete 
instantiations and not as abstract guiding principles at all. The results of these 
experiments do not allow such a conclusion, however. As outlined above, I propose 
that people possess an abstract representation of the value and that it is the 
instantiation of that value within the specific context that influences an individual’s 
behaviour within the situation. This proposal is bom out by the data; the current 
research provides evidence of the differential impact of value instantiations on 
subsequent behaviour as well as the consistency of strength-related properties of the
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abstract value. This consistency suggests that value representations at the higher, 
abstract level do exist and that they are unaffected by the specific instantiations of the 
value. It is the instantiations themselves that serve as salient bridges between the 
abstract principle and later application to other contexts that contain features (e.g., 
potential for unequal outcomes) relevant to the value. If the instantiation is typical, its 
likelihood of use is much greater.
Another intriguing finding of the current research is Experiment 5’s argument 
strength results. Interestingly, participants found the non-consequential arguments to 
be more convincing, overall, than the consequential arguments. This was the case 
despite the fact that these non-consequential reasons were simply reassertions of the 
basic principle of equality and, therefore, were not really arguments at all. 
Notwithstanding this evidence, the involvement of reasons in Experiments 4 and 5 
contributed an important additional perspective about the processes underlying the 
use of values by focussing on the cognitive support for the value. It is particularly 
remarkable that the typicality effect was evident even after participants have 
explicitly listed or read reasons for equality and therefore reasons to avoid arbitrary 
discrimination. Moreover, in the atypical instantiation of reasons condition, 
participants also rated the importance of equality. Yet, just moments after expressing 
strong pro-equality reasons and ratings, these participants still exhibited significantly 
less egalitarian behaviour than participants who pondered reasons in the typical 
context. In other words, the typicality of a value instantiation exerts a powerful effect 
even in a highly deliberative context that should make it difficult to see an effect at 
all. This is yet further evidence of the importance and influence of social values on 
decision-making and behaviour.
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The results across experiments have important implications for understanding 
the nature and rationality of human moral judgment and behaviour. Equality is not 
just any old value; it is a fundamental moral value (Schwartz, 1992) and, as such, it is 
enshrined politically and legally in documents across the world, from the French 
rallying call of “liberte, egalite, fratemite...!” through to the UN Convention of 
Fundamental Human Rights (Article 26: 185 signatories), the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Article 14: 45 signatories), and individual national constitutions 
(e.g., Amendments XV and XIX of the Constitution of the United States of America, 
Article III of Germany’s Constitution). I outlined in Section 3.2 how value 
instantiation involves a range of complex judgments and decisions, as evidenced in 
the legal materials. Though complex deliberations about values are also found in 
daily life, the cognitive system often brings values to bear in a seemingly effortless 
fashion. This suggests the possible use of heuristics (see Newell & Simon, 1972; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) in value-based decisions. Relevant to this hypothesis, 
several authors have previously sought to make a case for moral heuristics (e.g., 
Baron, 1993; Sunstein, 2005; see also Hahn, Frost, & Maio, 2005), such as the 
distinction that is made between acts of omission and acts of commission. Baron and 
colleagues (e.g., Haidt & Baron, 1996; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991) have found 
that participants judge individuals more harshly for an act of commission than for an 
act of omission, even given the involvement of the same principles. That is, with the 
same issues at stake and, in effect, the same decision to be made, the way that a moral 
choice is instantiated can elicit different decisions (Baron, 1992).
However, the main difficulty in establishing ‘moral’ heuristics is that of 
finding a standard of correctness against which moral outcomes can be judged. 
Absolute standards of moral rationality are notoriously difficult to obtain (Harris,
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1986; Pojman, 1998; Seedhouse, 2002). So, in the above illustration, one might 
question whether omissions and commissions are not relevantly dissimilar, as 
evidenced by the fact that the criminal legal systems of many countries make 
sophisticated and subtle distinctions between acts of commission and omission (see 
Bennett, 1981). However, my findings would seem to make a clear-cut case for which 
any kind of rational justification would be difficult to establish. It can not be 
normative to display differing amounts of egalitarian behaviour merely as a function 
of prior exposure to a fictitious episode, in particular as this exposure fails to 
modulate in any way participants’ overt perceptions of the relevance and importance 
of these values. In fact, participants explicitly indicate that (a) the value of equality is 
highly important, central and relevant, (b) they have sympathy for the individual 
involved, and (c) feel that they should use the value of equality in their decision­
making. Yet, with all these variables being equal, the typicality of the instantiation of 
the value plays a significant role in participants’ subsequent behaviour in an entirely 
unrelated task that presents strong incentives to be discriminatory. This would 
suggest the use of an underlying heuristic, although further investigation is needed to 
establish its scope and exact nature. Even within cognitive psychology, which has 
concerned itself extensively with typicality, the focus has been on effects of typicality 
on the processing of the instantiation itself (e.g., Battig & Montague, 1969; Rosch, 
1973; Stuss et al., 1983); to date, there is no published research on the effects of 
typicality on a subsequent processing situation. My results open the possibility that 
effects of typicality are deep rooted and have spill-over consequences for subsequent 
decisions. As such, these effects potentially apply to a wide range of psychological 
tasks and situations.6
6 The sim ilarity o f  the typical instantiation to past instances may trigger analogical mapping.
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The current findings also add to prior research that examined the effects of 
elaborating reasons for a value on subsequent pro-value behaviour (Bernard et al., 
2003b; Maio et al., 2001). That is, such reasons will have a significantly weaker (or 
null) effect when they feature an atypical instantiation. This result indicates that Maio 
et al.’s (2001) finding of increased pro-value behaviour following concrete 
instantiations occurred because participants in their research spontaneously thought of 
typical instantiations (Rosch, 1975). In other instances, people might not be guided to 
think of typical instantiations. For example, some intervention strategies seek to 
increase corporate citizenship by getting people to think about the importance of 
helpfulness (Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999; McAlister & Ferrell, 2002), but people’s 
typical thoughts about this value may have more to do with charities and people in 
need than colleagues at work or the role of the corporation within society. As a result, 
such interventions may be less effective than other approaches.
This is not to suggest, however, that atypical instantiations should be ignored 
or dismissed as unimportant. In contrast, they may function as important testing 
grounds for people’s use of the principle because they show how far the ideal may or 
may not be stretched. If people discover that the atypical instantiation can be covered 
plausibly, then the ‘value’ may be expanded to include this instantiation and its reach 
as a guiding principle would be considerably increased. What remains to be 
determined is whether or when atypical instantiations can function in this way. This 
issue is particularly salient when addressing atypical forms of discrimination (e.g.,
That is, participants apply the solution to previous problem s to an analogically similar 
instance o f  the problem  (see, e.g., Ross & Kilbane, 1997). In this way, the extensive 
inform ation in m em ory is not activated, but rather the principle of, for example, equality is 
restated as the self-evident solution in this situation and is more likely to be used in 
subsequent, unrelated behaviour.
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age-ist or fat-ist issues). Currently, ‘typical’ forms of discrimination are often 
prohibited in legislation, but there is no specific legislation against less typical forms 
of discrimination. Yet, some of the less typical forms of discrimination are noticeably 
prevalent within society. For example, research has shown that obese people report 
more employment discrimination than non-obese people (Rothblum, Brand, Miller, & 
Oetjen, 1990) and that employers were unwilling to hire “fat” people even if their 
weight would not have affected their performance in their job (Roe & Eickwort, 
1976). Touster (2000) suggests that fatness is stigmatized in society and yet 
oppression of fat people is not viewed as illegitimate oppression (see also Crandall & 
Biemat, 1990). It is likely that this view occurs because treatment of fat versus thin 
people is not as often perceived as an issue of equal opportunity (see McVittie, 
McKinlay, & Widdicombe, 2003, for a related discussion of age-ism). Therefore, it 
may be useful to ensure that values are considered across diverse situations because 
the contexts within which people experience values on a daily basis will not 
necessarily be typical instantiations of those values.
3.8 Chapter Summary
To return to the issue raised at the outset, it seems that value instantiations are 
the bridge that enable people to project abstract social values on to specific situations 
in order to influence behaviour. In relation to the quotation at the beginning of this 
Chapter, it is not simply the case that values make decisions easier; rather, people’s 
use of values is more complex than the extant literature has proposed. The results 
presented in this Chapter suggest that the guidance provided by values is dependent 
on the salient instantiation of the value and that people may be unaware of the impact
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that prior value instantiations can have on their own behaviour. The results also 
clearly show that value instantiations are vital and unique components of values, 
distinct from the existence of values at the higher, abstract level, but exerting a 
powerful impact on subsequent value-relevant behaviour. This research has shed light 
on the processes that underlie how values are used, which is crucial for understanding 
the link between values and behaviour.
Given this better understanding of how social values are used within specific 
situations and the evidence of the role that values play as guiding principles and 
justifications (Chapter 2), it is now appropriate to shift the focus back to the use of 
values at the abstract level. As I noted above and in the prior chapter, I expect that 
values are used both at the abstract level and at the level of instantiation. Both types 
of representations are relevant to the use of values in rhetoric and particularly in 
politics and political propaganda. In such contexts, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, 
values are often combined in order to form ‘stronger’ and ‘broader’ arguments in 
support of a particular policy or strategy. This use of values focuses on using the 
abstract values as part of an argument, often without specifying what is meant by the 
abstract terms. Despite this prevalent use of social values within rhetoric, this type of 
value argumentation has not been addressed empirically. This issue will be the focus 
of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4 
Persuasion: Similar is Best
4.1 Chapter Overview
The main aim of this Chapter is to expand understanding of co-value 
argumentation, which involves appealing to one value in order to support another 
value. This is a technique often employed by politicians, philosophers and rhetors in 
order to strengthen the overall impact of their arguments and to appeal to diverse 
audiences. Despite the prevalence of such arguments, the use and limitations of co­
value argumentation have not been empirically examined. Across three experiments, I 
investigated the impact of the psychological relatedness of values on the 
persuasiveness of the arguments that bind them. Experiment 8 found that participants 
were more persuaded by arguments citing values that fulfilled similar motives than by 
arguments citing more diverse values. Experiment 9 ruled out differences in value 
importance as an alternative explanation of this effect and Experiment 10 extended 
the effect to more complex real-world arguments taken from political propaganda and 
revealed a mediating effect of argument plausibility. This research highlights the 
importance of value relatedness in persuasive arguments, reveals an a priori 
psychological predictor of argument persuasiveness and shows that there are implicit 
constraints within the human structure of values that limit their use in argumentation.
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4.2 Co-Value Argumentation
“The Manifesto of the Communist Party 
QUESTION 1: Are you a communist?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION 2: What is the aim of the Communists?
ANSWER: To organise society in such a way that every member of it can 
develop and use all his capabilities and powers in complete freedom  and 
without thereby infringing the basic conditions of this society.
QUESTION 3: How do you wish to achieve this aim?
ANSWER: By elimination of private property and its replacement by 
community o f  property.”
Engels (1847, as cited in Wheen, 1999, p. 115, italics added) 
“I will choose freedom  because I think freedom  leads to equality”
George W. Bush (as cited in Anderson, 1999, italics added) 
From the 1847 manifesto of the Communist Party to more current and 
capitalist sources (e.g., the President of the United States), major political ideologies 
employ co-value argumentation: they appeal to one value in order to support another 
value. The two examples above use the same values of freedom and equality in order 
to convince their audience of the different goals that they seek to achieve. On the one 
hand, the Communist Manifesto states that freedom will be achieved by facilitating 
equality in a “community of property”. On the other hand, George W. Bush claims 
that freedom leads to equality. However, these are not isolated cases of co-value 
argumentation; appealing to one social value to validate another dates back as far as 
Plato, who stated that equality leads to friendship (Prangle, 1988). In addition, co­
value argumentation is used within the business domain (e.g., “Greenspan: Honesty
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leads to success in life and business,” 1999; italics added) and in political dialogue 
(e.g., George W. Bush above; see Gordon & Miller, 2004 for a discussion of the use 
of values in politics).
The use of co-value argumentation provides politicians and rhetors with a 
huge advantage: social values are seen as important, they are generally viewed 
positively (Schwartz, 1992), and individuals attempt to behave consistently with their 
values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996). Given these facts, it is easy to see why 
politicians and speech writers use social values to appeal to their audience, because it 
is likely that most people will agree with a statement in support of values. As such, 
this use of values is likely to be one of the predominant ways in which people 
encounter value terms and discuss values in everyday life. Any investigation of the 
use of values should therefore not ignore this prevalent rhetorical technique. In this 
Chapter, I propose that the motivational structure underlying values introduces a 
potential limitation of co-value argumentation. Namely, there must be constraints on 
which values are paired in such arguments; not all statements involving values are 
likely to be equally persuasive. This research investigates the influence of the 
psychological relationships between values on the persuasiveness of the arguments 
that bind them.
4.2.1 Social Value Structure
Examination of co-value argumentation is facilitated by the considerable 
evidence of a well-established structure of values, a structure that has been repeatedly 
tested across a range of samples in a variety of countries. As reviewed in Chapter 1, 
extensive research has examined the psychological organisation of values. The most 
influential and empirically supported structure was postulated by Schwartz (1992;
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Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987), who proposed the existence of ten motivationally distinct 
types of values organized in a circumplex design subsuming two dimensions (see 
Figure 4.1, a replication of Figure 1.1 presented again for clarity and ease of use). As 
outlined in Section 1.3, one dimension contrasts values that transcend self-interest 
(e.g., forgiving, helpfulness) with values that involve social superiority and esteem 
(e.g., social power, influence). The second dimension contrasts values that follow 
intellectual and emotional interests in uncertain directions (e.g., daring, a varied life) 
with values that emphasize conservation of order and harmony (e.g., respect for 
tradition, obedience). This structure has been supported by research in over 60 
nations (Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz et al., 2001), using analyses of the pattern of 
correlations between ratings of the importance of diverse values.
Self-T ranscendence
UNIVERSAUSM
TRADITION
SELF-DIRECTION
CONFORMITYOpenness 
to Change
Conser­
vation
STIMULATION SECURITY
HEDONISM
y ACHIEVEMENT POWER
Self-Enhancement
Figure 4.1. The Schwartz (1992) circumplex value structure.
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The crucial feature that creates this circumplex is the type of motives that 
values express (Schwartz, 1996). Schwartz (1996, p. 2) described three universal 
requirements of human existence: “biological needs, requisites of coordinated social 
interaction, and demands of group survival and functioning.” These requirements 
give rise to a variety of motives, which themselves are expressed as specific values. 
However, these motives can vary in congruence; actions taken in pursuit of one 
particular value have psychological, practical, and social consequences that may 
conflict with the pursuit of another value or be compatible with its pursuit. In the 
value structure, competing value types are in opposing positions around the 
circumplex, while compatible value types, which fulfil similar motives, are in 
adjacent positions. For example, ambition and loyalty are in opposing positions 
because actions taken in order to fulfil one of these values often cannot plausibly be 
pursued at the same time as actions to fulfil the other. One instance of this is the 
conflict between the pursuit of a career and loyalty to the company that provided 
one’s first job opportunity. In contrast, ambition and capability are in adjacent 
positions because they fulfil similar motives, and ambition and freedom are in 
orthogonal positions because they tend to be neither competing nor compatible per se.
Although Schwartz’s (1992) theory indicates that values in opposing positions 
around the circumplex often cannot easily be pursued at the same time, the abstract 
nature of social values enables politicians, speech writers, business leaders, and 
others to bring together opposing values and hence appeal to a more diverse spectrum 
of people. In fact, Gordon and Miller (2004) suggest that successful politicians do just 
that; they use ambiguity in values to make their appeals to a nation of voters with 
diverse interests, beliefs, and attitudes. However, the focal question in the present 
research is whether this use of arguments involving diverse motives is also less
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compelling. Although the inclusion of opposing values in an argument may mean that 
a wider range of people are not alienated, the inclusion of opposing motives may be 
unlikely to inspire people. Indeed, some research suggests that people are more 
ambivalent towards individuals who are seen to promote opposing values (Pakizeh & 
Maio, 2005).
Thus, there is a tension between the present theoretical understanding of the 
psychological structure of values and their common use in rhetoric. I expect that the 
use of opposing values in argumentation comes at a rhetorical cost, despite its ability 
to capture the attention of people with diverse interests. That is, arguments that 
include opposing values may be less persuasive than arguments that involve similar 
or congruent values.
4.2.2 Argument Persuasiveness
Arguments can be more or less persuasive, that is, they vary in the degree of 
conviction they bring about. Aristotle (Rhetoric, as cited in Aronson, Wilson, & 
Akert, 2002, p. 223) distinguished different kinds of factors that affect the extent to 
which an argument brings about the endorsement of a claim:
“the first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on 
putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; and the third on the proof, 
or apparent proof, provided by the words.”
Social psychological research has confirmed the importance of these factors 
(Chaiken, 1987; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; for a 
comprehensive review of this literature see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). For example, the 
more credible (e.g., Hovland & Weiss, 1951) or attractive (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 
1975) the speaker, the more persuasive their argument. Similarly, people who are
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motivated and able to think carefully about an issue scrutinize the information about 
it more carefully than those who are not (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; see also Maio 
& Haddock, in press). What has received the least attention within psychology is 
Aristotle’s third factor: argument persuasiveness, that is, the degree of ‘proof 
provided by the words themselves (see Areni & Lutz, 1988, for discussion of the role 
of argument quality). Until now, research in the persuasion literature has typically 
used pre-testing (or statements used in previous research) to select strong versus weak 
arguments and then used these to examine the influences of the other factors involved 
in persuasion, including Aristotle’s first and second kinds of determinants (e.g., Petty
6  Cacioppo, 1986). As argued by Areni and Lutz (1988), much of the research 
conducted within the context of the most popular theories of persuasion has not truly 
tapped the manipulation of argument strength. Some decades on, no a priori 
manipulation of argument strength has been deployed across studies; this remains a 
major limitation within the persuasion literature (Johnson, Maio, Smith-McLallen, 
2005).7
There have been some individual suggestions as to what makes an argument 
inherently strong or weak, such as the general quality of the argument (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986), its valence (Johnson, Smith-McLallen, Killeya, & Levin, 2004), and
7 Areni and Lutz (1988) make an im portant distinction betw een argument strength and 
argum ent valence, both embedded within the construct o f  argum ent quality. They propose 
that argum ent strength relates to the acceptance o f  the prem ises involved in the argument, 
w hilst argum ent valence relates to the audience’s evaluation o f  the consequences that the 
argum ent ties to the attitude object. The current research is one o f  the first to address the 
argum ent strength aspect o f  this distinction, because it m anipulates the relatedness o f  the 
values paired by the argument. However, the term inology used throughout the present 
research will refer to argument persuasiveness in recognition that a strict distinction can not 
be drawn in research involving social values because the inclusion o f  values in the arguments 
may also impact argument valence.
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the novelty of the information (Vinokur & Bumstein, 1978), but these do not form an 
integrated account. Most recently, cognitive psychologists interested in 
argumentation have proposed a general, Bayesian account of argument strength 
(Oaksford & Hahn, 2004; see also Hahn & Oaksford, in press; Hahn, Oaksford, & 
Bayindir, 2005; Hahn, Oaksford, & Comer, 2005) and, in its probabilistic orientation, 
this account is reminiscent of early models of attitude change (McGuire, 1960; Wyer, 
1970; 1974; but see also Anderson, 1981; 1991). Although this account will not be 
formally applied in the current research, it highlights some issues that must be 
considered in any investigation of argument persuasiveness. Oaksford and Hahn 
(2004) reiterate the three main Bayesian assumptions in terms of argument strength: 
(a) that negative arguments (i.e., arguments that cite a lack of evidence against the 
conclusion) should be less acceptable than positive arguments, (b) that people’s prior 
beliefs should influence argument acceptance, and (c) that the ‘better’ the evidence 
(e.g., more evidence, more reliably evidence, better fit with beliefs about the world) 
in favour of the conclusion, the more acceptable it should be. Given the aim of the 
current research to shed light on the use of values in co-value argumentation, I 
focussed on the third of the three assumptions (quality of evidence) and, in particular, 
on the ‘quality’ of the link between the values on the basis of the well-established 
Schwartz (1992) value circumplex. However, in order to provide a rigorous test of the 
hypotheses, I ensured that all of the arguments were positive and that the combination 
of the values in the co-value arguments followed a logical format. Experiments 9 and 
10 also addressed the issue of ‘prior’ beliefs, such as the importance of the values.
Although this research on Bayesian argument strength provides a general 
framework for my investigation, other cognitive research facilitates specific 
predictions about co-value argumentation. One of the most well-documented findings
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in inductive reasoning is the so-called similarity heuristic. Rips (1975) found that 
participants were more likely to predict the same effects when a premise and 
conclusion were similar than when the premise and conclusion were dissimilar. For 
example, given that all horses on an island had a disease, participants were more 
likely to predict that cows also had the disease than to predict that mice had the 
disease. This suggests that the more similar the premise and conclusion are (e.g., 
horses and cows vs. horses and mice), the more likely people are to transfer and 
accept information about the two elements. Consistent with this, Yanowitz (2001) 
found that participants reason more between similar instances of a category than 
between dissimilar instances. However, this research has focused exclusively on the 
domain of facts and has not examined values. Examining the role of value relatedness 
in co-value argumentation poses novel and important theoretical implications because 
of values’ bases in social motives and behaviour, over and above their conceptual
o
category-like attributes.
The examination of co-value argumentation would therefore help to address 
several relevant issues and shed light on any limitations of such a technique. First, it 
would help to test whether diffuse abstract concepts like values can indeed function 
similarly to more concrete categories (e.g., horses, cows). The “fuzziness” of abstract 
categories, such as values, may render them more permeable and less susceptible to 
differences in knowledge transfer. As such, values may not function in the same way 
as other categories; the permeability of these abstract concepts could cause people to 
perceive associations even between opposing values in the circumplex model. If this 
was the case, people would perhaps regard arguments combining diverse values as
8 O f interest, this evidence is also relevant to the use o f  instantiations described in C hapter 3. 
In the “analogical m apping” o f  instantiations, people should more readily transfer and accept 
inform ation between sim ilar instantiations than between dissim ilar ones.
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more compelling because of the sheer breadth of interests that they cover, as noted by 
observers of political rhetoric (Sanders & Hamilton, 2001). This reasoning suggests 
that the combination of broader concepts (including opposing values) would add to 
the persuasiveness of the argument.
This possibility reflects a second point of interest: despite the permeability of 
these abstract concepts, the relative diversity of two values may not in itself be 
sufficient grounds for people to find any argument linking them as more or less 
persuasive. People may consider other information while judging the persuasiveness 
of the argument. In the context of values, this additional information may include the 
motivational link between the values or even their association in memory. Indeed, 
there is evidence that motivationally similar and opposing values are equally strongly 
associated in memory (Pakizeh et al., in press). This association may facilitate the 
transfer o f information between the values and, consequently, increase the 
persuasiveness of any argument that binds them. That is, arguments involving similar 
values and arguments involving opposing values may both be more persuasive than 
arguments involving unrelated values because the associations in memory between 
the values results in greater acceptance of the transfer of information between them.
Alternatively, even if the two values are highly associated, any link that binds 
them is not necessarily a plausible one. How plausible participants find the argument 
linking the values may play a key role in the extent to which they accept the 
argument. Two values may be more plausibly linked when the association between 
them is due to their compatibility and motivational congruence than when the 
association is due to their incompatibility. That is, arguments involving values 
fulfilling similar motives may be perceived as more plausible because their 
connections more closely fit personal experience and people’s implicit theories about
Frost 2006 1 1 9
Chapter 4 Persuasion: Similar is Best
social values and behaviours. As a result, people may be more persuaded by 
recommendations based upon co-value argumentation involving similar values than 
by recommendations based upon co-value argumentation involving dissimilar 
(unrelated or opposing) values.
4.2.3 Overview o f Experiments
The following three experiments investigated the influence of value 
relatedness on the persuasiveness of co-value arguments. Because of my interest in 
the persuasiveness of the arguments per se, all arguments were presented in a context 
of high motivation and ability (see above, and Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). All 
arguments were consequentialist arguments about values (on consequentialist 
arguments in general, see Hahn & Oaksford, in press), whereby participants were 
encouraged to endorse a particular value (the “target value”) because it promoted 
another value (the “reason value”): for example, ‘we should encourage helpfulness 
because it will promote freedom’. The two values fulfilled either similar motives 
(adjacent in the Schwartz circumplex), orthogonal motives, or opposing motives.
The cognitive and political psychology research described above led me to 
consider several alternative predictions. On the one hand, the diversity of the 
arguments involving opposing values may cause these pairs to be most persuasive 
because o f the breadth of the interests they cover (breadth hypothesis). Alternatively, 
the high degree of association between similar values and between opposing values 
might cause both pairs to be more persuasive than the pairs that feature orthogonal 
values (association hypothesis). Finally, a third alternative is the aforementioned role 
of plausibility, with participants finding the arguments involving the similar value 
pairs to be more plausible because these arguments are more consistent and
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motivationally congruent (plausibility hypothesis). The designs of the following 
experiments permitted an examination of these three possibilities.
4.3 Experiment 8
4.3.1 Method 
Participants
Participants were 60 undergraduate psychology students (51 women and nine 
men) who participated for course credit. Two additional participants were eliminated 
from analyses because they failed to follow instructions.
Procedure
Participants took part in groups of three to six people seated approximately 
four feet apart. All participants were informed that the study was investigating the 
persuasiveness of different arguments. They were then presented with summaries of 
arguments on three different topics and asked to rate how persuaded they were by 
each argument. Participants were then debriefed and probed for suspicion of the 
experimental hypothesis.
Argument Manipulation
Participants were exposed to three arguments. Each argument claimed that 
encouraging a target value has beneficial effects on behaviour that promotes another 
value (the reason value). The target value and the reason value served either similar, 
orthogonal, or opposing motives in Schwartz’s (1992) value system (see Table 4.1). 
For example, one statement cited one of three benefits of creativity:
“Research conducted by the Arts Council has found that increasing people’s 
creativity has beneficial effects. The studies found that encouraging people to
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be more creative increases their (curiosity in new ideas and methods/influence 
and impact on others/sense of social order and stability in society).”
Another statement cited one of three benefits of helpfulness:
“Recent research carried out by the Economic and Social Research Council 
has recommended encouraging people to be more helpful in their workplace. 
Research found that encouraging helpfulness increases (true friendship within 
the business environment/the freedom of others within the business 
environment/company success, profits, pay, and the economy).”
A third statement cited one of three benefits of self-discipline:
“The Educational Research Board has conducted research that suggests 
encouraging young people to be self-disciplined. The research found that 
encouraging self-discipline in young people increases (politeness in their 
behaviour towards others/broadmindedness and tolerance of different ideas 
and beliefs/their overall enjoyment of life).”
As shown in Table 4.1, each participant received an argument for each of the three 
target values. Within participants, the arguments promoted either a similar, 
orthogonal, or opposing value. Because I was not interested in the specific values
Table 4.1
Similar, Orthogonal, and Opposing ‘Reason Values ’from the Schwartz (1992) 
Circumplex used in the Experimental Manipulation o f  Arguments.
Target Value Similar Orthogonal Opposing
Creativity curiosity social influence social order
Helpfulness true friendship freedom success
Self-discipline politeness broadmindedness enjoyment 
of life
Frost 2006 1 2 2
Chapter 4 Persuasion: Similar is Best
involved, but rather in the influence of the relatedness of the values (similar, 
orthogonal or opposing), I used a Latin Square Confounded design (see Kirk, 1995) 
to collapse across the specific values and argument settings and to focus simply on 
the value relatedness dimension. In this way, I reduced the design from a 3 (target 
value: creativity, helpfulness, self-discipline) x 3 (value relatedness: similar, 
orthogonal, opposing) between-subjects design to a three level within-subjects design 
by collapsing across the nuisance variable o f target value (which was interlinked with 
the setting of the argument).9 In addition to reducing the complexity of the design, 
this technique was used in order to reduce task demands that would have arisen from 
repeated exposure to the same arguments with alternative reason values. The order of 
presentation of the statements was randomised.
Argument Persuasiveness
After exposure to the arguments, participants were asked to underline the part 
of the paragraph that they considered to be the reason for encouraging creativity, 
helpfulness, or self-discipline. This sought to ensure that participants processed the 
whole argument, rather than focussing on the initial target value (see Langer, Blank, 
& Chanowitz, 1978). Next, participants completed four questions to assess the 
persuasiveness of the arguments: “To what extent do you find this reason 
persuasive?”, “How convinced were you by the argument that (creativity, helpfulness, 
or self-discipline) is a good thing?”, “To what extent were you convinced that 
(creativity, helpfulness, or self-discipline) is good specifically because it increases
9 It is im portant to  note that the argum ent settings w ere alm ost identical across the three 
argum ents to  reduce any possibility  that this w ould im pact participants’ evaluations o f  
persuasiveness. This also enables the use o f  the Latin Square Confounded design (Kirk,
1995) to collapse across these argum ents and thereby to focus on the relatedness o f  the 
values.
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(behaviour consistent with similar, orthogonal, or opposing value)?”, and “To what 
extent do you agree with the report’s position that (creativity, helpfulness, or self- 
discipline) is important?” Participants responded to these questions using 10-point 
scales anchored from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). These four questions were 
averaged to create a single measure of persuasion (average a = .81). Participants were 
also given an opportunity to list any other factors that made the argument persuasive. 
This latter task was simply included to increase the validity of the cover story; most 
respondents provided no additional information and thus this task will not be 
discussed further.
4.3.2 Results
The effect of sex of participants on the argument persuasiveness factor was 
not significant (all ps  > .2). Therefore, all subsequent analyses were conducted across 
this variable.
The Latin Square Confounded technique provided us with participants’ 
argument persuasiveness ratings for each level of value relatedness. These ratings 
were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA, which revealed an effect of value 
relatedness on participants’ ratings of argument persuasiveness, F (2, 118) = 2.96, p  = 
.056. Investigation of this effect revealed that participants were more persuaded by 
arguments that cited similar values (M = 6.75) than by arguments involving 
orthogonal (M = 6.20), t (59) = 2.26,p  < .05, or opposing values (M = 6.27), t (59) = 
1.90,/? = .06 (see Figure 4.2). Arguments involving orthogonal and opposing values 
did not differ significantly, t (59) = - 0.31, ns.
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Figure 4.2. Argument persuasiveness ratings for similar, orthogonal, and 
opposing value arguments in Experiment 8. Error bars indicate standard errors 
of the mean
4.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 8 provided the first evidence that persuasiveness of arguments is 
affected by value relatedness and that there may be some limitations to the ways 
values can be combined. As described in Section 4.2, there are three potential patterns 
of results that would provide some indirect evidence of the mechanism underlying 
any effect. The breadth hypothesis predicts that the opposing value arguments would 
be most persuasive because of the diversity of the components. Alternatively, the 
association hypothesis suggests that the similar value arguments and the opposing 
value arguments would be more persuasive than the orthogonal value arguments 
because of their stronger associations in memory. Finally, the third hypothesis
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predicts that the similar value arguments would be most persuasive because these 
arguments are more plausible and fitting with personal experience. The pattern 
predicted by this plausibility hypothesis was evident in the results of Experiment 8. 
Specifically, participants were more persuaded by arguments involving similar value 
motives than by arguments involving orthogonal or opposing values. This result 
indicates that appealing to diverse motives does come at a cost and that people are 
more influenced by arguments that address similar values than by arguments 
involving diverse values. This result is also consistent with extant evidence about the 
transfer o f information between categories and provides a link between the cognitive 
research on reasoning and the persuasion literature.
The fact that the similar value arguments were seen as more persuasive than 
arguments linking values that were psychologically unrelated or opposed suggests 
that the plausibility o f the link between the values may be the important factor for the 
relatedness effect. The arguments linking similar values may be more plausible and 
fitting with personal experience because these values are motivationally more 
compatible than orthogonal or opposing values. The increased plausibility of this link 
may, in turn, make the argument more acceptable to participants. However, before 
interpreting this result further, I sought to replicate the effect with a more stringent 
design in Experiment 9 . 1 then directly examined the role of argument plausibility in 
Experiment 10.
4.4 Experiment 9
Although a range o f values was used in the previous experiment, an 
alternative explanation for the results o f Experiment 8 would arise if the similar
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values were, by chance, more important to participants than the orthogonal and 
opposing values. If this was the case, it could be the importance of the values 
involved and not value relatedness that was driving the effect. For example, people 
may view an argument as more persuasive if  its premise is a value that they consider 
more important than if  its premise is a value that they consider less important. 
Experiment 9 used Schwartz’s (1992) Value Survey to measure the importance of the 
different values as guiding principles in participants’ lives. In conjunction with a 
replication of the task used in Experiment 8, this measure enabled me to investigate 
any value importance differences across the value relatedness conditions of similar, 
orthogonal, and opposing values.
4.4.1 Method 
Participants
Participants were 60 undergraduate psychology students (38 women, 14 men, 
and eight who failed to indicate their gender) who participated for course credit. 
Procedure
Participants took part in groups o f three to six people, seated approximately 
four feet apart. All participants were informed that they would be taking part in two 
different “studies” that had been combined because they were short. The 
experimenter randomly assigned the materials from Experiment 8 (average a for 
persuasiveness ratings in Experiment 9 = .81) and the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey 
to roles as the “first” or “second” study. In other words, the order of these two tasks 
was counterbalanced across participants. There were no significant order effects. 
Participants were then debriefed and probed for suspicion.
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Value Importance
The instructions for the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey noted an interest in 
assessing the importance that people attach to different social values. Participants 
were told that they would be presented with a list of 56 social values and were asked 
to rate the importance o f each value as a guiding principle in their life. Each value 
was presented with a standardized definition from the Schwartz Value Survey, and 
the list included all of the 12 values (both target and reason values) involved in the 
manipulation o f value relatedness (along with the 44 others). Participants were asked 
to read through the entire list of values before rating each value. The value ratings 
were then made using a scale from -1 (opposed to my values) to 7 (extremely 
important).
4.4.2 Results
There were no significant effects of sex on any of the factors investigated (all 
ps > .14), so all of the subsequent analyses were conducted across this variable.
As in Experiment 8, the Latin Square Confounded nature of the design 
allowed me to collapse across individual value settings and focus on value 
relatedness. Participants’ argument persuasiveness ratings were analysed using a 
repeated measures ANOVA. Results indicated a significant effect of value relatedness 
on participants’ ratings o f argument persuasiveness, F ( 2, 118) = 4.13,/? < .05. 
Replicating Experiment 8, participants were again more persuaded by arguments 
involving similar value motives ( M -  6.48) than by arguments involving values that 
served orthogonal (M =  6.02), t (59) = 2.01 ,p <  .05, or opposing motives (M=  5.75),
/ (59) = 2.89,/? < .01 (see Figure 4.3). Again, there was no significant difference 
between arguments involving orthogonal and opposing values, t (59) = 0.94, ns.
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Value Importance
To investigate the potential role of value importance, participants’ mean
ratings of the target and reason values (i.e., creativity and curiosity/true friendship/
politeness, in the ‘similar’ condition, helpfulness and social influence/freedom/
broadmindedness in the ‘orthogonal’ condition, and self-discipline and social order/
success/enjoyment of life in the ‘opposing’ condition) were analysed using a three-
level (similar vs. orthogonal vs. opposing) repeated measures ANOVA. There were
no significant differences in importance across the three types of value relatedness, F
(2, 116) = 0.84, ns, {p > .4). Therefore, the relatedness effect on argument strength
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Figure 4.3. Argument persuasiveness ratings for similar, orthogonal, and 
opposing value arguments in Experiment 9. Error bars indicate standard errors 
of the mean.
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was not driven by spurious differences in the importance of the values across the 
value relatedness conditions.
4.4.3 Discussion
In Experiment 9, participants again found arguments involving similar values 
to be more persuasive than arguments involving orthogonal or opposing values.
These results replicated those o f Experiment 8. In addition, the relatedness effect was 
not attributable to differences in value importance across conditions which rules out 
this alternative explanation for the value relatedness effect.
4.5 Experiment 10
The consistent pattern o f differences between conditions across Experiments 8 
and 9 makes it important to test the hypothesis that it is the plausibility of the link 
between the values, how well this fits with personal experience and one’s own 
thinking about the world, which influences how persuasive people find the argument. 
The arguments involving similar values may be more plausible than the arguments 
involving orthogonal or opposing values, and this plausibility may make co-value 
argumentation with similar values more persuasive. Therefore, Experiment 10 used 
mediational analyses to test the hypothesis that differences in the plausibility of the 
arguments mediate the effects of value relatedness on argument persuasiveness. This 
hypothesis is relevant to an interesting feature of consequentialist arguments like co­
value argumentation. Consequentialist arguments are arguments that recommend a 
particular action because it will bring about a particular consequence. The strength of 
such arguments is influenced both by the importance attached to the consequence and
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by the probability that the action will indeed bring about this consequence (see Hahn 
& Oaksford, in press, for detailed analysis). Implausible arguments are those where 
the action is seen to be unlikely to lead to the consequence (e.g., ‘we should ban 
cannabis, because otherwise everyone will become a drug addict’). But even plausible 
arguments where the action-consequence link is likely can be unpersuasive if  one 
does not care much about the consequences (e.g., ‘we should ban cannabis, because 
cannabis use tends to lead to changes in music preference’). Thus, it is important to 
examine the role o f perceived plausibility directly.
Although the arguments used thus far are consistent with the plentiful 
examples o f co-value argumentation in philosophy, politics, and rhetoric, such 
arguments are often embedded within other information. Therefore, Experiment 10 
aimed to examine the effects o f value relatedness within a realistic piece of political 
propaganda; embedding the value argument within a real-world persuasion context. 
To achieve this aim, actual policy statements from a British political party were 
slightly modified and presented to participants the day before the 2005 British 
General Election. Participants were asked to rate the persuasiveness of the policy 
statements (arguments) they received and to rate the importance of the reason and 
target values to them personally. Because I had already shown the value relatedness 
effect across 12 social values, participants in this experiment were presented with 
only one argument, which either involved similar or opposing motives. (The 
orthogonal condition was not included.)
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4.5.1 Method 
Participants
Participants were 82 students and members of the public, who were 
approached in a university refectory the day before the British General Election in 
May, 2005. Participants were paid £1 for their participation. Because sex of 
participants had not had an effect on the measures in the previous experiments, this 
variable was not recorded in the current research.
Procedure
Participants took part individually or in groups of two to four people. All 
participants were informed that they were being approached because it was the day 
before the General Election and some o f the research related to political policies. In 
addition, participants were told that they would be taking part in two “studies” that 
had been combined because they were short. Participants were randomly assigned to 
read a policy statement that used a co-value argument with either similar or opposing 
values. I randomly assigned the persuasion materials and a shortened Schwartz 
(1992) Value Survey to roles as the “first” or “second” studies, such that the order 
was counterbalanced across participants. Again, no significant effects of order were 
evident. Participants were then debriefed and probed for suspicion.
Argument Manipulation
Participants were exposed to a policy statement that was taken from the 
political manifesto o f a British political party. To avoid the influence of political 
affiliations to a British party, all participants were informed that this policy statement 
was taken from the (fictional) FDP party in Australia. The policy related to social 
justice, and I manipulated whether it was supported by a similar social value 
(broadmindedness) or an opposing social value (wealth). The majority of the text
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across the two conditions was identical and was taken verbatim from two political 
policy statements with a few minor adaptations to accommodate the manipulation. 
Equal amounts of information were provided in both conditions. The similar-value 
policy statement was worded:
“FDP is the party o f social justice and broadmindedness. Reforms introduced 
by the FDP have built a fairer and more just society. Our country now has the 
most comprehensive social justice legislation in the United Nations and our 
commitment to protection for every citizen is also enshrined in the 1998 
Human Rights Act.
In addition, we have introduced a range of policies which protect people from 
discrimination on the grounds o f disability, help more disabled people to find 
and stay in work and support those whose disabilities mean they are unable to 
work.
We know that legislation alone cannot achieve the systemic and cultural 
changes we need to make diversity and human rights core values in our 
society. So, in order to bring about measurable improvement in the position of 
those who are discriminated against, we believe that all our citizens should 
receive education that encourages them to be broadminded and tolerant in 
every aspect of their lives. Increasing broadmindedness will increase the 
fairness o f our society.”
The opposing-value policy statement was worded similarly, except that the first 
sentence became: “FDP is the party o f social justice and wealth.” In addition, the last 
two sentences were slightly modified:
“So, in order to bring about measurable improvement in the position of those 
who are discriminated against, we believe that all our citizens should be able
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to strive to secure greater wealth through every aspect of their lives.
Increasing the pursuit o f wealth will increase the fairness of our society.” 
Argument Persuasiveness
The argument persuasiveness measures were simplified to fit the policy 
context. The adapted measures included four questions: “How persuaded were you by 
this policy statement?”, “How convinced were you by this policy statement?”, “If all 
other variables were equal, would you vote for this party on the basis of this policy 
statement?”, and “Aside from how important you consider these issues to be, how 
strong do you find this policy statement?” Participants answered these questions on 
10-point scales from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) or from 1 (not at all) to 10 
(definitely). These measures were averaged to form an overall measure of argument 
persuasiveness (a = .82).
Argument Plausibility
Immediately after completing the persuasiveness ratings, participants were 
asked to complete two questions that assessed the plausibility of the argument: “How 
plausible did you find this policy statement?”, and “To what extent do you find this 
policy statement believable?”. Participants answered these questions on 10-point 
scales from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). These items were combined to form one 
overall measure o f the plausibility o f the argument (r = .63).
Argument Readability
An additional item, “How easy to comprehend and understand was this 
statement?”, was included to ensure that participants understood both sets of policies 
equally. Participants responded to this question using a 10-point scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 10 (extremely).
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Value Importance
A 12-item version of the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey was used. The survey 
included three items from each o f the four value domains, including the target value 
of social justice and the similar (broadmindedness) and opposing (wealth) values.
4.5.2 Results 
Argument Readability
To ensure that participants equally understood the two policy statements and 
that any differences in argument strength did not stem from participants’ failure to 
understand one o f the policies, participants’ ratings of the comprehensibility of the 
statements were analysed using a one-way (value relatedness: similar vs. opposing) 
ANOVA. This analysis revealed no significant differences in comprehension of the 
statements across the two conditions, F  (1, 80) = 1.75, ns.
Argument Persuasiveness
A one-way (value relatedness: similar vs. opposing) ANOVA was conducted 
on participants’ ratings o f argument persuasiveness. Consistent with the previous 
experiments, participants were more persuaded by the political policy statement that 
cited values serving similar motives (M =  5.99) than by the policy statement that cited 
values serving opposing motives (M =  5.13), F ( l ,  80) = 7.65,/? < .01.
Value Importance
A one-way (relatedness: similar vs. opposing) ANOVA was conducted to 
investigate any differential importance o f the values involved in the arguments. There 
was a significant difference between the mean value importance for the similar reason 
value (A/= 5.27) and the opposing value {M  = 4.40), F ( l ,  80) = 13.56,/? < .001. To 
control for any effects of value importance on participants’ acceptance of the
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argument, the value relatedness dummy variable and the ratings of value importance 
for the target and reason values were entered as predictors of argument 
persuasiveness in a regression analysis. Consistent with the ANOVA analyses, there 
was a main effect of value relatedness: participants were more persuaded by the 
policy statement that cited a similar value in support of social justice than by the 
policy statement that cited an opposing value, b = 0.94, t (78) = 2.96, p  < .005, even 
when controlling for the importance o f both target and reason values. There were no 
main effects of value importance (all ps > .10). Therefore, value importance does not 
account for the link between value relatedness and argument persuasiveness. 
Argument Plausibility
To investigate the hypothesis that the plausibility of the argument plays a role 
in the relatedness effect, I tested whether participants found the policy statements to 
be differentially plausible. A one-way (value relatedness: similar vs. opposing) 
ANOVA revealed that there was a significant effect of the experimental manipulation 
on participants’ ratings o f argument plausibility, F  (1, 80) = 7.07,/? < .01. Consistent 
with the effects on the argument persuasiveness ratings, participants found the policy 
statement involving similar values to be more plausible (M=  5.89) than the policy 
statement involving opposing values (M = 5.16).
To further examine the role of plausibility, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three 
tests of mediation were applied (see Figure 4.4). Using regression analyses, value 
relatedness significantly predicted participants’ ratings of argument plausibility 
(mediator), b -  1.04, t (80) = 3.37, p  < .005, thus fulfilling the first requirement for 
mediation. Consistent with the second requirement, and as demonstrated in the 
ANOVA above, value relatedness significantly predicted participants’ argument 
persuasiveness ratings, b = 0.86, t (80) = 2.77, p  < .01. Finally, the third test was
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fulfilled: in a regression analysis that included value relatedness and argument 
plausibility as simultaneous predictors of argument persuasiveness, the mediator 
(argument plausibility) significantly predicting participants’ ratings of 
persuasiveness, b = 0.61, t (79) = 6.73, p  < .001, and reduced the influence of value 
relatedness to non-significance, b = 0.23, t (79) = 0.85, ns. The Sobel test also 
confirmed mediation, z = 3.01 ,p <  .005.
Plausibility
Value (.30**) Argument
Relatedness...........................................    Persuasiveness
.08 (ns)
Note. ** p < .  01
*** p < . 0 0 1
Figure 4.4. Path diagram showing the mediational link between value 
relatedness and argument persuasiveness via plausibility (standardised 
regression coefficients).
4.5.3 Discussion
Using political policy statements the day before a General Election, 
participants were more persuaded by a statement that supported a value using another 
value that served a similar motive than by a statement that cited as support a value 
that served an opposing motive. In addition, this effect occurred when controlling for 
levels of value importance, which is consistent with the previous experiment. Most 
importantly, the effects of value relatedness on argument persuasiveness were 
mediated by the perceived plausibility of the arguments. Thus, the results provided
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the first direct indication that co-value argumentation using similar values is more 
persuasive because people find the links between similar values to be more plausible 
than the links drawn between opposing values, perhaps because of the greater 
behavioural impact o f similar values on everyday life (Schwartz, 1992, 1996).
It is also worth noting that my measure o f persuasiveness included a question 
relating to behavioural intention: participants’ likelihood of voting for the party on 
the basis o f this policy statement. Regression analyses solely using this measure as 
the dependent variable revealed an identical pattern of mediation; participants who 
received the argument that used similar values expressed more favourable voting 
intentions than participants who received the argument that used opposing values 
because they found the similar value arguments more plausible. Overall, these results 
provide evidence o f a potentially important impact of value relatedness arguments on 
subsequent behaviour and reveal why similar value arguments have this effect.
4.6 Discussion
Across three experiments, I investigated the impact of the psychological 
relation between values on the persuasiveness of co-value arguments. Experiment 8 
revealed that people are more persuaded by arguments involving similar values than 
by arguments involving orthogonal or opposing values. Experiment 9 replicated this 
pattern o f results and ruled out the possibility that the importance of the values 
involved in the arguments was driving the value relatedness effect. Using real-life 
persuasive arguments derived from political policy statements, Experiment 10 
revealed that arguments linking values that express similar motives are more 
plausible. Using mediational analyses, I showed that the effects of value relatedness
Frost 2006 1 3 8
Chapter 4 Persuasion: Similar is Best
on persuasion occur through its influence on the plausibility of the argument. In 
addition, Experiment 10 provided evidence to suggest that this effect is strong enough 
to emerge even when the value relatedness information is presented very briefly 
within much more abundant text on political policy. Together, these results indicate 
that the motivational relatedness o f values is a key determinant of the success of co­
value argumentation.
This research has provided the first direct empirical test of co-value 
argumentation and indicates that value relatedness can now be used as an a priori 
predictor o f argument persuasiveness. In relation to the discussion in Chapter 1, an 
important implication o f this evidence is that, although appealing to diverse values 
may have the positive outcome o f appealing to a more diverse range of voters 
(Gordon & Miller, 2004), the effectiveness o f this strategy may be undermined by a 
reduction in the persuasiveness o f the arguments to the audience. When the 
arguments contained similar values as support for each other, participants in the 
current research perceived the arguments linking the values as more plausible and 
hence showed more agreement with the arguments. This pattern was obtained across 
a wide variety o f values, using two sentence arguments about research findings, and 
using complex real-life policy statements taken from actual political party 
propaganda. Perhaps, then, some politicians employ a delicate trade-off between 
appealing to people with diverse value priorities and being persuasive. Successful 
politicians may be more able to appear cogent and trustworthy, while capturing 
diverse interests. The necessity of capturing seemingly opposing interests, without 
appearing disingenuine, may be the biggest challenge that a politician may face, and 
this challenge may explain why “trustworthiness” is regarded as a vitally important 
trait for politicians to project (see Priester & Petty, 2003).
k
\
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The current findings also act as a novel experimental test of the Schwartz 
(1992) circumplex structure o f values. Extensive previous research on the value 
system (e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1996; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) has used correlational 
methods to investigate the nature of the value structure. However, using novel 
methodology, the present research has provided further evidence at least partly 
consistent with the circular structure of the value system. The influence of the similar 
arguments because of their motivational congruence and consistency supports the 
greater motivational similarity o f adjacent values compared to orthogonal and 
opposing values.
The integration o f ideas behind the inductive reasoning research in the 
cognitive domain and the persuasion research in the social domain raises other 
provocative avenues to explore. One interesting issue is the nature of effects evident 
in multi-premise arguments. These arguments are distinct from the types of 
arguments used in the current research, which included one premise and a subsequent 
conclusion. When two separate premises are used in multi-premise arguments, more 
diverse premises are more persuasive. For example, the premises that “lions have 
sesamoid bones” and “tigers have sesamoid bones” are less convincing evidence for 
the conclusion that “bears have sesamoid bones” than the premises that “lions have 
sesamoid bones” and “cows have sesamoid bones.” This effect occurs because lions 
and cows are more diverse and, therefore, the assumption that these two animals have 
the same property makes the argument that bears also have this property more 
persuasive (see Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990, for further 
discussion of this and other argumentation phenomena). An interesting extension of 
the current research would be to investigate whether this ‘diversity’ phenomenon 
when two separate premises are used would also hold for arguments involving values.
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The present research focused on the effects of relatedness in conditions that 
engendered high scrutiny of the arguments, because this is the best context for 
obtaining differences between strong and weak arguments (Albarracin & Wyer, 2001; 
Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
Nonetheless, I do not suggest that the relatedness effect is limited to this 
motivationally intensive route to persuasion. The similarity of the values involved in 
arguments may also be used as a persuasion heuristic, enabling it to influence 
participants who are less interested in the issue at hand. This speculation is based on 
evidence of automatic links between values in memory that are consistent with the 
circumplex model of values (Pakizeh et al., in press). These links suggest a potential 
perceptual fluency for arguments that cite similar values and opposing values, 
perhaps enabling quick acceptance or refutation of them, respectively. This 
hypothesis would benefit from future research that manipulates the motivation to 
process the messages.
The impact of the combination of similar values fits with research in the 
attitudes literature on cognitive consistency (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for a 
review). This early work emphasised the importance of consistent attitudes and 
beliefs and proposed that people work towards maintaining or returning to 
consistency both internally and interpersonally between themselves and important 
others (e.g., Abelson, 1968; Heider, 1946; Newcomb, 1953; Rosenberg, 1960). A 
related motivational congruence process may underlie both this consistency effect 
(see Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004, for further elaboration on the general phenomenon 
of consistency) and the combination of values in co-value argumentation. This is an 
interesting domain for further research that would, I propose, further highlight the 
central role of values. Nevertheless, whether the relatedness effect is the result of a
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generic consistency bias or a motivational influence unique to values, the current 
research has achieved its aim of examining the use of co-value argumentation and 
shedding light on the process underlying this prevalent use of value terms.
4.7 Chapter Summary
The research in this Chapter focused on a type of argument commonly used in 
a diverse range of fields, from politics to business and from philosophy to marketing, 
it uncovered the importance of the motivational relations between values in 
determining the persuasiveness of the arguments that bind them. The experiments 
provided some of the first empirical tests of co-value argumentation techniques and 
an insight into their limitations. Interestingly, it seems that both the 19th Century 
Communist Party and George W. Bush were fortunate in their articulation of 
arguments linking values that are motivationally congruent and in valuing the 
consistency and plausibility that such arguments provide.
This Chapter has shed light on one o f the most prevalent uses of social value 
terms that people encounter in everyday life and provided further evidence for the 
powerful impact of values. The limitations of co-value argumentation highlighted in 
the current research empirically demonstrate the underlying structure of values and 
the constraints that this structure places on the use of values in such arguments. The 
next chapter reviews the research presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and discusses the 
broader implications of the findings.
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion
5.1 Chapter Overview
The aim of this Chapter is to review the research presented in the Thesis and 
to discuss the implications of the findings. To achieve this aim, I summarize the 
results of the 10 experiments and discuss their implications for current thinking on 
social values, human decision-making, and behaviour. I also outline some potential 
directions for future research. Given the parallel nature of the three streams of 
research, much o f the discussion of specific implications has been elucidated in the 
discussion sections o f the individual chapters. Therefore, the focus of this Chapter is 
the broader, inter-related aspects o f the research findings.
5.2 Review of the Main Findings
As discussed in Chapter 1, interest in social values comes from a diverse 
range of disciplines. Values are considered to be unique and important constructs by 
philosophers, business leaders, politicians, and scientists and evidence of their 
influence has been debated for centuries. Nevertheless, despite this broad base of 
interest, there has been little empirical research into the use of values and the 
processes that underlie this use. Moreover, there is continuing conflict between 
researchers who see values as guiding principles (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
1992, 1996) and those who see values as justifications for actions taken on the basis 
of value-irrelevant consequences (e.g., Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994; Seligman & Katz,
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1996). Therefore, Chapter 1 highlighted the necessity for further research into the use 
of values and emphasised the need for wider understanding of the underlying 
processes. The subsequent experimental chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) then 
individually presented evidence that achieved the primary aim of the Thesis; they 
each provided a deeper insight into how social values are used, achieving this aim in 
different ways.
5.2.1 Decisions: Values or Consequences?
In Chapter 2 ,1 addressed the fundamental issue of whether or not values are 
used as the basis for decision-making. This was the first empirical research to 
investigate the use of social values using dilemmas that manipulated both the values 
involved and the value-irrelevant consequences of the decisions. By examining the 
causal effects and simultaneous impact of the variables, the research was able to 
determine how values are used in such situations. The results of Experiments 1 and 3 
provide evidence that values do have an important impact on decision-making in an a 
priori fashion and are not simply applied as post-hoc justifications for decisions made 
on other bases. Moreover, Experiment 1 also provided some of the first empirical 
evidence that participants are aware of the influence that values have on their 
decision-making.
On the other hand, Experiment 2 revealed that values are not used equally in 
all situations. In fact, it seems that the aboutness principle (Higgins, 1998a) plays an 
important role in determining whether decisions are based on values or consequences. 
Consistent with Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs, individuals more automatically 
consider personal consequences in decisions. Such consequences are more basic than 
the use of principles, which are higher-order and therefore require thought and
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deliberate consideration. This result is also consistent with research by Tetlock et al. 
(1996) who found that reasoning with values is more cognitively complex and 
effortful than reasoning with value-irrelevant items. Consequently, people do not 
always engage in reasoning with values. In the current research, only when 
participants expected to explain their decision did they view the decision as being 
‘about’ the value involved and thus used the value as a guiding principle. Therefore, 
the use of values is more complex than the extant literature would propose. Values 
are not solely guiding principles applied in all relevant contexts; rather, the use of 
values critically depends on situational factors.
5.2.2 Application: Abstract to Specific
In Chapter 3 ,1 addressed the second issue that arises from the values-as- 
abstract-principles versus values-as-justifications debate. That is, if  values are used as 
guiding principles, as seen in Chapter 2, how do these general abstract principles 
impact behaviour within specific contexts or situations? I proposed that values must 
be instantiated within the specific context in order for them to impact behaviour. If 
this is the process underlying value application, then the typicality of the value 
instantiation should affect the use of the value. Four experiments (Experiments 4 - 7 )  
confirmed this hypothesis. Using reasons for the values of equality (self-generated by 
participants in Experiment 4 and provided to participants in Experiment 5), the results 
provided the first empirical evidence that this process of applying a value to a specific 
context occurs through value instantiation. Experiments 6 and 7 then took this one 
step further by removing the presence of reasons all together. Thus, participants 
engaged in a process more akin to real-life and still the typicality of the value 
instantiation influenced participants’ subsequent behaviour. This evidence suggests
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the necessity for a major shift in thinking about the use of social values. Throughout 
the four experiments, no evidence o f changes in the properties of the value of equality 
at an abstract level was noted. Nevertheless, participants were significantly more 
egalitarian following a typical instantiation of the value than following an atypical 
instantiation. Therefore, values seem to impact behaviour in specific contexts through 
instantiations in those contexts, and it is the instantiations themselves and not the 
value at the abstract level that drives this effect. This is a new advance in the 
literature on social values and has important implications discussed in Section 5.3.
5.2.3 Persuasion: Similar is Best
Chapter 4 addressed a prevalent and popular use of social values that has been 
ignored by the extant literature. Although distinct from the uses of social values 
addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, my research sheds light on a use of values that occurs 
on a regular basis. As a result, my investigation o f the use of values and their impact 
on decision-making and behaviour is made more complete by addressing this 
common use of values. Across three experiments (Experiments 8 - 10), I examined 
the impact of the underlying relations between values combined in co-value 
arguments on the persuasiveness of the arguments themselves. Using the well- 
established Schwartz (1992) circumplex structure of values, I found that arguments 
combining motivationally similar values were more persuasive than arguments 
combining orthogonal or opposing values. Experiments 8 and 9 provided initial 
evidence that this effect is related to differences in the plausibility of the arguments 
and ruled out several alternative explanations. Experiment 10 directly tested the 
plausibility hypothesis using mediational analyses and found that participants did 
perceive arguments involving similar values to be more persuasive because they
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found these arguments more plausible than arguments involving orthogonal or 
opposing values.
This research used both ‘sound bite’ style arguments as are often used by the 
media (Experiments 8 and 9) and more complex political propaganda (Experiment 
10). The evidence obtained using the complex propaganda is particularly noteworthy. 
This propaganda used actual political policy statements as co-value arguments and 
revealed that participants found the policy involving similar values to be more 
persuasive than the policy involving opposing values because they found the similar 
policy more plausible. This research was run the day before a General Election when 
political policies and voting decisions would have been particularly salient to 
participants. Moreover, the co-value arguments were embedded within a much longer 
policy statement that did not differ across conditions. Thus, the results provide 
provocative evidence o f the powerful impact of values and value-based arguments.
5.2.4 Summary
One conclusion is evident from the research presented in each of the three 
experimental chapters; social values have a broad impact and a powerful effect on 
people in diverse ways. There is evidence that values act as guides in decision­
making, that they are used as justifications to explain decisions, that the manner of 
their instantiation influences behaviour and that they are used, with important effects, 
in persuasive arguments. The next section will address some of the broader 
implications of the research findings and propose some potential directions for future 
research.
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5.3 Research Implications and the Future
The evidence for the impact o f values on behaviour through value 
instantiation (Chapter 3) is probably the most important finding in the Thesis. These 
results provide a new theoretical standpoint from which to understand values; they 
are not solely rigid guiding principles (Schwartz, 1992, 1996) applied to situations in 
a rule-like fashion. Rather, their impact on behaviour is importantly mediated by prior 
instantiations of the value in specific contexts. This finding draws attention to a need 
for research on the mental processes that underlie the way that values are brought to 
bear in everyday life. Moreover, it adds an important caveat to the overarching role of 
values as rigid guiding principles. If an ‘abstract trans-situational guiding principle’ is 
used in different ways depending on its instantiation, this severely restricts its 
universal nature. This new conceptualization of the process underlying value 
application provides a more flexible framework o f values than those currently 
predominant in the literature.
Thus, this finding allows an integration of the two competing roles of values 
outlined in Chapter 1. Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Bilsky, 
1986; Schwartz et al., 2001) conceptualized values as abstract trans-situational 
guiding principles. In contrast, Seligman and Katz (1996) proposed that values do not 
exist at a general, abstract level, but rather they exist as dynamic and transient 
instantiations within specific situations that can be used to justify or explain decisions 
made on the basis of other factors (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994). The flexible value 
instantiation framework proposed in Chapter 3 allows for the trans-situational nature 
of values, as seen in the consistency o f the strength-related value properties (e.g., 
centrality) after different value instantiations. Moreover, the framework allows for the
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application of values in some contexts, but not in others, because of the impact of the 
specific instantiations of the value on subsequent behaviour. In this way, both 
perspectives can be integrated within this flexible value framework.
Another particularly interesting implication of the research findings presented 
in Chapter 3 is the evidence that elaboration of reasons (Maio et al., 2001) is not 
necessary for values to be bolstered and thus to increase pro-value behaviour. The 
results of Experiments 6 and 7 show that providing participants with a situation 
describing an incident of typical discrimination resulted in more value-consistent 
behaviour than when participants read about a situation involving an incident of 
atypical discrimination or were simply given an opportunity to affirm the value of 
equality. This is the first evidence that bolstering the narrative (affective and 
behavioural) support o f values can have similar effects to bolstering argumentative or 
cognitive support.
It would be interesting to investigate whether this bolstering of narrative 
support for values has other effects consistent with those found for the bolstering of 
cognitive support. For example, Bernard et al. (2003a) found that building cognitive 
support for a value decreased the influence of persuasive anti-value messages and 
made values more resistant to manipulation. In one experiment, an essay attacking the 
value of equality caused a dramatic drop in participants’ endorsements of the value’s 
importance. This effect was significantly reduced, however, when participants were 
first given an opportunity to consider arguments for and against the value. Whether 
building narrative support for these values would have a similar inoculation effect 
remains to be examined.
Another important implication of this research is its potential to address the 
question of how values change over time. Rokeach (1973, p. 6) proposed that any
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conception of social values “must be able to account for the enduring character of 
values as well as their changing character.” The theories of values in the extant 
literature do not propose specific processes through which values can change, 
however. In fact, there is very little research on this topic at all and what little there is, 
says nothing about such processes. For example, although people share some of the 
same values, people from different generations, even within the same family, have 
divergent values. Over time, however, cultural value systems evolve as individuals 
from the older generations reconcile themselves with the younger generation’s values 
(Teo, Graham, Yeoh, & Levy, 2003). Similarly, Rohan (2000) suggested that coming 
into contact with people who have different priorities facilitates changes in beliefs 
about the world and one’s own values. I propose that this could occur through a 
change in value instantiations: value instantiations that were seen as atypical could 
become more typical over time. This process could change the priorities that people 
allot to values because of new or broader ways in which the values are instantiated. 
These proposals are consistent with research by Inglehart and Baker (2000). Using 
data from the World Value Surveys, they found evidence from 65 Societies indicating 
that values can and do change over time, whilst they also maintain something of the 
cultural heritage o f the society.
Differences across generations are not solely due to differences in value 
priorities, however. People from two sides of a divide (whether generational, racial, 
or political) may consider many of the same values to be equally important and 
relevant to the situation (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988; Rokeach, 1973). However, 
individuals from these groups can still come into conflict (see quotation from 
Rokeach, 1973, pp. 183-184, in Section 1.6). For example, across cultures, or even 
subcultures (see Peppas, 2001), there can be tensions in relation to values, despite
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both sides sharing the vast majority o f their values (Schwartz, 1996) and even value 
priorities. To illustrate this point, consider the following situation. Members of two 
cultures may consider the value o f freedom to be equally important, but the 
instantiations of the value may differ in crucial ways. A typical instantiation of 
freedom in Saudi Arabia may relate to freedom to own property, whereas a typical 
instantiation of freedom in Denmark may relate to freedom of the Press. Thus, the 
publishing of cartoons depicting Mohammad in Denmark was consistent with their 
instantiation of freedom. Nevertheless, this action resulted in moral outrage in Saudi 
Arabia, despite the fact that members o f both cultures would earnestly agree that 
freedom is important. In other words, individuals may react to a situation in very 
different ways dependent on the typical value instantiation for them, even if they both 
consider the value to be equally important.
This value-instantiation framework may also be informative in research into 
racial attitudes. Theories of racism (e.g., McConohay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1988) 
propose that that value violation plays an important role in levels of racism and racial 
attitudes. Consistent with the illustration above, action taken by one group in order to 
protect or enhance a value (e.g., freedom) may not be understood or accepted by the 
other group, even if they put a similar priority on the value in question. Future 
research should consider the importance of value instantiations in programs of 
conflict resolution that use perspective-taking to reconcile opposing sides (see Krauss 
& Morsella, 2000). For example, many citizens in Western societies regard orthodox 
Muslim practices for the treatment of women as violations of equality, whereas many 
practicing Muslims would, in fact, regard many Western practices as violating equal 
status for women (e.g., by making them sex objects).
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This topic of value violation is interesting for a number of reasons, primarily 
because people face tradeoffs between values every day (Tetlock et al., 1996) and 
thus are unable to avoid value violation. Despite the fact that values are used to guide 
judgments of one’s own actions and the actions of others (see Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 
1992), people engage in value violations on a daily basis, even of values that they 
consider to be very important (Maio et al., 2001). The research presented in Chapter 2 
provides an indication of how people can perform such value violating actions 
without facing negative consequences. If the value, and thus the violation, is not 
salient to the individual, then he or she should be able to make decisions in 
contradiction of their values, whilst escaping the dissonance and moral outrage this 
could otherwise involve (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993).
On the other hand, if people do perceive a decision as involving conflicting 
values between which they must choose, they have the advantage of framing the 
decisions as a choice between two important principles. As a result, they can engage 
in substantial justification of their decision on the basis of the other value as seen in 
Experiment 1. This result is consistent with research showing that people who do 
make a decision in contradiction of a value engage in substantial impression 
management techniques in order to conceal their decision or to justify it and ‘save 
face’ (e.g., Calabresi & Bobbit, 1978). Thus, these findings are relevant to 
deliberations about introducing or abolishing official bodies (e.g., Ofcom, Ofgen, or 
the Legal Services Ombudsman) that regulate legal, business or political decision­
makers. The presence of such organisations, to which decisions must be justified, 
would facilitate decisions based on values and principles and not solely on 
consequences such as maximising profit.
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Future research should also test the robustness of the findings across 
participants who vary in age, religion, ethnicity, and other important social variables 
(e.g., socio-economic status). The importance of this follow-up can be illustrated by 
considering the role o f values and consequences, as described in Chapter 2. An 
important possibility is that values and consequences vary in their separability across 
individuals and cultures. For example, some religions impose strong negative 
consequences for actions that contradict religious beliefs and principles. Participants 
who follow these faiths may therefore use the religious principles at the same level as 
personal consequences, making it more difficult to detect differences in their use. 
Further research is needed to examine how this affects value-relevant behaviour, and 
whether such contexts attenuate the role of expected justification.
Given the aims of the current Thesis, the research in Chapter 4 focussed on 
the use of social values in co-value argumentation. It seems that there are important 
constraints on how values can be combined, which should be considered by all users 
of co-value argumentation techniques. However, an interesting issue raised by the 
results of Experiments 8, 9, and 10 is whether related similarity results can be 
revealed for other constructs that possess clear patterns of inter-relations. For 
example, people may receive messages claiming that an intervention in the workplace 
might ‘increase job satisfaction by reducing anxiety’ or claiming that the intervention 
will ‘increase job satisfaction by reducing sadness’. Theories about emotion suggest 
weaker associations between contentment, happiness, and anxiety than between 
satisfaction and sadness (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; see also Tellegen, Watson, & 
Clark, 1999), which may cause the latter link to be more plausible and, hence, more 
persuasive. Such evidence would help to test the limits of relatedness effects in 
persuasive argumentation across multiple domains. This issue is important because it
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would enable persuasion theorists to use more a priori theory to predict the necessary 
content o f strong arguments, thereby addressing a large gap in current persuasion 
research.
Moreover, in addition to the types o f arguments included in Chapter 4, it is 
possible to envisage arguments where values are negated (e.g., “encouraging people 
to be helpful does not lead to more wealth” or “encouraging people to not be helpful 
does lead to more wealth”). This negative-pairing possibility was not addressed in the 
current research. However, these alternative combinations hold interesting 
implications for future research, including the potential to investigate relative value 
importance using value-promotion/value-violation decisions.
In his influential discussion o f values, Rokeach (1973) proposed the 
importance of assessing the impact of the whole value structure and not simply 
focussing on single values. I agree that a more complex integration of a variety of 
values is necessary to provide a reliable picture of how values influence behaviour. 
However, this admission does not mean that the examination of single values and 
their application to specific situations to investigate the processes that underlie this 
use of values is unnecessary or in some way too basic. Considering the application of 
the whole value system to behaviour in a specific situation would be impossible 
without first understanding the processes that underlie the application of single values 
(Chapter 3).
The research presented within this Thesis has provided a deeper insight into 
aspects of the social value literature that have been largely unaddressed by prior 
research. All of the research has provided evidence of the powerful impact of social 
values and has added to current understanding on the use of values and the processes 
that underlie this use. Given that “Values are not just words, [but] the causes that we
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champion and the people we fight for” (Senator John Kerry, b. 1943), I hope that the 
current research will stimulate further investigation of social values, this crucially 
important part of human decision-making and behaviour that still remains on the 
fringe of social psychological research.
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